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The thesis consists of a critical evaluation of Paul Churchland's eliminative
materialism. The first of the central claims of the thesis is that it is unclear how radical
an eliminativism Churchland wishes to adopt, in that his published work appears to
vacillate between a position which is too modest to be regarded as a genuinely
eliminative form of materialism, and positions which, while radical in their
eliminativism, are not supported by the empirical evidence which Churchland presents.
I conclude that eliminative materialism is itself a candidate for elimination, on the
grounds that the radical positions are insupportable in principle, while the only
eliminativist position which is defensible effectively fails to qualify as a form of
'eliminative materialism'.
The early chapters of the thesis consider the negative element in Churchland's position
- the claim that 'folk psychology' will not ultimately reduce to neuroscience, and that,
this being a constraint on the acceptability of folk psychology as a putative source of
mental explanation, folk psychology ought therefore to be eliminated. The positive
element of Churchland's position is then considered: his claims that research
programmes currently being undertaken in both parallel distributive processing
('PDP'), and neuroscience, converge in providing a more psychologically realistic
account of human cognition than do more conventional accounts, which utilise the
explanatory categories of folk psychology; and that, as this PDP model eschews the
use of folk psychological categories, it thus entails elimination of folk psychology, as
anticipated in the earlier, negative thesis. I consider the philosophical implications of
1
the PDP model, and find it deficient with regard to two of the main areas of
philosophical interest considered by Churchland: the operation of moral choice; and
consciousness. My conclusion is that PDP does not serve to provide support for any
but the most modest of eliminativist positions - so that what empirical plausibility PDP
may have cannot rescue eliminative materialism from elimination.
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CHAPTER 1 INTERTHEORETIC REDUCTION AND
ELIMINATIVISM
Paul Churchland cites, as the distinguishing feature of eliminative materialism: its
denial that a smooth intertheoretic reduction is to be expected ... of the framework of
folk psychology to the framework of a matured neuroscience'.[l] It is, I will later
argue, often unclear precisely what eliminativists propose to eliminate. Here, however,
the target is clear: explanation of human action in terms of folk psychology. The
eliminativist conclusion requires the addition of a prior premise:
i. Folk psychology provides genuine explanation of human action iff it is
smoothly reducible to mature neuroscience;
ii. Folk psychology is irreducible to neuroscience; therefore
iii. Folk psychology does not provide genuine explanation of human
action.
If we take the term 'folk psychology' to denote explanation in terms of propositional
attitudes such as beliefs and desires, then what is being denied by Churchland is the
possibility of genuine explanation which utilises beliefs and desires among its
explanatory categories. [2]
As the argument is valid, the truth of the conclusion depends upon the truth of the
premises.
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The second premise is widely held to be true: clearly the eliminativist requires the truth
of this premise, but non-reductive physicalists such as Fodor and Davidson also accept
the truth of the second premise. Their case for rejecting the eliminativist conclusion
thus depends upon proving the falsity of the first premise. Dualists will also accept the
falsity of the first premise, and the truth of the second premise. I propose in this
chapter to consider the controversial first premise, returning later to the question of
whether folk psychology is reducible.
I take it that for Churchland, it is necessary for (m) being an explanation of (p) that
(m) be a cause of (p). Where (m) has no causal efficacy, explanations which appeal to
the presence or absence of (m) may have instrumental value, but they are not 'genuine'
explanations. The first premise thus makes it a constraint on (m) being genuinely
explanatory that (m) be smoothly reducible to some explanatory category of mature
neuroscience. 'Maturity' would reside in the completeness of neuroscience: it would be
unrevisable, in the sense of the unrevisability aimed for by Descartes; there would be
no explanatory gaps, no events within its domain which could not be predicted, given
sufficient knowledge of antecedent events, and no errors in the theory. Both Paul and
Patricia Churchland emphasise the continuing evolution of the sciences, so that what is
being considered here is a future version of neuroscience. 'Smooth' reduction would be
type reduction, where the explanatory categories of folk psychology are shown to be
identical to those of neuroscience. This must be distinguished from a weaker form of
reduction, where every event is shown to be a physical event. If a physical event can
have mental properties, then ifwe assume that it is in virtue of its properties that an
event has causal efficacy, this weaker form of reduction - token event physicalism -
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would leave mentalistic ('folk psychological') explanation autonomous. By
'autonomous' I mean that folk psychology would generate explanation which was
beyond the explanatory reach of neuroscience. It is this autonomy which Churchland is
concerned to deny - hence the eliminativist's constraint that for folk psychological
explanation to be genuine, there must be reduction in the stronger form of
type-reduction. [3]
Lennon and Charles see such reduction as having the epistemic advantage of clarifying
or simplifying our understanding:
Reductionist accounts aim to show that where we thought we had two sets of
concepts, entities, laws, explanations, or properties, we in fact have only one,
which is most perspicuously characterised in terms of the reducing vocabulary. [4]
Lennon and Charles provide five conditions for reduction:
(1) the derivation of higher-level laws, (2) the discovery of nomological
biconditionals linking the terms of each theory, (3) the presence of genuine
properties at the reducing level, (4) the causal explanation in terms of the reducing
theory of the phenomena explained by the reduced theory, and (5) a reason for
giving privileged status to the reducing descriptions.[5]
Condition (1) presents an immediate problem: an exhaustively deterministic and
nomological universe is a metaphysical assumption of scientistically-minded
philosophers such as the Churchlands.[6] Ifwe adhere to the view that human beings
have free will - that they can resist acting on the rational patterns of behaviour to
which their beliefs and desires would appear to commit them - then this entails that
there can be no laws governing human action.
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Condition (2) concerns 'bridge laws'. It appears that what is required is that there be a
law of nature such that, for example, each occurrence of a given mental property is
identical to some physical (or, in the present case, neurological) property. The claim
that some mental property is identical with a neurological property is an empirical
claim. It is difficult to see what would count as evidence in support of the claim.
Suppose the co-occurrence of some mental property and some neurological property is
established by frequent testing for the presence of each property. This would be
consistent with identity (what is being observed is the same entity, variously
described), but co-occurrence is also consistent with the truth of dualism for both
entities and properties. Nor can I see how the fact of this relationship being covered by
a law of nature could be demonstrated. In short, all that is likely to be available to the
reductivist is an accumulation of inductive evidence, which must then be interpreted in
the light of his own metaphysical assumptions.
Condition (3) alludes to a point which I made earlier: that for a property to be
'genuine' in the sense required is for it to have causal efficacy. This entails that, qua
physical causal property, it will be denoted by a predicate which will form the
antecedent in some physical law. Thus, for example, the hard disk in my computer is a
physical object which has various properties. Some of these properties, such as the
property of being currently located in Edinburgh, is not a genuine property in the
requisite sense.
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Condition (4) - the explanation of the reduced by the reducing theory - is, as earlier
suggested, a motivation for reduction. The promise would thus be that matured
neuroscience would be capable of explaining and predicting any events hitherto
explained or predicted in terms of beliefs and desires. Neuroscience would also be able
to explain how folk psychology had what explanatory and predictive success it had
had, and how and why it was deficient. In addition to the enrichment of our
understanding, reduction serves to provide vindication for the successfully reduced and
successfully reducing theories. The reducing theory is privileged - condition (5): as the
reduction relation is asymmetrical, the superiority of neuroscience to folk psychology
would be guaranteed on epistemic grounds.
In addition to the epistemological motivation for reduction, there is an ontological
motivation. This is made explicit by Lennon and Charles, who provide as a motivation
that:
... many would accept (1) that social and psychological events are (in some sense)
constituted out of physical events, (2) that physical explanation is complete, i.e.
that all physically characterizable events are susceptible to explanation in terms of
physically sufficient causes, and (3) that there are causal explanations employing
social and psychological vocabulary. [7]
The fact that 'many would accept' these propositions does not entail their truth; the
first two are a posteriori and contingent and, I suggest, false. To make an ontological
case for reduction of the psychological to the physical on the basis of the first of the
propositions - which is a definition of physicalism - would be question-begging. This
ontological assumption appears to underlie the epistemological case for reduction,
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however: there are no grounds for expecting that some physical reducing theory will,
on achieving maturity, succeed in explaining all events in the domain of folk
psychology, other than the assumption that physicalism is true. The second of the
propositions - the completeness of physical explanation - is a sufficient condition for
physicalism. If it is true that there are physical sufficient causes for all physical events,
then either all mental events are physical events, in which case token physicalism is
true, or there are no mental events. A further possibility is epiphenomenalism
regarding the mental. Epiphenomenalism is consistent with every cause being a
physical cause, but is inconsistent with the third of Charles and Lennon's conditions for
reduction: the presence of genuine properties at the reducing level, as mental
properties would on the epiphenomenalist account be causally inert. [8] One final
possibility which is consistent with the second proposition is that there are both
physical sufficient causes and mental sufficient causes for (at least some) physical
events. This possibility would be inconsistent with two apparent assumptions of the
physicalist reductionist: the ontological primacy of the physical[9] - if mental causes
are sufficient for physical events, then physical causes are not necessary for these
events (if (a) is sufficient for (c), then (b) is not necessary for (c)). ; and the need for
parsimony in explanation - the latter being explicit in the reductionist's desire to
demonstrate that where we had thought there were two explanations, there is in fact
only one. Charles and Lennon's third proposition - that some causal explanation is
couched in psychological terms - is uncontroversially true - though it is consistent with
instrumentalism regarding the mental, which is in turn inconsistent with the
reductionist requirement of genuine properties at the reducing level.
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Patricia Churchland and Sejnowski offer a pragmatic motivation for seeking to reduce:
the process of reducing - or attempting to reduce - will lead to new scientific
discovery, and hence take us further along the road to matured science:
... seeking reductions of macro-level theory to micro-level theory does not imply
that one must first know everything about the elements of the micro theory before
research at the macro level can be usefully undertaken. Quite the reverse is
advocated - research should proceed at all levels of the system, and co-evolution of
theory may enhance progress at all levels. (my emphasis)[10]
The apparent failure of folk psychology to contribute to the evolution of neuroscience
(or vice-versa) is thus taken as strong prima facie evidence for the falsity of folk
psychology, presumably on the grounds that if reducibility entails co-evolution, then
the absence of co-evolution entails the absence of reducibility. Nor can folk
psychology, on this account, be safe from the requirements of reducibility until such
time as neuroscience is fully matured: the co-evolution thesis recognises the current
shortcomings of neuroscience, and looks to psychology to contribute to their
resolution:
Neuroscience and psychology need each other. Crudely, neuroscience needs
psychology because it needs to know what the system does ... psychology needs
neuroscience for the same reason ...[11]
This claim is tenable only in terms of Churchland's sparse account of cognition: as the
processing of inputs and outputs. If one suggests that 'what the system does' is to
represent external reality to itself via the manipulation of propositional attitudes which
have semantic content, to distinguish between self and other, or to experience qualia,
10
then it seems that neuroscience will make little if any progress in providing a
'micro-level' explanation of these events. Here again, the advantage being claimed for
reduction depends upon question-begging: the mental realm must be interpreted so as
to eliminate in advance all that is characteristically (and irreducibly) mental, in order
that there is the possibility of reduction. This cannot be taken to entail what the
eliminativist wants: namely, that the irreducibility of mentalistic psychology entails its
radical falsity.
Churchland and Sejnowski's concern to advance physical science reveals what is
perhaps the most pressing motivation for intertheoretic reduction: the aim of the unity
of science. This is a central objective of the philosopher, on Paul Churchland's
account:'... philosophy remains the focal point for synoptic concerns about how the
scattered sciences can be fitted together into a unified and coherent account of the
world and our place in it.'[12] Churchland offers a further task for the philosopher,
which again suggests a high degree of deference to physical science: the development
of proto-scientific speculation into testable empirical theory. One conspicuous
omission from Churchland's account of what philosophy is is conceptual analysis. He
argues that this project, together with its target of the discovery of synthetic a priori
truth, is doomed to failure.
The possibility in principle of the reduction of all scientific theories to the most basic
scientific theory is a necessary and sufficient condition for the unity of science - the
pursuit of which is a legacy of logical positivism. Sorell, in his aptly-titled
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Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science, quotes from Carnap: when
we say that scientific knowledge is unlimited, we mean: there is no question whose
answer is in principle unattainable by science'. [13] This is an exceptionally strong
claim. It entails, for example, the principled possibility of an exhaustively deterministic
and scientific account of every future event, so that, for example, both the outcome of
the next general election, and the contents of the menu at 10 Downing Street on the
day following the election, would be predictable by science. Notwithstanding
Churchland's reductive account of philosophical method, it seems sufficient to claim
that this is massively counterintuitive. What Carnap is here claiming is sufficient, but
not necessary for the unity of science, and could perhaps be described as the 'Unity of
all Knowledge' thesis. [14]
Sorell locates the origins of contemporary scientism in Carnap's 'scientific empiricism',
which is based on five claims:
1) science is unified; (2) there are no limits to science; (3) science has been
enormously successful at prediction, explanation and control; (4) the methods of
science confer objectivity on scientific results; and (5) science has been beneficial
for human beings. [15]
Clearly claim (1) is merely a statement of the unity of science. The claim that science is
unified in this way is a metaphysical claim. It entails a further metaphysical claim: that
monism is true. The integration of all explanation will necessitate the linking, via
bridge laws, of all of the properties and laws of each special science. If those
properties and laws are fundamentally distinct in one or more of the sciences, then this
ontological pluralism will entail explanatory pluralism, and hence the falsity of the
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claim that science is unified. There can be no a priori argument for the claim that
monism is true, and hence reductionism and unity is possible. [16] The Carnapian unity
of science claim, when combined with the further a posteriori and metaphysical claim
that ultimately all that exists is physical, jointly entail the elimination of any irreducibly
mental entities. Hence Stich suggests that:
... if our best theories fail to quantify over putative entities of a certain sort, we
should conclude that there are no such things. And since (ex hypothesis) cognitive
science does not invoke the language or concepts of folk psychology, the states of
folk psychology are not among the entities over which it quantifies. So these
putative states do not exist. [17]
If the unity of science thesis is false, then this entails the falsity of Stich's claim - hence
the importance of the unity of science project for the eliminativist. The quotation also
assumes what remains to be proved: that folk psychology is a theory, and hence in
competition with or reducible to our 'best' theories. The term 'best theories' is
tendentious. There are three possible grounds for arguing that physics is the 'best
theory': as I have already suggested, one might argue that the best theory will be the
one which, by virtue of its greatest explanatory and predictive reach, can successfully
reduce other theories, while not itself being subject to reduction. Whether physics can
achieve this vis a vis the mental depends in part on the truth of the physicalist's
ontological claim; if the ontological claim is false, then this entails the impossibility of
physical reduction of any sciences which incorporate mental realism. A second ground
for holding that physics is the best theory might be the truth of physicalism: if as
Charles and Lennon suggest, '...psychological events are ... constituted out of physical
events', then the science which treats most directly of the physical would appear to be
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the science which is closest to fundamental reality. As already urged, however, the
physicalist's ontological claim is at best not proven. Finally, it could be argued that the
superiority of physics resides in the fact that physics does not avail itself of the ceteris
paribus clauses which are prevalent in the special sciences (and most particularly, the
social sciences, where - as Charles and Lennon point out, mentalistic terminology is
also most prevalent). The entailment from relative absence of such hedging to
superiority of the theory is not clear - but is implicit in Paul Churchland's jibe that folk
psychology is "... festooned with ceteris paribus clauses...'[18]
The first of Carnap's five claims - the unity of science - is thus especially significant for
the eliminativist project - but the second and third of the claims are also at least
implicit in contemporary eliminativism. The second claim is the already-discussed unity
of all knowledge thesis. Although this thesis is much stronger than the eliminativist
needs in order to eliminate folk psychology (assuming that the other eliminativist
premises are true), the thesis does find a role in some of the more radical claims
advanced in some of the writing of the Churchlands.
Carnap's third claim - the past success of science - is frequently cited by the
Churchlands, where the success has been in terms of past reductions and eliminations
of other theories by more basic physical theories. Thus, in addition to acceptance of
the central metaphysical claims implicit in contemporary science, such as physicalism
and determinism, an inductive argument from the history of science is appealed to in
support of eliminativism. As already noted, Churchland sees the role of the philosopher
as being proto-scientific and at least partly speculative. On occasion, this leads him to
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a posture of relative open-mindedness with regard to the possibility of reducing folk
psychology:
How Computational Neuroscience and Connectionist AI will fare in the coming
years remains to be seen ... whether folk psychological categories will find some
kinematical and dynamical role within the new framework remains a strictly open
question, (my emphasis)[19]
Carnap's third claim also informs Churchland's scepticism regarding folk psychology;
he lambasts folk psychology as being 'stagnant' - having made little or no progress
since the time of Homer. As with Stich's earlier-quoted claim that folk psychological
entities do not exist, this stagnation argument contains the suppressed premise that
folk psychology is a theory. If it is not, then the truth of the claim that science is
unified does not entail the radical falsity of explanation in terms of propositional
attitudes, and the eliminativist thesis - construed as the thesis that folk psychological
explanation should be eliminated - falls. As the Unity of Science thesis is based on no
more than induction from past reductive successes, it can only accumulate a
progressively greater degree of probability as further successful reductions are
achieved. As Searle notes, however, such successes are '... rather rare in the actual
practice of science, and it is perhaps not surprising that the same half dozen examples
are given over and over ...'.[20]
For Carnapian positivists, theories are sets of sentences, and explanation is via
deduction from these sentences. This sentential model of theories will also facilitate
intertheoretic reduction. A greatly simplified account of how this works is as follows:
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the special science laws, once discovered, will be set out as sentences; the bridge laws
will allow for their translation into sentences utilising the proprietary terminology of
the reducing science, and once this has been carried out for all of the laws of the
special science, reduction is achieved. In his essay 'On the Nature of Theories: A
Neurocomputational Perspective', Churchland actually claims that the 'primary
business of theories', on the conventional view, is 'prediction, explanation, and
intertheoretic reduction'. [21] In this essay, Churchland rejects the sentential model of
theories, on the grounds that this model makes the:
...fundamental assumption that language-like structures of some kind constitute the
basic or most important form of representation in cognitive creatures, and the
correlative assumption that cognition consists in the manipulation of those
representations. [22]
Churchland's view is thus that elimination of prepositional attitudes entails the
elimination of the sentential model of theories. [23] The grounds for this view are,
predictably, empirical, speculative, and based on research into brain function in order
to establish how representation and computation is achieved in the absence of
propositional attitudes. [24] Churchland's task is thus to give an alternative -
'neurophilosophical' account of what is a theory. The remainder of his essay fails to
give a succinct answer. Churchland considers the purely physical relationships which
the brain's billions of neurons may bear towards each other. Different configurations
constitute different theories, each constituting a distinct paradigm, in the Kuhnian
sense. Churchland makes the point that neuroscience is still at a very early stage, so
that the promise is of a developing and progressively more sophisticated account of
what is a theory. [25]
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Churchland's account of theories is consistent with the eliminativist conclusion, but
appears to cause problems for the eliminativist project, as it is inconsistent with some
of his other central claims. Churchland needs, for example, to give necessary and
sufficient conditions for being a theory, which will be consistent with both his
neurophilosophical account, and his claim that folk psychology is a theory. In his
'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', he cites the provision of'...
explanations/ predictions/ understanding of... behaviour' as criteria, under the section
heading 'Why folk psychology is a theory'.[26] This is inconsistent with - and is
explicitly contradicted by - Churchland in his 'On the Nature of Theories', in which this
'classical view' is dismissed: '... hardly anyone will now deny that there are serious
problems with every element of the preceding picture.'[27] If, on the other hand,
Churchland's putative necessary and sufficient conditions for being a theory are
neurological conditions, then this will be inconsistent with the claim that folk
psychology is a theory. If folk psychology is not a theory, then its failure to reduce to
neuroscience theory is not a constraint on its acceptability.
It is, in any case, difficult to see how intertheoretic reduction can proceed in the
absence of sentences, or some alternative modes of presentation which fulfil the same
functions as sentences. This is because the object of reduction is to explain the laws of
one theory in terms of another theory, and the possibility of achieving this
cross-theoretical explanation is demonstrated via deduction. If it is a necessary
condition for reduction that theories be expressible - and I take it that deduction and
explanation do make this a necessary condition, then Churchland's account of what a
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theory is renders reduction practically impossible, thereby making his claim for the
irreducibility of folk psychology trivially true. The same objection would appear to rule
out much less controversial reductions, such as that of meteorology to physics. An
alternative non-Carnapian (i.e. non-sentential) model would be necessary. Churchland's
position on theories thus appears to be incoherent: he needs a model of scientific
unification which is both non-sentential and preserves the claim that folk psychology is
a theory, but the claim that folk psychology is a theory cannot be separated from the
claim that theories are sets of sentences.
An Ontological Version ofEliminativism.
The form of eliminativism considered up to this point advocates the elimination of a
putative theory - folk psychology. On some construals, however, eliminative
materialism also makes an ontological claim: the claim that there are no beliefs and
desires; they do not exist. Thus Paul Churchland opens his essay 'Eliminative
Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' by defining eliminativism as '... the thesis
that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically
false theory, a theory so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that
theory will eventually be displaced'.(my emphasis)[28]
The claim that there are no beliefs is a stronger claim that the claim that folk
psychology is radically false. By 'stronger than', I mean that the former claim entails
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the latter claim, but that the latter claim does not entail the former. Even if the
proposition that folk psychology is radically false is true, a further premise is needed to
entail the conclusion that there are no beliefs. One could, by analogy, argue that
musical theory is in principle irreducible to more basic theory; that in addition to the
acoustical properties of a concerto, there are meaningful and true propositions which
may be put regarding concertos, and which pick out properties of concertos which
cannot be explained by more basic theory. Notwithstanding this, concertos surely
exist. [29] The missing premises, with regard to concertos, might be provided by a
combination of what I earlier described as the 'Unity of all Knowledge' thesis, together
with the claim that 'the entities we are committed to are simply those quantified over in
our best scientific theories'.[30] The elimination of the concerto would then proceed as
follows:
i. a smooth intertheoretic reduction of all theories to physics is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the real existence of the entities quantified over by the theories
which are candidates for reduction;
ii. musical theories of concertos are not so reducible; therefore
iii. concertos do not exist.
Ifwe assume the truth of (ii), the unsoundness of this argument resides in the absurdity
of the first premise. What we have here is the conjunction of two a posteriori premises:
the unity of all knowledge, and reducibility to science as a necessary and sufficient
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condition for the real existence of entities. I cannot see what could possibly count as
evidence in support of either claim. It is, in any case, strongly counterintuitive to
suggest that the Beethoven Violin Concerto does not exist. [31]
It thus remains to be seen how the claim that there are no beliefs can be validly
deduced from the claim that folk psychology is false. In a recent essay, Stephen Stich
has argued that the claim that there are no beliefs cannot be demonstrated to be true.
Stich suggests that the inference is only valid relative to some theory of reference. On
a very simple version of the descriptive theory of reference, evidence that folk
psychology makes false claims about beliefwould be sufficient to prove that what is
referred to as 'belief in everyday use does not exist. The argument for the
non-existence of belief thus takes the form:
i. Either common-sense assumptions about beliefs are true, or 'beliefs' as the term
is employed by common-sense do not exist;
ii. At least some of the common-sense assumptions about beliefs are false;
therefore
iii. 'Beliefs'does not exist. [32]
The first premise here is the simple descriptive account of reference. There is an
ambiguity regarding how much of common-sense would need to be wrong in order for
'belief to fail to denote. I presume that on a very simple account, any falsity in the
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claims being made by common-sense would be sufficient for failure to denote.
Whether the second premise is true or not is an empirical matter; for the Churchlands,
it is regarded as being true, so that the descriptive account of reference serves to
demonstrate the truth of the conclusion. However, as Stich points out, this is a theory
of reference which will lead to catastrophic elimination: the history of science suggests
that all current theories are likely to be false to some degree. By implication, the
entities over which all scientific theories currently quantify do not exist.
One popular alternative to the descriptive theory is Kripke's 'Causal-Historical' theory
of reference. As Stich points out, however, while the descriptive theory renders the
eliminativist claim that there are no beliefs trivially true, the Causal Historical theory
makes the claim trivially false. This arises due to the fact that, following its original
dubbing, the theory allows for adjustments to the extension of a term - these
adjustments being nonetheless reference-preserving. What this entails is that no
evidence of the falsity of folk psychology could serve to prove that folk psychological
'beliefs' do not exist; the extension of the term can be amended in the light of any such
empirical evidence. This would appear to be sanctioned by Patricia Churchland's
co-evolution strategy -1 take it that both the central theoretical claims, and the
extensions of the proprietary terms of the sciences might 'evolve'. If so, then Patricia
Churchland's position entails a much more liberal theory of reference than the
catastrophic descriptive theory. The triviality of the falsity of folk psychology arises
from the fact that it would appear that no empirical evidence could ever serve to entail
the non-existence of beliefs: the defender of beliefs can amend the extension of the
term, while maintaining that the amended and new terms have identical reference.
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The claim that the alleged falsity of folk psychology entails that there are no beliefs
must thus be indexed to some theory of reference which will avoid the dangers of
either pan-eliminativism or the frustration of the eliminativist project. In the absence of
any such proposed theory from the eliminativist, I propose to consider eliminativism as
a thesis concerning explanation, rather than as a straightforwardly ontological thesis.
[33]
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[15] Sorell, Scientism, p.4.
[16] Churchland's post-Quinean epistemological convictions - which play a key role
in rendering eliminative materialism possible - will constrain his claiming that any such
a priori argument is available. In its absence, all that is available is induction from past
scientific success. But this doesn't support the claim that science is unified - so that
speculative optimism regarding the future unifying trend of scientific explanation is the
basis for much of what follows.
[17] Stephen P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science - The Case
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Against Belief, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, p.222. Stich later resiles from
this view, as I will show later in this chapter.
[18] Paul M. Churchland,'Postscript: Evaluating Our Self-Conception', appended
to his 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' in Paul K. Moser and
J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism - A Reader, Routledge, London, 1995,
p. 172. Here and elsewhere Churchland appears to assume that basic physics is free of
ceteris paribus clauses (or that, at least, the prevalence of hedging diminishes as one
descends closer towards the basic physical level). This implicit assumption is left
undefended. Interestingly, however, a standard proposition from physics which is
widely utilised in elementary philosophical texts: 'water boils at 100° Celsius', requires
hedging, as water will boil at higher or lower temperatures at non-standard
atmospheric pressure.
[19] Paul M. Churchland, 'Postscript', Moser & Trout (eds.), p. 178.
[20] John R. Searle, The Rediscovery ofMind, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
1992, p. 113.
[21] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational
Perspective', in his A Nearocomputational Perspective - The Nature ofMind and the
Structure ofScience,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, p. 153.
[22] op. cit., p. 154.
[23] Presumably Churchland would not express his position in this way: I take it
that the relationship of entailment makes necessary use of some form of quasi
sentence-like entities. This is an example of how eliminativism can extend well beyond
the elimination of simple folk psychological explanation; philosophical logic may be
endangered as a consequence of the elimination of sentences.
[24] This empirical study of cognitive processes is 'naturalised epistemology'. Here,
as elsewhere, Churchland bases his approach on Quinean assumptions.
[25] My contention is that Churchland does not have the notion of 'theory' that he
needs: his PDP account (see ch.4) embodies theories as patterns of synaptic weights in
the brain. While this allows for a PDP account of the operation of competing theories
(identical inputs to the brain being subject to differing patterns of processing activity),
it cannot accommodate intertheoretic reduction (see footnote [21], this chapter).
Churchland's discussion of reduction comes in his early (pre-PDP) work, where he can
avail himself of the classical notion of a theory as being a set of sentences. On this
account, even if one rejects the metaphysics which underlies eliminativism, one can at
least see how reduction arises. But sets of synaptic weights cannot accommodate the
logical and semantic relationships which Charles and Lennon identify. This observation
anticipates my central claim in the latter part of the thesis: accommodating logic,
epistemology, ethics and the phenomenological will result in eliminative materialism
being hopelessly modest; adjusting eliminative materialism to render it more radical in
its substantive claims will result in its losing its capacity to accommodate these basic
concerns of philosophy. An account of 'theory' which is compatible with radical
eliminative materialism, but which cannot accommodate intertheoretic reduction - and,
ipso facto, elimination - is self-defeating.
[26] Paul M. Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,
in Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition, p.208.
[27] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Theories', p. 153. This condemnation is
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admittedly general, but it does seem to apply to the predictive/ explanatory account as
well as the sentential model.
[28] Paul M. Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes',
p.206. Churchland here drops the earlier caution which leads him merely to speculate
that such an outcome is likely.
[29] I recognise the difficulty in stating clearly what it is for something to exist, and
that the status of the existence of a concerto will differ in potentially problematical
ways from that of a violin. Nonetheless, when a musicologist claims that a tenth
Beethoven symphony exists, it seems wildly counter-intuitive to deny this on
physicalist grounds.
[30] Stephen Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, p.222.
[31] This raises general problems in formulating the physicalist thesis. If we define
physicalism as the thesis that for all (x), if (x) exists, then (x) is physical, this entails
that if (x) is not physical, then (x) does not exist - so that it may well be that concertos,
together with numbers, and propositions, do not exist. The alternative would appear to
be either to enter a number of caveats which will redeem both physicalism and
concertos, or to define physicalism as the thesis that a complete account of what
exists, and the nature ofwhat exists, could in principle be offered by the physicist.
Here again problems arise, however: what is the principle, being alluded to? It cannot,
on pain of circularity, be the ontological claim that for all (x), if (x) exists, then (x) is
physical. Furthermore, this latter definition is a clear case of scientism: why ought we
to defer to the future physicist as the arbiter ofwhat exists?
[32] I have put 'belief in quotation marks to leave open the possibility - which I take
it that Churchland would concede - that cognitive science may provide a theory of
belief which is distinct from the common-sense conception, and does not suffer from
the alleged errors of the latter. On the simple descriptive account of reference, these
would - terminology notwithstanding - be two separate entities (i.e. it would not be the
case that both common-sense and cognitive science were discussing the same entity,
but common-sense was wrong about the entity.
[33] I am thus accepting, for present purposes, Charlton's claim that 'if physicalism
is to define itself in opposition to dualism, the idea it opposes is not that the universe
contains two different sorts of entity, but that there are two irreducibly different sorts
of explanation' (William Charlton, The Analytic Ambition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1991,
p. 127). It should be noted that Charlton's definition of physicalism is in fact a
definition of physicalism, together with the unity ofscience thesis. Fodor insists upon
the autonomy of psychology - and is thus, on Charlton's account, a dualist (a
characterisation which Fodor would, I take it, reject)
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CHAPTER 2 WHAT IS FOLK PSYCHOLOGY?
In presenting his case, Paul Churchland typically considers the empirical question of
whether it is likely that folk psychology will eventually be eliminated by neuroscience.
[1] The question of the likelihood of elimination conflates two types of question:
broadly a priori questions regarding the theoretical status of folk psychology and the
ontological status of the entities over which folk psychology generalisations quantify;
and speculative questions regarding the likely future development of science.
Churchland's view is that the latter - speculative - category is the proper domain for
philosophical work, traditional a priori philosophy being effectively worthless:
There is no ... accumulated compendium of important a priori truths ... and this
despite that fact that philosophers have been talking and theorising about them for
over twenty five centuries. [2]
Speculating about future scientific discovery - and hence about the possible elimination
of folk psychology - is, by contrast, precisely the kind of task which is proper to
philosophy:
The philosopher is just another theorist, one whose bailiwick often places him or
her at the earliest stages of the process by which proto-scientific speculation slowly
develops into testable empirical theory ... the academic discipline of philosophy
typically focuses on domains so far unconquered by any mature science.[3]
This statement of method does much to explain Churchland's approach to his work,
which is consistently inductive, empirical, and scientistic - and dismissive of argument
based on conceptual analysis. I nonetheless propose to separate what I take to be the
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non-philosophical question of the likely future development of neuroscience, from the
philosophical questions of the theoretical status of folk psychology, and the
ontological status of those entities over which it quantifies. This separation marks the
distinction between the empirical and speculative question of the likelihood of the
elimination of folk psychology, and the question of the eliminability of folk
psychology. Eliminability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for future
elimination, so that a refutation of the thesis that folk psychology is eliminable is a
fortiori a refutation of the thesis that future elimination is likely. Churchland opens his
essay 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' with the elimination
claim:
Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of
psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so
fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory
will eventually be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed
neuroscience. [4]
Mere eliminability does not entail this outcome, being a condition which obtains in
principle; empirical considerations may militate against elimination in practice.
Elimination in practice would require the satisfaction of other conditions, such as a
change in the procedures for socialising children into linguistic practice, and the
development of a scientific theory which fulfilled all of the tasks currently performed
by folk psychology. An outcome whereby folk psychology was eliminable - but
retained on the purely instrumentalistic grounds that these practical conditions could
not be met - would be a victory for eliminative materialism (albeit of a more limited
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nature than that aspired to by Churchland). I thus propose to concentrate on the
philosophical question of eliminability in principle.
Churchland's central claim, as established in my last chapter, is that its putative failure
to reduce entails the eliminability of folk psychology. There are two suppressed
premises at work in this argument:
that folk psychology is a theory; and
that there is no basic mental level.
The first of these conditions for eliminability - which has been referred to as the
'theory-theory' - is a condition the truth ofwhich is necessary for eliminability, as, by
definition, if folk psychology is not a theory then it cannot be a candidate for
intertheoretic reduction. In chapter one, I outlined five conditions for scientific
reduction, the first ofwhich is the derivation of higher-level laws. In terms of
Churchland's position in his essay 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes', folk psychology meets this condition. In this essay, Churchland alludes to:
... the expression of generalisations concerning the lawlike relations that hold
among propositional attitudes. Such laws involve quantification over propositions,
and they exploit various relations holding in that domain. [5]
If folk psychology is not a theory, then the first condition for scientific reduction is not
met: if it is sufficient for some conceptual framework being a theory that it generates
putative laws, then it is necessary for laws being generated that the conceptual
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framework be a theory. It is unclear how the later, post-logical empiricist Churchland
could with consistency support the 'derivation of higher-level laws' condition for
reduction. Laws are intrinsically capable of sentential presentation: the derivation of
such entities from theories - where theories are not themselves intrinsically capable of
sentential presentation appears problematic. The eliminative materialist case thus
requires that folk psychology be a theory which fails to reduce to some putatively
more basic physical level. In the remainder of this chapter, I propose to consider the
case for construing folk psychology as a theory[6].
In his essay 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', Churchland
presents folk psychology as a set of generalisations, examples of which are:
(i) (x)(p) [(x fears that p) then (x desires that not-/?)]
(ii) (x)(p) [(x hopes that p) & (x discovers that p) then (x is pleased that /?)]
(iii) (x)(p)(q) [((x believes that p) & (x believes that (ifp then q))) then
(barring confusion, distraction, etc., x believes that q)\
(iv) (x)(/?)(r/)[((x desires that p) & (x believes that (if q then p)) &
(x is able to bring it about that q)) then (barring conflicting desires or
preferred strategies, x brings it about that q)].[7]
Here we have states which are related: to each other (e.g. fear causing desire); to
external inputs (e.g. the state of affairs which constitutes the content of (/?)); and to
actions (e.g. x bringing it about that q).
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Given his need to characterise folk psychology as a theory, Churchland is providing a
question-begging account here: the formal presentation of what appear to be putative
laws, with the inclusion in (iii) and (iv) of ceteris paribus clauses, and the analogy
which Churchland draws with laws such as:
(x)(/)(m) [(x has a mass of m) & (x suffers a net force off) then x accelerates at
f/m.l8]
appear calculated to persuade the reader that the case for the theoretical status of folk
psychology is both simple and compelling:
Not only is folk psychology a theory, it is so obviously a theory that it must be held
a major mystery why it has taken until the last half of the twentieth century for
philosophers to realise it. [9]
In his more recent work, Churchland would, as earlier noted, eschew the presentation
of a theory as a set of sentences. This sentential account would entail that those who
are adept at using the theory would perform cognitive processes on the sentences (or
on some physical correlates of the sentences), deducing the explananda in (i) - (iv)
above as a result. As already noted, such an account is at odds with Churchland's
connectionist account of cognition, and hence with his account of what a 'theory' is.
This has the interesting consequence that, on Churchland's account, folk psychology is
so inept as to misrepresent itself, by falsely portraying cognition as the manipulation of
propositional attitudes.
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In a recent postscript to 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes',
Churchland alludes to 'the epistemology that makes [eliminative materialism] possible.
[10] Churchland doesn't make explicit the connection between this 'contemporary
epistemological perspective' and the possibility of eliminativism, but I take it that the
intended connection is that, if true, the epistemological claims will entail the truth of
the claim that folk psychology is a theory. That both Churchlands press this latter
claim with such insistence is due to the fact that any sound argument to the conclusion
that folk psychology is not a theory would in turn be a sound argument for the falsity
of the central claim of eliminativism. Patricia Churchland defines eliminativism in
terms of three claims - the first of which is 'that folk psychology is a theory'. [11]
Notwithstanding the Churchlands' denial of the value of a priori philosophy, any proof
that folk psychology is not a theory would, on Churchland's own account, entail the
falsity of eliminativism without the need for any empirical (or 'neurophilosophical')
research.
The epistemology which Paul Churchland cites as performing the task of making
eliminativism possible is expressed succinctly. It is 'the realisation that all of human
knowledge is speculative and provisional...'
This view of what knowledge consists in appears impossible to reconcile with
Churchland's vigorous attack on the logical empiricist view of a theory as a set of
sentences This attack constitutes part of Churchland's attack on folk psychology, with
its '...crudely linguaform conception of theories as sets of sentences'. [12] If knowledge
is to be 'speculative and provisional', however, this would appear to necessitate that
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there be a medium for knowledge - and that this medium be at least capable of being
characterised in sentential form. It would appear prima facie to be a necessary
condition for a set (x) to have the property of being speculative that (x) be at least
expressible as a set of sentences. If this is the case, then there can be no radical error in
so characterising the set, irrespective of however else it may be characterised.
Churchland thus appears to have a dilemma: the epistemology which, on his own
account, makes his metaphysics possible, is inconsistent with one of the central
assumptions of the metaphysics. The claimed irreducibility of folk psychology rests in
part on its allegedly false characterisation of what possession of a theory consists in -
yet that same false assumption is at work in the claim that folk psychology is a theory,
and thus eliminable.[13]
Jerry Fodor sets out an argument from Quinean holism to the theory-ladenness of
perception, and cites Churchland as an example of a philosopher who has drawn this
conclusion from Quine's argument in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. [14] Fodor's
explanation of Quinean holism is again inconsistent with Churchland's recent view of
what it is to be a theory, however. The account which Fodor offers identifies the
semantic and logical relations which must obtain in order for the holist claim to be
true:'... inferential relations, evidence relations, and so forth.'.[15] Once again, the
presence of such relations necessitates a medium which can at least be characterised in
sentential form. Quine's holistic conclusion, regarding our beliefs, that 'revision can
strike anywhere' is, it would appear, the basis for the 'contemporary epistemological
perspective' in Churchland's paper. Ifall knowledge is speculative and provisional,
then - if a theory is defined as a set of claims which is speculative and provisional -
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then folk psychology is a theory, and Churchland's immediate claim is secure.
Churchland cannot, on his recent account of'theory', avail himself of this Quinean
route to the theory-theory, however, on pain of inconsistency.
The fact of Churchland's argument for the theoretical status of folk psychology being
inconsistent with his other claims does not of itself secure the falsity of the claim that
folk psychology is a theory. There is, however, an objection to the claim that folk
psychology is speculative and provisional, which could be pressed even if Churchland
were to relinquish his neurophilosophical account of theories. Churchland makes
passing reference to the possible counter-claim that our capacity for introspection
yields incorrigible knowledge. No argument is advanced against this Cartesian claim,
other than that '...it may seem Palaeolithic and regrettable to some of us ...'.[16]
Two points need to be made about this cursory dismissal of what is an extremely
telling argument against the theory-theory. Firstly, the suggestion that the longevity of
a claim counts against its truth is an eccentric claim. Secondly, and more importantly,
when one considers what Churchland is here denying, the counterintuitive nature of
the denial is very considerable. That, as I write this, I believe that I am presenting a
critique of Churchland's position, and hope that this critique be effective, and that my
desire to make the critique effective causes me to continue writing, is at once an
instance of the idioms of folk psychology being utilised in explanation, and
incorrigible. It is interesting that Churchland entitles this paper 'Evaluating our Self
Conception'. Contrary to what this suggests, his writing seems consistently to adopt a
third-person perspective. I fail to see how such a perspective, however well informed
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by neuroscience, could plausibly correct my own appraisal of my current mental state.
I conclude that, even if Churchland could with consistency argue for the theoretical
status of folk psychology on the grounds of the speculative and provisional nature of
all knowledge, the claim, when applied to self knowledge gained via introspection of
one's current mental states, is in any case false - so that the argument for the theory
theory will require some alternative basis.
Churchland has suggested that the controversy surrounding the putatively theoretical
status of folk psychology is 'best addressed by rehearsing the history of this notion'.
[17] In place of Quine, Churchland here identifies Wilfrid Sellars as having presented
the first explicit portrayal of our self-conception as being akin to a theory - in his paper
'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. Sellars' paper is interesting in that the
relevant passages for Churchland's purposes are based on a story which Sellars invents
to describe the imaginary development of prehistoric folk psychology. In place of
speculation about the future, Churchland is here basing his claims on speculation about
the past. [18] Having summarised Sellars' story, Churchland, under the subheading
'Development of the Idea', alludes to 'thefact that our conception of the semantic
properties of thoughts is derivative upon an antecedent conception of the semantic
properties of overt declarative utterances' (my emphasis). [19] Notwithstanding
Churchland's nihilistic view of truth, we cannot allow that Sellars has established that
this is a 'fact' - especially given that this alleged 'fact' is the basis for the conclusion that
our self-conception is theory-like, a claim the truth of which is in turn a constraint
upon the truth of the central thesis of eliminativism.
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In his paper, Sellars considers the 'classical tradition', according to which
... there is a family of episodes, neither overt verbal behaviour nor verbal imagery,
which are thoughts, and that both overt verbal behaviour and verbal imagery owe
their meaningfulness to the fact that they stand to these thoughts in the unique
relation of'expressing' them. These episodes are introspectable.[20]
Sellars' criticism of this classical view is that it assumes that such thoughts 'could not
occur without being known to occur'. [21] Sellars' position is that, as it is empirically
false that there is such self-intimation of thoughts, the classical view is false. It is
unclear how the claim that thought is not self-intimating entails what I take to be the
desired conclusion - viz. that our knowledge of our internal cognitive states is thus
provisional, and hence, in the sense required, 'theoretical'. Sellars' proposed
emendation to the classical view allows for 'privileged, but by no means either
invariable or infallible access'.[22] Two points must be made here: the
Freudian-inspired observation that not all beliefs and desires are self-intimating does
not entail that no thoughts are self-intimating; and secondly, the infallibility to which
Sellars here alludes appears to be infallibility with regard to the presence of thoughts,
rather than with regard to their content, or the attitude which one bears towards that
content. His observation, even if true, would thus appear to be consistent with much -
or most - thought being both self-intimating and possessed of first-person
incorrigibility. I can be certain of the content of my occurrent and conscious
propositional attitudes. Sellars goes on to present his case on the apparent assumption
that no thought is self-intimating, with his question: 'in what sense can these episodes
be "inner" if they are not immediate experiences?'. [23] It is at this point that he
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presents 'a myth of my own' - the science fiction speculation to which Churchland
alludes .
Sellars' story describes a primitive society of'our Rylean ancestors'. They have
developed a language, but have as yet no conception of the inner states which Sellars
has set himself the task of investigating. As a consequence of this deficiency,
Churchland suggests:
They can explain some human behaviours, but only very few. Being linked to a set
of operationally defined dispositional concepts, they have no conception of the
complex dance of occurrent internal states driving human behaviour, no conception
of the internal economy that is just waiting to be characterised by a full-blown
theory of human nature. [24]
Sellars' story now involves an individual - Jones - who develops a theory of the internal
states. Sellars prefaces this with an account of what it is to construct a theory:
... to construct a theory is ... to postulate a domain of entities which behave in
certain ways set down by the fundamental principles of the theory, and to
correlate ... complexes of these theoretical entities with certain non-theoretical
objects or situations; that is to say, with objects or situations which are either
matters of observable fact or, in principle at least, describable in observational
terms. [25]
Sellars' preamble has in my view failed to establish the need for all of the entities
quantified over by folk psychology (i.e. all of the internal states) to be the subject of
such theoretical postulation. Even ifwe are to accept the existence ofFreud's
subconscious internal states, some does not entail all - and no case has been made for
the claim that no internal state is given immediately to introspection. There is,
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however, a more serious problem with Sellars' account ofwhat Jones is doing in
forming his theory of internal causal states. These are held to be 'postulated'.
'Postulation' raises a problem for any Rylean account - and this problem infects Sellars'
myth: how can postulation proceed in the absence ofjust those internal states which
are being postulated into existence by Jones - indeed, what can 'postulation' be, if not
an internal event of the type which is being brought into question? There is an
incoherence in the claim that one can 'postulate' in the absence of such internal
cognitive states as belief. The internal states which Sellars is here calling into question
are, surely, a precondition for the formulation of theories. If the presence of internal
cognitive states is a necessary condition for postulation, then the act of postulation is
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of internal cognitive states. The claim that we
possess such inner states cannot then be itself a theoretical claim. Churchland appears
not to have noticed this difficulty, as his summary of Sellars' myth also utilises the term
'postulates' - and adds a further intentional term: 'assigns':
... in short, Jones postulates the basic ontology of our current folk psychology, and
assigns to its elements their now familiar causal roles, much to the explanatory and
predictive advantage of everyone who gains a command of its concepts. [26]
Sellars' story concludes with Jones taking as his model for these postulated, theoretical
entities, overt verbal behaviour - hence Churchland's earlier-noted reference to the
putative derivation of the semantic properties of thought from the semantic properties
of our public language. This account is congenial to Churchland's own position in two
respects: it appears to account for the error in the putatively erroneous 'linguaform
conception' of folk psychology, and for the origin of that error; and - if correct - it
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would dispose of the problem which the intentionality of thought poses for the
naturalist. Unfortunately for Churchland's account, the problem earlier mooted - that
postulation already presupposes the categories of folk psychology - carries over to the
semantics of public languages. Surely for any linguistic utterance to have meaning, it
must have meaningfor or to some cognizer - and a necessary condition for this being
the case is the prior possession of thoughts which have meaning. In the same way in
which Jones could not postulate or assign in the absence of internal cognitive states,
nor could he make sense of the language which Sellars and Churchland propose to
take as an 'explanatory primitive' which will endow thoughts with meaning.
Finally, the notion that we must somehow learn 'to make spontaneous first-person
ascriptions ... which are strongly consistent with the ascriptions made on purely
explanatory or third-person criteria'[27] again seems to reverse the actual order of
explanation. That one must learn a public language in order to have a medium for
reporting to others one's self-intimating and internal first-person states is undoubtedly
the case - but this does not entail what Churchland here apparently takes it to entail:
that third-person ascriptions are explanatorily primary. Once again, the actual order is
surely that one first has experience of one's first person states, then learns to express
them as one acquires a language, and to ascribe similar states to others.
Under the subheading 'Consequences of the Idea', Churchland takes the Sellars story
to entail that 'introspective knowledge is denied any special epistemological status', on
the grounds that '[it] is hostage to the quality of the background conceptual scheme in
which [it is] ... framed'.[28] As Churchland's own writing is entirely from the third
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person perspective, he requires some justification for this relegation of the first-person
perspective, and the claim that all perception is theory-laden is, I take it, the
justification. As Sellars has not, in my view, demonstrated the theory-ladenness of all
perception (and thus of all perception of one's own occurrent mental states), I
conclude that Churchland needs some alternative justification for the claim that:
... introspective judgements ... turn out not to have any special status or integrity ...
and introspective judgement is just an instance of an acquired habit of conceptual
response to one's internal states ... contingent on the integrity of the acquired
conceptual framework (theory) in which the response is framed. [29]
Churchland takes as a second of the consequences of Sellars' idea, that 'the traditional
mind-body problem emerges as a straightforward scientific question - as a question of
how the theoretical framework of folk psychology will turn out to be related to
whatever neuropsychological theory might emerge to replace it'. [30] Churchland here
rather begs the question against folk psychology by alluding to its 'replacement', but
for my present purposes what is of greater concern is the fact that Sellars'
theory-ladenness thesis is again being taken to entail the conclusion which
eliminativism requires. The argument at work here appears to be:
i. all knowledge is based on perception;
ii. all perception is mediated by theoretical - and hence
speculative - assumptions; therefore
iii. all knowledge is speculative (and hence 'theoretical')
iv. therefore our self-knowledge is theoretical.
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The first premise is a straightforward empiricist assumption. While the fact that his
subscription to this view will account for Churchland's scientism, and rejection of
philosophy as an a priori discipline, it remains to be proved that (i) is in fact true.
Premise (ii) is the Sellarsian assumption which I have already argued is not proven. A
further difficulty emerges for Churchland when one asks how the conclusion is to be
put to use by the eliminativist. If all knowledge is speculative, then the normative
character of knowledge is lost: why should one accept one knowledge claim in
preference to another? Churchland's position here seems to be self-defeating: one can
only accept his conclusion if one accepts it as being true, in contrast to its provisional
and speculative opponents.
Having drawn this conclusion from the Sellars story, Churchland then goes on to
suggest that a failure on the part of folk psychology to reduce to neuropsychology
would have the result that:
the successor theory will then displace Jones's antique theory in our social and
explanatory practices, and the ontology of folk psychology will go the way of
phlogiston ... [31]
That no such outcome would be guaranteed by the truth of the theory-theory, together
with the irreducibility of folk psychology , should be clear: even if folk psychology is a
theory, and there is no basic mental level, it remains to be proved that irreducibility
entails eliminability - the claim which non-reductive physicalists will reject. But the
quotation also shows Churchland making an inferential leap from eliminability to actual
elimination - which would, as already urged, require the satisfaction of certain practical
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conditions such as a change in the practice for socialising children into explaining
human action. Finally, Churchland assumes that the form of elimination which would
be the outcome is ontological elimination - which, as I suggested earlier, is the
strongest form of elimination, and one which is only entailed by elimination of folk
psychology explanation if one assumes the truth of the simple descriptive account of
reference.
I have now considered two possible routes to Churchland's conclusion that folk
psychology is a theory. Churchland cannot avail himself of the Quinean route, as this is
inconsistent with his own current position on theories. The Quinean route appears also
falsely to characterise all first-person knowledge as speculative. [32] Finally, I have
argued that the Sellars route to the theory-theory (the categories of folk psychology
are postulates - hence theoretical entities, and so folk psychology is a theory) fails on
two grounds. Firstly, the position suffers from pragmatic incoherence, in that it
assumes that one can postulate in the absence of internal cognitive states. Secondly,
the false claim is apparently made that, as some mental states are not self-intimating,
none are - so that postulation is required.
In his essay 'Evaluating Our Self-Conception', Churchland rehearses various criticisms
which are levelled against eliminativism, and attempts to rebut each. One such criticism
is separately levelled by Wilkes and Hannan, and is based on the observation that:
... the conceptual framework of folk psychology is used for a vast range of
"non-scientific" purposes beyond the prototypically "theoretical purpose of
describing the ultimate nature of human psychological organisation. [33]
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IfWilkes' and Hannan's objection stands, then as folk psychology is not then a theory,
it is not eliminable.
Churchland accepts the case being made here for the practical function of folk
psychology , 'yet the conclusions drawn therefrom betray a narrow and cartoonish
conception ofwhat theories are and what they do' (my emphasis). [34] In what he
apparently takes to be a contrast with the 'cartoonish' account of theory of his
opponents - 'abstract propositional description, invented for the purpose of deep
explanation far from the concerns of practical life' - Churchland presents 'theory' as
being in continual use in our everyday lives: thus the jazz musician uses musical theory,
the carpenter geometry, and the blacksmith metallurgy, mechanics and simple thermal
physics. Despite his recognition that there are two questions to be addressed with
regard to theories: 'what they are', and 'what they do', it is, however, once again
difficult to see from this passage what Churchland takes a 'theory' to be, if not a
framework of abstract propositions for the purpose of explanation. [3 5] Churchland
evades this question by concentrating on the 'what they do' question - citing examples
of the practical abilities of the individual who has command of a theory, and the
relationship which he claims to obtain between the development of skills, and mastery
of theory:
... what learning a theory amounts to [is] much less the memorising of doctrine and
much more the slow acquisition and development of a host of diverse skills ...[36]
The development of practical musical skills may be made possible by, and reinforce the
musician's grasp of, musical theory. As Churchland himself notes:'... sustaining
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enhanced practice is what theories typically do'.[37] When one returns to the 'what
they are' question, however, the fact of their sustaining skills does not entail that
theories are not most appropriately thought of as 'abstract propositional descriptions
invented for the purpose of deep explanation'. [3 8] Churchland's characterisation of
theory as intimately related to practical skill is in any case too narrow. It is difficult to
see how much philosophical theory could be accommodated by this account - for
example, Plato's Theory ofForms, which appears to be a paradigmatic case of'abstract
propositional description invented for the purpose of deep explanation'.
Churchland thus rejects the claim of Wilkes and Hannan that folk psychology is not a
theory, and hence not eliminable. His position is that their characterisation of what folk
psychology does - serving practical needs - is consistent with its being a theory. In
advancing his pragmatic account of theory acquisition, Churchland cites Kuhn in
support of this position: 'our best... [account] of what learning a theory amounts to' is,
he contends, contained in Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions '.[39]
Kuhn's account of scientific progress as a series of paradigm shifts is clearly congenial
to Churchland's own position, which proposes a radical revision of our
self-conception. In Scientific Realism and the Plasticity ofMind, Churchland locates
Kuhn's text along with the work of Quine in the tradition ofNaturalised Epistemology
- the epistemology, that is, which, on Churchland's own account, makes eliminativism
possible. In Kuhn we thus have a third putative source of support for the claim that
folk psychology is a theory, and thus for the truth of the first premise in the argument
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for eliminability. In Scientific Realism and the Plasticity ofMind, Churchland provides
scant support for the naturalised epistemology which he attributes to Kuhn:
One can be impressed with the poverty of current a priori epistemology when
confronted with the intricate details and grand dramas of our actual theoretical
development (cf. Kuhn).[40]
For some insight into the alleged 'poverty' of conventional a priori epistemology, one
may turn to Patricia Churchland, who in her essay 'Epistemology in the Age of
Neuroscience' claims to speak for both herself and Paul Churchland. [41] Patricia
Churchland here presents 'the fundamental epistemological question from Plato
onwards' as being 'how is it possible for us to represent reality?'.[42] To this premise
is added the physicalist premise that 'it is ... the nervous system that achieves
[representation of reality]; yielding the conclusion that 'the epistemological question
can be reformulated thus: How does the brain work?.[43] If this was indeed the
central question of epistemology, then it would occasion little surprise that a priori
epistemology was impoverished. This conclusion is arrived at by a sleight of hand,
however: both of the premises are false, so that a priori epistemology is redeemed.
Patricia Churchland's first premise - that the central question of epistemology is 'how it
is possible for us to represent reality?' - is carefully framed in order to beg the question
in favour of neurophilosophy. If one takes the fundamental question to be concerned
with knowledge, as the etymology of the term would dictate, and if one further takes a
necessary condition for knowledge to be justification, then the naturalist is confuted.
As Paul Churchland points out:
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'Ought's not being derivable from 'is's, it would seem that normative epistemology
cannot be a purely empirical science. [44]
If epistemology is inherently normative, then this entails the falsity of the naturalist
project: if all that exists is natural, and can thus be studied by those methods
appropriate to the study of nature, then there can be no accommodation of values - no
discovery of what ought to be the case . Jonathan Dancy defines epistemology as 'the
study of our right to the beliefs we have'.[45] Here there is not only the normative
dimension which Churchland concedes not to be accommodated by science, but in
addition, the claim that the target of epistemology is the justification of entities, the
existence of which the eliminativist is concerned to deny. I conclude that if there is a
case for naturalising epistemology, Patricia Churchland has not made it here. [46]
Naturalism provides a putative route to the irreducibility of folk psychology , rather
than to the claim that folk psychology is a theory. If we try to elicit Churchland's
argument, contra Hannan and Wilkes, from the truth of Kuhn's thesis to the truth of
the theory-theory, the argument seems to be as follows:
i. learning a theory consists in developing skills which are 'internalised';
ii. the folk psychology adept has internalised skills;
therefore folk psychology is a theory.
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If this is Churchland's argument, then it is surely invalid: one cannot deduce the answer
to the question 'what is a theory?' from the answer to the question 'how is a theory
learnt?'. This is, I take it, where the reformulation of epistemology's central question in
naturalised epistemology comes into play. If the central question is 'how does the brain
work?', then this must entail that the answer to the question 'how is a theory learnt'
must be in terms of purely physical processes. The theory must thus be postulated not
to have the intentional characteristics of being true or false, or having its components
related by logical interrelationships. [47] All that remains is that the behaviour of the
system - the skills which it undertakes - is subject to change as a consequence of the
'internalisation' of the theory. Even on this account, it seems that the most that can be
deduced from the answer to the question 'how is a theory learnt?' is an answer to the
question 'what is it that theories cannot be?'. Once again, the question of Churchland's
positive thesis on the question of what theories are is left mysterious.
Apart from the invalidity of the argument which I have extracted from Churchland's
text, the first premise appears to be empirically false. The 'internalisation' of theories is
alluded to by Kuhn:
... during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking... in
places they have looked before ... looking at a bubble-chamber photograph, the
student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record of familiar
subnuclear events. Only after a number of such transformations of vision does the
student become an inhabitant of the scientist's world, seeing what the scientist sees
and responding as the scientist does. [48]
Here we have the theory-ladenness of perception thesis, combined with the notion that
the acquisition of a theory involves the recipient in a 'change ofworld view'. The unit
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of understanding is on this account a 'paradigm', rather than a proposition, or set of
propositions. As a consequence, the individual may not be able to retrieve from the
mind the theory as readily as one would with a set of consciously-known propositions.
Nonetheless, the theory is 'internal' in the sense that one cannot but see the world in its
terms. Churchland reinforces the point by listing some of the skills putatively involved:
... skills of perception, categorisation, analogical extension, physical manipulation,
evaluation, construction, analysis, argument, computation, anticipation ...[49]
This list includes tasks putatively performed by folk psychology - such as evaluation,
argument and anticipation. As with the earlier-noted comparison between laws of
mechanics and 'laws' of folk psychology , this is an argument from analogy: the
acquisition of theoretical skills facilitates argument; ability to use folk psychology
facilitates argument; therefore folk psychology is a theoretical skill. The falsity of this
analogy arises from the fact that Churchland has conflated two sets of preconditions
for advancing or understanding an argument in, to take Kuhn's example, nuclear
physics. In order to do this one must have a command of the relevant nuclear theory.
But prior to this is a command of the idioms of folk psychology. Far from being in
competition with it, folk psychology is a prerequisite for scientific theorising: having
the belief that (p) is a necessary condition for having an understanding of (p), or - in
Churchland's terms - being able to apply the skill which is contingent on having (p). If
the first condition for the eliminability of folk psychology is that folk psychology be a
theory, then eliminativism falls at the first hurdle: far from being a theory, folk
psychology provides the context within which theories are known and learnt and
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applied. The eliminability of folk psychology entails the eliminability of all theories - an
outcome which even the most catastrophic eliminativist cannot countenance.
One final possible route to the theory-theory arises from the reification of belief. [50]
Ifbeliefs are entities, and beliefs are invoked in common-sense explanation, then this
might be thought to entail that beliefs are theoretical entities, and the framework
within which they figure is thus a theory. [51] If one rejects the reification of belief,
then the temptation to view beliefs as theoretical entities is forestalled.
I would suggest that to have a belief is to be disposed to assign the truth value (T) to
some proposition, in the light of some assumed justification. [52] The question of
whether one has a non-occurrent belief is then addressed by the use of counterfactuals
- as opposed to neurological investigation. Folk psychology is not a theory, as theories
are - as Sellars suggests - consciously created sets of claims, constructed with a view
to explaining the phenomena under investigation. Pace Sellars, folk psychology is not
the result of such conscious creation. Folk psychology does satisfy the condition of
explaining human action - but folk psychological idioms are prior to folk psychological
explanation. By 'prior to', I mean that one must have a belief - be disposed to assign
the relevant truth-values - as a necessary condition of postulating the existence of
theoretical entities, and hence constructing a theory. As they are prior to the creation
of theory, folk psychological idioms thus cannot be taken themselves to denote
theoretical entities, capable of elimination in the light of some subsequent, and
putatively superior, theory.
48
I conclude that there is no sound argument for the conclusion that folk psychology is a
theory. If - as the Churchlands themselves claim - the truth of this claim is a constraint
on the truth of the central claim of eliminative materialism, then I conclude that
Eliminative Materialism is false.
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CHAPTER 3 WHAT DOES ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM
PROPOSE TO ELIMINATE?
In his essay 'The Varieties of Eliminativism: Sentential, Intentional and Catastrophic'
[1], Andy Clark responds to an essay by Barbara Hannan.[2] Clark draws, in the first
instance, a useful distinction between what he terms 'Intentional Eliminativism', and
'Sentential Eliminativism' .Intentional Eliminativism: ' ... questions the correctness of
all descriptions of our mental states which invoke propositional contents' .Sentential
Eliminativism, on the other hand ' ... need not balk at such descriptions, and insists
only that any actual internal representations in the agent concerned are unlikely to
exhibit a comparable language-like structure' (italics in original). Clark's thesis is that
eliminativism is confronted with a problem here - for while Sentential Eliminativism is
relatively easy to defend, it is arguably not a genuinely eliminative thesis in any
significant sense. Intentional Eliminativism is genuinely eliminative - but is, perhaps,
impossible to defend, and liable to collapse into a much more radical form of
eliminativism - 'Catastrophic Eliminativism' - which is incoherent.
Hannan's paper identifies as a weakness of eliminativism the apparent fact of our being
rational agents. Given that a rational agent is rational in virtue of adopting beliefs on
the basis of appropriate reasons, it cannot, Hannan claims, be wrong to characterise
the state of such an individual in terms which make use of propositions. [3] To
demonstrate the difficulty which any anti-propositional account will face, Hannan cites
an example attributed to Pylyshyn:
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Suppose a person ... has come running out of a building. Ifwe agree to see
[this person] as a cognizer, and to view her running out of the burning building
as a rational act, then it must be admitted that her action might have resulted
from a variety of different stimuli. She might have smelled smoke. She might
have heard an alarm. She might have seen flames. She might have heard
someone yell, 'Fire!' ... This is the feature of rational acts that is sometimes
called stimulus independence. A rational act is a response to the meaning or
import of the stimulus, not to the stimulus itself; a rational act is not a mere
tropism, nor is it a mere conditioned response ... [4]
Hannan then presents 'the crunch': '... unless we see [the person's] causally-relevant
states as representational... how are we going to account for the rationality and the
stimulus-independence of her act?' (emphasis in original). [5] Hannan's position here
seems impregnable to doubt: that, at the very least, the internal state of the individual
fleeing the fire must be open to description by means of propositions, and the relations
of entailment which obtain between these propositions. Despite her apparent
endorsement, earlier in the essay, of some form of Quinean epistemology (what
Churchland has referred to as 'the epistemology that makes [eliminative materialism]
possible'[6]), Hannan surely understates the case, in her claim that: ' ... it is at least
arguable that where rational capacities are the explananda, it is necessary that there be
propositional attitudes in the explanans'.[7] While it may be arguable what further
ontological claims ought to accompany a commitment to the truth of this claim, the
claim itself is surely true in virtue of being analytic.
Lynn Rudder Baker regards Hannan's use of analyticity in her argument as both
unacceptable to the eliminativist, but also ultimately unsuccessful on its own terms, in
opposing the eliminativist claim that 'the best science of mind will not underwrite
propositional attitude concepts'.[8] Baker's argument against Hannan's position on
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this point is based on her apparent confusion of two issues which Clark in his essay has
insisted must be kept separate: the issue of whether there are internal mental states
which have semantic properties, and which may thereby be referred to as
'prepositional states'; and the issue of whether it is appropriate to describe an agent's
internal mental states by recourse to prepositional attitude ascriptions. [9] Thus, for
example, Hannan notes that:
... unless cognitive science is cognitive in name only, it had better acknowledge
that the internal states it studies possess some kind ofprepositional content ... [10]
This conclusion seems too strong - or at any rate stronger than the claim which is
required by her argument. To claim that the states possess 'some kind of prepositional
content' is, it may be argued, to claim that something akin to a language of thought
exists. Hannan generates some confusion when she earlier states that:
'if the meanings of stimuli [of the individual fleeing the fire] are internally
represented, then there are internal states appropriately characterised as having
propositional content. That is, on one reading ofwhat a propositional attitude is,
there are propositional attitudes, (my emphasis)[l 1]
The first sentence of this quotation is, I suggest, unproblematically true. The second
sentence, however, seems ambiguous. That the internal states are appropriately
characterised propositionally only entails that propositional attitudes exist on a very
limited reading of the claim that 'prepositional attitudes exist' .In her paper, Hannan
shifts between the straightforward claim that propositional characterisation is
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appropriate, and the more contentious (and ambiguous) claim that propositional
attitudes exist. [ 12]
Baker's criticism of this part of Hannan's paper is based on the inconsistency between
Hannan's paper's 'pragmatic billing' and Hannan's claims:
a. that a science of mind will study cognition; and
b. that it is analytic that the study of cognition must yield an account of
rationality, which must in turn recognise the appropriateness of
propositional description - so that propositional attitude concepts
cannot not be 'underwritten' by any science of mind.
The claimed inconsistency resides in the attempts in both (a) and (b) to stipulate a
priori the explanans and ontology of science of mind, given Hannan's endorsement of
post-Quinean epistemology - which is concerned to deny the possibility of such a
priori stipulation.
While Hannan may be open to criticism for her inconsistency, this does not of itself
render claims (a) and (b) above false. Baker's more significant criticism is that
Hannan's argument rests upon an equivocation on the term 'rational':
'If we take 'rational' in a pre-theoretical sense, so that most everyone would agree
on which were rational capacities, then [the claim that cognition involves rational
capacities] ... is unproblematically true. But in the sense of 'rational capacities'
that would make [this claim] ... true, [the claim that rational capacities cannot be
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explained other than by reference to internal states that possess propositional
content],.. would not be available as a premise in the argument.[13]
Baker's objection is that there is no empirical evidence for this latter claim (i.e. the
claim that we cannot dispense with reference to internal states which possess
propositional content). As earlier suggested, the difficulty here lies with Hannan's
presentation of her case, which may be taken as committing her to the existence of a
language of thought, by virtue of her reference to the 'possession' by mental states of
propositional content. Had she eschewed use of the term 'possession', then Baker's
objection would surely lack force. An alternative presentation of Hannan's argument
might be as follows:
i. any science of mind must account for the stimulus-independence of
human action;
ii. this account must present action as being rational;
iii. any such account will advert to processes which may be described by
means of sentences in natural language - so that propositional
characterisation of one's mental states (at least) cannot be mistaken.
Premise (iii) above makes no commitment to the actual existence of token
propositional or sentential items in the head. In my earlier discussion of theories I
suggested that any replacement which Churchland proposes for the sentential model of
theory, designed to accommodate his claim that the role of philosophy - and by
extension philosophical theory - is speculative, must respect the necessary condition
for a set (x) to have the property of being speculative that (x) be at least expressible as
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a set of sentences. [14] Here the same point can be brought to bear in defence of
Hannan's position: while it may be thought plausible to argue that neither theories nor
human heads actually contain sentences, it is nonetheless a priori that both speculation
and accounts of human agency must be open to sentential description. Both Hannan
and Baker have conceded too much to the eliminativist in accepting the pragmatist
epistemology 'that makes [eliminativism] possible' .Thus, for example, Hannan claims
that:
'we don't know which of our current 'indubitable truths' will turn out to be
doubtful after all, in the light of future empirical discoveries and conceptual
changes ...'.[15]
As Hannan goes on to point out, this claim is in turn used by the eliminativist in
support of the further claim that folk psychology consists of a speculative body of
claims - and that, as such, it is a candidate for reduction or elimination (i.e. it underpins
the 'folk-theory theory, the truth of which, as already noted, is a constraint on the
truth of the central claim of eliminative materialism). [16] Reluctance to endorse the
seemingly unfashionable analytic/ synthetic distinction has led in Hannan's paper to a
failure to press her - very telling - criticism of eliminativism with sufficient force.
Consistent with her apparent acceptance of the possibility of'future empirical
discoveries and conceptual changes', Hannan anticipates the eliminativists' response:
'... the eliminativist will protest at this point that I am begging the question;
cognition and rationality are concepts that (like all concepts) could change over
time or become outmoded.'.[17]
58
Rather than press the objection that this is in fact an impossible outcome - it is a priori
that cognitive states are rational, and that instances of rational choice are at least open
to propositional description, Hannan adheres to the pragmatic line on this occasion:
'... in the absence of plausible replacements for these concepts ... don't we have
ample reason to bet against the eliminativist?'.[18]
This reiterates an earlier suggestion that: 'in the absence of contenders for replacement
concepts, it is reasonable to say to the eliminativist ... "Put up or shut up"'.[19]
Two observations can be made regarding this line of attack. Firstly, it is a weak
response to eliminativism - presumably necessitated by Hannan's desire to maintain
allegiance to post-logical positivist epistemology, despite her de facto use of
conceptual analysis to present a potentially very effective problem for eliminativism.
Secondly, the argument demonstrates how, by shifting the focus of debate on to the
empirical ground favoured by Churchland, and thus denying herself the opportunity to
maximise the effectiveness of her critique, Hannan allows her opponent the
opportunity of counterattack. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, as far as
empirical studies are concerned: as Hannan herself notes, the eliminativist will accuse
her of begging the question.
In his own response to Hannan's paper, Paul Churchland characterises Hannan's 'put
up or shut up' argument as: 'if [folk psychology] is currently the only boat afloat, isn't
this ample reason to expect that it will continue to be the only boat afloat?'.[20] Thus
presented, the argument is clearly invalid - though for reasons stated earlier,
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Churchland will presumably not present his counter-argument in these terms. [21]
Churchland writes in entirely figurative terms in this part of his essay, so that his
meaning is obscured. Thus, for example, he here promotes a relatively moderate form
of eliminativism, which merely 'urges the poverty of our current home', together with
'the pressing need to explore the construction of one or more new ones, and the
probability that we will eventually move into one of them'. [22] It is left unclear what it
is which the possible replacements would be replacementsfor. If Churchland is here
envisaging replacements for the concepts cognition and rationality, then it remains to
be seen what he takes these concepts to be. Churchland's earlier-noted allusion to folk
psychology in his response to Hannan suggests that what he envisages replacing is the
putative theoretical posits of folk psychology. If we take Hannan not as arguing for
some form of language of thought, but rather for internal states which are
appropriately characterizable as having propositional content, then Churchland must
be taken to be arguing here for the possible future discovery of internal states which
are not so characterizable. Speculation and the eschewal of traditional epistemology
may lead Churchland to regard this is a possibility. But my inclination is here to press
the question: in virtue of what would these states then participate in processes which
could aptly be described as cognitive or rational states?
I proposed earlier a reconstruction of Hannan's 'rationality' argument which is, I
suggest, immune to the criticism levelled against it by Baker:
i. any science of mind must account for the stimulus-independence of
human action;
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ii. this account must present action as being rational;
iii. any such account will advert to processes which may be described by
means of sentences in natural language - so that propositional
characterisation of one's mental states (at least) cannot be mistaken.
Regarding (i), Churchland's options are either to deny stimulus-independence, or to
deny that it is the task of a science of mind to account for stimulus-independence - or
to accept the premise. Interestingly, Churchland chooses not to address the 'burning
building' example - an example which, I have suggested, presents an especially serious
challenge to eliminativism. The denial of stimulus-independence would appear not to
be an option for Churchland, who notes, as a 'major flaw' of behaviourism that it
'evidently ignored, or even denied, the "inner" aspect of our mental states'. [23] As a
science of mind must surely therefore give an account of the inner causal states which
give rise to the woman's fleeing the burning building, I assume that Churchland will
endorse the first premise in my reconstruction of Hannan's argument.
Whether Churchland will also endorse the second of my premises - that action must be
construed as being rational - is less clear. Churchland opens his essay by characterising
the conventional self-conception as 'a rational economy of propositional attitudes'[24]
- but appears to envisage only the elimination of the propositional attitudes - construed
realistically, as being somehow tokened in the brain. Rationality would presumably
thus survive - though rational processes would not be held to consist in manipulations
of internally-coded propositional attitudes. Patricia Churchland appears to vindicate
this reading[25], when she alludes to our currently 'inchoate understanding of
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rationality, which is all we have, until neuroscience and psychology yield a more
complete theory of mind-brain function'. [26] I take it that we can thus assume that the
future development of neuroscience is not thought likely to result in the elimination of
rationality - though, in the spirit of scientific pragmatism, we ought to avoid
attempting to stipulate a priori what the explananda of science are in advance of the
future development of that science: scientists who embarked on a research programme
to investigate alchemy eventually eliminated alchemy as a legitimate part of our
conceptual scheme, and such historical precedents are salutary for the Churchlands.
Ifwe assume that Churchland is thus liable to accept - perhaps with some modification
- the first two premises, this leaves the third: the acceptability of the propositional
characterisation of one's inner states. It is here that Clark's 'Sentential/ Intentional
Eliminativism' dichotomy comes into play, and Clark's contention that 'eliminativists
like Paul Churchland have ... tended to shift around a little between these two
positions'.[27] In his rejection of Hannan's 'no existing alternatives' critique,
Churchland alludes to 'some very specific and highly promising "replacement
concepts" under active exploration'.[28] Churchland proceeds to outline the current
research findings in connectionism. Referring to the representational apparatus
postulated by this research, Churchland uses scare quotes in referring to 'the
"semantics" of the representation' .But the following sentence, with its allusion to
'information-preserving transformation from external world to internal representation'
[29] suggests that the eliminativism at work here is (mere) sentential eliminativism:
what is being denied is that these putative representations have a sentential structure.
Where there is 'information preserving transformation', the subject of this
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transformation must be open to description in terms of propositions expressed in
natural language. As Clark points out, Churchland reinforces this reading by elsewhere
providing just such a description of these intrinsically non-sentential representations:
'Is the mouse eating sesame seeds? Or hickory nuts? Is it avoiding a cat? Or a
hawk?[30]
It seems, then, that there is no significant difference between Hannan's paper and
Churchland's response in terms of what both would be prepared to eliminate: on this
occasion, at least, Churchland is a (merely) sentential eliminativist: he denies that,
corresponding to the propositional descriptions of inner states, there are sentential (or
quasi-sentential) tokens, somehow encoded in the brain. Hannan also denies this -
though her unsupported claim that 'propositional attitudes exist', especially if taken
out of context, may be thought to suggest otherwise.
Representation in the brain, claims Churchland, involves 'vectorial representations' -
intrinsically non-sentential patterns of brain activity. Churchland concludes:
'What is important for the issues of this paper is that the relevant sciences have
indeed articulated fertile and systematic theories concerning representation and
computation in the brain. From the perspective of those theories, the most general
and fundamental form of representation in the brain has nothing discernible to do
with propositions, and the most general and fundamental form of computation in
the brain has nothing to do with inferences between propositions. The brain
appears to be playing a different game from the game that [folk psychology]
ascribes to it'.[31]
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While Churchland has, in this paper, presented a case merely for the elimination of
sententially-structured tokens in the brain, this last quotation demonstrates how he
may be tempted to go beyond this claim, to the stronger claim that propositional
description of our inner states is inappropriate (i.e. to make the transition from
sentential- to intentional eliminativism, in Clark's terms). If the brain is 'playing a
different game' from that postulated by folk psychology, then isn't this a compelling
ground for eliminating descriptions using folk-psychological locutions? As Clark
points out, Churchland succumbs to this temptation in the speculative concluding
section of his paper 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes'. Here
Churchland contemplates 'three scenarios in which the operative conception of
cognitive activity is progressively divorced from the forms and categories that
characterise natural language'. [3 2] On the first of these scenarios, neuroscience
discovers 'a new kinematics and correlative dynamics for what is now thought of as
cognitive activity'.[33] What this amounts to is empirical support for sentential
eliminativism - where what sentential eliminativism eliminates is both
sententially-structured tokens in the brain, and a dynamics directly analogous to the
relations of entailment etc. which obtain between the propositions which these
sentence represent. Churchland is, on his own terms, charitable to folk psychology at
this stage - folk-psychological accounts of the inner reality 'do carry significant
information regarding it, and are thus fit to function as elements in a communication
system'.[34] Folk psychological descriptions are, however, likened to the shadows on
the wall of Plato's cave. The folk description is capturing only a 'narrow part of the
reality' .Hence the temptation to eschew all use of folk psychology, at least in any
attempt to convey accurately how cognition operates. [3 5]
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This raises the question of how inaccurate a set of descriptive resources may be
permitted to be, without succumbing to elimination. Fodorian enthusiasts for folk
psychology will surely take any such description as "(x) believes that (p) " to be a
partial and simplistic account of one part of the 'rational economy of propositional
attitudes', which will embrace occurrent beliefs; dispositional beliefs; (perhaps)
subconscious beliefs; beliefs which are held with greater and lesser degrees of
conviction; beliefs which (x) might relinquish on closer inspection, in the light of
discovered inconsistencies with other beliefs which (x) holds true, and so on. The
difficulty with Churchland's account here is that it seems to depend upon a straw man
argument, in that no proponent of folk psychology will take its descriptive resources to
be generally entirely accurate and exhaustive in their account of an individual's
cognitive state. It will, surely, be a largely arbitrary matter of stipulation as to how
inaccurate a particular mode of description will be permitted to be, without being
subject to elimination. [36]
As Churchland appears to suggest, his putatively superior descriptive apparatus is
itself capable of rendering only an approximate account of what is going on during
cognitive processes: he refers to "'solid" states' (quotation marks in original)[37], and
concedes that 'exhaustive accounting of all dynamically relevant adjacent "solids" is
not practically possible'. [3 8] So, prima facie, we have two partial accounts of the
putative inner reality. Given that one of them - the folk account - is familiar and easy
to apply (and enjoys considerable predictive success), it might be thought difficult to
see what might motivate the difficult transition to relinquishing folk psychology's
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descriptive apparatus, and replacing this with an account in terms of "solids" within a
four- or five dimensional phase space.
There is, however, a stronger motivation than I have hitherto attributed to Churchland,
and which becomes evident when he comments that' [folk psychological descriptions
of cognitive processes are] ... unfit to represent the deeper reality in all its
kinematically, dynamically, and even normatively relevant aspects'.[39] 'Folk
theory-theory' is again performing a role in supporting eliminativism - hence the
demand that folk psychology 'represent the deeper reality' .Having earlier been used in
an attempt to justify the claim that folk psychology must reduce or be eliminated, the
theory-theory thesis here compels the transition from sentential eliminativism to
intentional eliminativism, so that description of mental states which avails itself of
propositions and relations between propositions is to be rejected. As a theory, folk
psychology carries with it a set of ontological commitments - and, as Churchland
suggests in the opening paragraph of 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes', '... both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be
displaced ... by completed neuroscience' .Given the theoretical status of folk
psychology, there cannot be an employment of the theory which carries with it no
commitment to the existence of token sentences in the head - as this is the ontology of
the theory. If the use of folk psychological locutions entails that there are sentences in
the head, then the claim that there are no sentences in the head entails the falsity of
folk psychology qua theory. [40]
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If the central claim of sentential eliminativism is false[41], then intentional
eliminativism must be false: if there are tokens in the head which are tokens of
propositional attitudes, then it cannot be erroneous to utilise intentional idioms to
describe mental processes. But, as already noted, the truth of the sentential
eliminativist claim is necessary, but not sufficient for intentional eliminativism.
Dennett, for example, will endorse sentential eliminativism, but, as an instrumentalist,
will not endorse intentional eliminativism - citing the falsity of the theory-theory thesis
as the reason. Sentential eliminativism is, in fact, a very modest thesis - and certainly
seems far too modest to accommodate the Kuhnian ambitions of Churchland.[42] Nor
need the truth of the sentential eliminativist thesis entail the falsity of folk
psychological attributions. If folk psychology is not a theory, then there are no
corresponding theoretical entities - which would, on Churchland's account, be the
mentalese tokens. If the claim that (x) believes that (p) does not entail the claim that
(x) stands in a believing relationship to some physical brain token which represents that
(p), then the fact that (x) does not stand in any such physical relationship will not
imperil the predictive and explanatory adequacy of folk psychology, which will survive
whatever findings neuroscience delivers. This demonstrates the pressing need on the
part of eliminativists for folk psychology to be taken to be a theory. For sentential
eliminativism without theory-theory will not threaten 'the greatest intellectual
catastrophe in the history of our species.'.[43]
But it seems that it might also be possible for sentential eliminativism's central claim to
be held true, and for the theory-theory claim to be true, but for intentional
eliminativism yet not to be vindicated. This would arise if folk psychology were, qua
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theory, to quantify over entities which, as conventionally described, didn't exist[44] -
but where its explanations and predictions retained their accuracy (as presumably they
must, under these circumstances). The problem which arises here is the problem of
stating under what circumstances an established theory's ontological commitments are
false: as noted in my last chapter, this is the problem to which Stich alludes, when he
asks:
'could it not be the case that folk psychology and computational theories are
talking about exactly the same things, and that folk theory is just wrong about
them?'. [45]
If, as Churchland claims, the entities being studied by connectionists have 'semantic'
and 'syntactic' properties, then it is by no means clear that the appropriate 'judgement
call' is in favour of the claim that folk psychology and neurophilosophy are talking
about different things, rather than the claim that they are talking about the same things,
but folk psychology is putatively mistaken in its characterisation of them. Churchland
clearly needs to press the former claim in order for eliminativism to have any
substance: as Clark argues, '... most recently published pro-Eliminativist writings
manage to support [only sentential eliminativism]'.[46] If sentential eliminativism is to
be construed as being the claim that folk psychology is wrong about some details of
mentality, then, if that claim is taken to be equivalent to 'eliminative materialism', then
surely no philosopher (or informed layman) will be anything other than an eliminative
materialist.
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The claim which sentential eliminativism contests is thus ill-defined, and hence
sentential eliminativism is itself a vague thesis. Stich presents the contested thesis with
a literal construal of the claim that there are 'sentences in the head', which are
analogous to messages on a CRT:
. Fodor takes the objects of thought to be sentences in a species-wide mental
code, the language of thought.'[47]
Horgan and Tienson, on the other hand, suggest that:
'a cognizer has a language of thought if it has a system of syntactically structured
representations that undergo processes sensitive to that structure.'[48]
The fact of Churchland's using the terms 'semantics' and 'syntax' - albeit in scare
quotes[49] - serves to demonstrate how elusive is the claim that sentential
eliminativism seeks to oppose. Churchland uses the term 'representation' to describe
the role of 'patterns of activation levels of neurons' - these giving rise to '... principled
transformation(sf .It is instructive to read this in light ofFodor's assessment of the
conditions for the vindication of folk psychology:
'Common sense would be vindicated if some good theory of the mind proved to be
committed to entities which - like the [propositional] attitudes - are both
semantically evaluable and etiologically involved'.[50]
It's unclear what grounds - if any - Fodor would advance for not accepting that
Churchland's activation vectors, if proven empirically to exist, and to 'represent' and
'transform', 'vindicate common sense' in the requisite manner. Part of the difficulty is,
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of course, with the term 'representation': the claim that (a) represents (b) is, in this
context, impossible to justify - for the reason advanced by Madell:
'No physical item can intrinsically be a representation of anything. As Dennett has
argued, it can be a representation onlyfor or to someone'. [51]
The insistently third-person approach adopted by physicalists such as Fodor and
Churchland must raise a further problem, in that they cannot accommodate in their
theses a self for whom the representation is a representation. Even if, per impossibile,
there were to be some means of introspecting activation vectors amongst the neurons
in one's head, the account offered by the physicalist would be mired in infinite regress,
as awareness of this would be in terms of an activation vector, which would in turn be
known only by a further activation vector ...
Of course, while Fodor may not take Churchland's speculations as being a potential
vindication of folk psychology, Churchland will certainly not take his findings in this
way. For him, the criterion for vindication would be theoretical integration of folk
psychology qua theory - so that he must reject Fodor's criteria for vindication cited
above. However, at the token level, what Churchland offers, and what Fodor claims to
seek, seem to correspond. The difference is, I take it, in the nature of the aetiology
offered by Churchland and sought by Fodor. Fodor wants causal mechanisms which
correspond to the logical connections between propositions - and Churchland claims
that empirical research work into activation vectors reveals causal connections which
don't have this property. Thus Fodor:
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'What connects the causal-historical aspect of [trains of thought] ... to its
plausible- inference aspect is a general principle whose significance can hardly be
over-emphasised: the train of thoughts that causes one to believe that such and
such provides ... reasonable grounds for believing that such and such. Were this
not the case - were there not this harmony between the semantic contents of
thoughts and their causal powers - there wouldn't, after all, be much profit in
thinking'. [52]
And, by contrast, Churchland:
... the most general and fundamental form of representation in the brain has
nothing discernible to do with propositions, and the most general and fundamental
form of computation in the brain has nothing discernible to do with inferences
between propositions. The brain appears to be playing a different game from the
game that [folk psychology] ascribes to it.[53]
Churchland's position here seems problematic in two respects: firstly, it is unclear
what one would look for were one to look for physical features of the brain which did
have 'something discernible to do with propositions', or whose causal transactions had
something to do with inferences between these propositions. That what research
evidence there is has found no appearance of the brain 'playing this game' seems
hardly surprising. But, secondly, if the states which Churchland identifies don't play
this game, then Churchland must surely have no adequate response to Fodor's point
that the account which neuroscience offers in any putative science of mind must
respect the inferences which obtain between propositional attitudes during instances of
rational thought. [54]
Churchland thus faces a difficulty: the empirical evidence which he cites can, at best,
support only the claim that there are no sentences in the head. Given the difficulty in
proving the truth of a negative empirical existential statement, it may be doubted
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whether even this much is likely to be demonstrable by connectionist-inspired empirical
research. The further claim that folk psychology is a theory is not empirically
demonstrable. But the claim that there are no sentences in the head will not, of itself,
support the elimination of folk psychology, as outlined in my opening chapter. Even
with the addition of the further claim that folk psychology is a theory, a 'judgement
call' is required in order to press the further claim for its elimination, due to the
difficulty in resolving the 'reference' problem raised by Stich and Lycan. But, having
made this judgement call - on what can only be rather impressionistic grounds of'gut
feeling', Churchland now faces a new problem: his own use of propositional
description of inner states notwithstanding, description of such states in these terms is
in fact erroneous - and is presumably justified only on the grounds that we have not yet
'constructed a new [house] ... that invites us to move in.[55] But intentional
eliminativism, while genuinely eliminative, and hence not open to the criticism of being
too modest which I have levelled against sentential eliminativism, is now confronted
with a problem: how can this position preserve our perception of ourselves as rational
agents? Fodor's constraint on a science of mind - that it must respect the inferences
which obtain between propositional attitudes during instances of rational thought -
cannot be dismissed. Even if propositional attitudes are not physically tokened in the
brain, even if folk psychology is a theory which has as its ontology such tokens, the
fact remains that our understanding of rationality is ineliminably tied to behaviour
being rational in virtue of its being consistent with the antecedent beliefs and desires of
the agent. If intentional eliminativism is held true, then this self-image must be held to
be false.
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The eliminativist's options at this stage would appear to be:
i. deny the conclusion by pressing the more modest thesis of sentential
eliminativism;
ii. accept the conclusion;
or
iii. attempt to postulate some basis for preserving rational agenthood in some
form which is describable without recourse to the propositional-style
locutions utilised by the folk.
Option (i) presents the difficulties to which I earlier alluded - that such a position will
render the eliminativist thesis so modest that philosophers who are not even
physicalists will endorse it, and that in consequence the eliminativist position cannot
sustain Churchland's ambitions for a Kuhnian paradigm shift.
Option (ii) is surely incoherent. There can be no rational argument for the
abandonment of rationality - which is equivalent to there being no argument for this
position. Churchland may object that this is a purely a priori argument - and hence
intrinsically antagonistic towards the epistemology which makes eliminativism
possible, and that such paradoxes '... signal only the depth and far-reaching character
of the conceptual revolution that [eliminative materialism] would have us
contemplate'.[56] But this defence relies upon an epistemology which is in turn left
undefended by Churchland. [57] Furthermore, the promise of a non-incoherent
formulation is - even ifwe accept Churchland's epistemological stance - based on an
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what is left as a remote future scientific possibility, so that Churchland's earlier-noted
claim that the true task of the philosopher is speculation regarding the future
discoveries of science is given an enormous burden of defence to perform on this
occasion.
Option (iii) may thus seem attractive to the eliminativist, as an alternative to both
weakness and incoherence. Given his epistemological stance, Churchland can feel free
to reject the claim that it is analytic that agenthood entails rationality, and that
rationality in turn entails the claim that rational procedures may be characterised
propositionally. The task will be to envisage a radical reconfiguration of natural
language - so that rationality can be sustained, but in some currently unimaginable
form. This is the bizarre possibility which Churchland takes as the second of his
'scenarios in which the operative definition of cognitive activity is progressively
divorced from the forms and categories that characterise natural language'.[58]
On this second scenario, we are:
... guided by our new understanding of those internal structures [to] ... construct
a new system of communication entirely distinct from natural language ... the
compounded strings of this new system ... are not evaluated as true or false, nor
are the relations between them remotely analogous to the relations of entailment,
etc., that hold between sentences.[59]
The latter observation raises the question of how such a scenario could be taken to be
an alternative account of rationality: once again Churchland can fall back on his
rejection of the claim that we can stipulate a priori that rationality must be accounted
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for via 'the relations of entailment, etc., that hold between sentences' .On this occasion
there seems to be no recourse to the claim that it is a matter for judgement whether the
new concept is the same as the old concept, only differently construed, or whether
there is the replacement of one concept by an entirely new and alternative concept. If
this form of eliminativism - what Clark aptly terms 'catastrophic eliminativism' - is to
address the objection levelled against intentional eliminativism that it fails to account
for rationality, then it is rationality which must accounted for via catastrophic
eliminativism, independently of any analytic consideration.
Churchland attempts to clarity his position in a more recent paper, where he observes
that:
the bottom line claim of the eliminative materialist ... is and always has been that
the content and character ofour socialpractices in the domain ofmutual
perception, explanation, anticipation, and behavioural interaction are going to
change, and change substantially, with the dawning ofa truly adequate
neuropsychology, (italics in original)[60]
Churchland's claim here is ambiguous. He alludes to social practice - so that
something more radical than eliminability at the level of scientific practice is envisaged.
He also envisages elimination in practice - which is stronger than eliminability in
principle - in that the former is sufficient for the latter, but not vice-versa. The
'judgement call' is still necessary, with regard to intentional eliminativism: will it be
taken to be mistaken to describe the rationality of'our social practices' using
propositional attitudes? If Churchland is proposing merely that our understanding of
activation vectors, together with our resources for their description, will gain with
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future scientific progress, so that we actually choose to dispense with
propositional-attitude description but need not, then the 'bottom line' claim of
eliminativism amounts to the very modest claims: (a) that the language of thought
thesis is false; and (b) we will in future have a richer understanding of the causal/
representational entities which do exist in our heads. Only when combined with the
further claims: that folk psychology is a theory; and that all theories which are not
reducible to the physical ought to be eliminated, do we have a thesis which is
effectively eliminative. But as I have earlier argued, the 'theory-theory' claim is not
defensible, and the 'unity of science' claim is a mere dogmatic assertion - so that, as it
stands in this quotation, the 'bottom line' of eliminativism is surprisingly modest.
It is instructive to read Adrian Cussins' response to Hannan's target paper in the light
of Churchland's 'bottom line'.[61] Cussins' central claim here is that Hannan's
criticisms: ' ... all depend on a simple failure to understand what it is that
eliminativism proposes to eliminate and what it is that eliminativism proposes to
substitute'.[62] Cussins opens his paper with the claim that eliminativism's critics
assume that 'the only kind of content is propositional or conceptual content'[63], and
that the critics therefore beg the question against 'embodied representation'.
It isn't clear from this what it is that Cussins is taking his opponents to be assuming.
The claim that 'all content is propositional' can be endorsed without making the
further claim that there is a language of thought (i.e. we can claim that all content must
be open to propositional description, so that in that sense it is 'propositional') .As I
have earlier urged, only in conjunction with the theory-theory does the critic appear to
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endorse an ontology of internally-coded propositions. But Cussins' claim raises a
further question: what is it for a representation to be an 'embodied representation'? .It
is not clear in virtue of what any such 'representation' is a representation. As earlier
suggested, a necessary condition for a representation being so is that it is a
representation to or for some observer. Thus, for example, Putnam presents a case
where:
An ant is crawling on a patch of sand. As it crawls, it traces a line in the sand. By
pure chance the line that it traces curves and recrosses itself in such a way that it
ends up looking like a recognisable caricature of Winston Churchill. Has the ant
traced a picture of Winston Churchill, a picture that depicts Churchill?[64]
As Putnam goes on to suggest, we must conclude that the line is not "in itself' a
representation of anything rather than anything else. There can be no intrinsic
representation: the line looks like Churchill only to us - as interpreters of the putatively
representational entity. It thus appears that it is not sufficient for (a) being a
representation of (b) that (a) be embodied. A further difficulty arises when we ask:
what is it for a representation to be 'embodied' ? I earlier noted that Churchland's
response to Hannan's paper neglected directly to address the 'rationality' issue raised
by the Pylyshyn 'burning building' example. It is unclear how 'embodied
representation' can save rationality: the mere fact of the meanings of the various
indications that the building is on fire being embodied within the head of the woman
(whatever we must take this to mean) cannot be sufficient to account for the
rationality of her fleeing the building. The representations thus encoded must be
representations to her - and this latter component of any adequate account of rational
choice seems likely to be missed by any such attempt to naturalise meaning.
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Finally regarding Cussins' claim, we again encounter the problem of saying whether
any putative account of rationality based upon embodied representation will be capable
ofdescription via propositional attitudes - that is, the question of whether Cussins is
defending intentional eliminativism, or mere sentential eliminativism.
Cussins proceeds to set out three possible targets for elimination:
(1) Folk psychological or common-sense psychological practice
(2) Content or meaning or belief or rationality ...
(3) The purported referents of Propositional Attitude theories of
psychology', (ellipsis in original)[65]
The first of these is a straw man argument, based upon a confusion between
eliminability in principle - which Churchland and others do postulate - and 'the
grotesque ... political proposal'[66] which no critic attributes to eliminativism, namely
that individuals be somehow prohibited from using folk psychological locutions. [67]
With the second of these possible targets for elimination, we return to the issue of
whether it is in fact possible for eliminativism to preserve meaning and rationality. This
will depend in part upon the nature of the claim which eliminativism does in fact make.
Cussins here makes the claim that 'meaning content, belief and rationality are in the
world and likely to remain so'.[68] I take it that what is meant here is that in virtue of
being embodied, these semantic properties are naturalised - 'in the world'. Cussins'
attempted vindication of eliminativism depends upon keeping options (2) and (3)
above separate - that is, he must maintain that one can eliminate sentences-in-the-head,
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but nonetheless retain meaning and rationality. Interestingly, this is taken to entail the
possible retention of representational content by the eliminativist:
... these consequences[69] would follow if eliminativism abandons
representational content, but it does not ...[70]
What is at stake is here made quite explicit: if the abandonment of representational
content has catastrophic, massively counterintuitive consequences, then the
eliminativist must either embrace these consequences or retain representational
content. But the retention of representational content surely impels the eliminativist
towards a thesis so modest that it really does not merit the designation 'eliminativist':
... the real eliminativism - eliminates meanings-as-propositions and beliefs-as-
propositional attitudes by rejecting the propositional theory of meaning and the
propositional attitude theory ofbelief .[71]
If, on Cussins' account, meaning (i.e. content) and belief is embodied, but is
non-propositional, then all that his 'real eliminativism' eliminates is something akin to
Fodor's language of thought. Cussins goes on to suggest that'... most of the
arguments marshalled against eliminativism do not carry any weight against this third
construal of eliminativism'. [72] This seems hardly surprising, as the third construal
will find favour with such trenchant (and diverse) awfr'-eliminativists as Lynn Rudder
Baker and Geoffrey Madell.
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In his concern to render the eliminativist thesis moderate, and hence immune to the
criticisms of allegedly misguided anti-eliminativists, Cussins even goes so far as to
attack, on the Churchlands' behalf, intentional eliminativism:
'it is no part of the Churchlands' program to engage in the dubiously coherent
exercise of rejecting all possible theories of representational content'. [73]
It is unclear what Cussins means by the term 'dubiously coherent' - but in deploying an
argument frequently levelled by anti-eliminativists (i.e. that eliminativism, in denying
the reality of belief, or truth or rationality, is self-defeating), Cussins appears to be
endorsing traditional epistemological dichotomies - those which are abandoned by 'the
epistemology that makes eliminativism possible' .For the naturalised epistemologist,
the criterion for coherence will be coherence with the rest of science (philosophy
differing from science merely by degree of entrenchment of the claims which it makes)
- hence the case for elimination in the light of principled irreducibility. I leave to the
following chapter the question ofwhether representation, together with the semantic
network of which it is a key component, can be 'naturalised ' .
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CHAPTER 4 WHAT STRENGTH OF ELIMEVATIVISM DOES PDP
ACCOMMODATE^]?
My last chapter has argued that eliminativists have a dilemma: one version of the
eliminativist claim is too weak to be taken seriously as elimination ('sentential
eliminativism', which merely eliminates 'sentences in the head'); the stronger claim
that sentential descriptions of mental states and processes ought to be eliminated
leaves us without any way of accounting for human rationality, unless supplemented by
some as-yet unavailable non-sentential system of verbal communication.
Paul Churchland's most recent essays have demonstrated his enthusiasm for the
'prototype activation' model of cognition - which yields:
a novel and unorthodox conception ofwhat cognition consists in [and which
derives from] current research in cognitive neurobiology and from PDP models of
brain function. [2]
The precise contribution of each of these scientific disciplines is not specified by
Churchland explicitly: I take it that neurobiology provides information on the synaptic
firings and synaptic connections in the human brain, and that PDP modelling in
artificial intelligence yields an outcome which is held to be consistent with the
neurobiology, in that the synaptic dynamics identified by neurobiology could be the
medium for the cognitive dynamics postulated by PDP researchers. For present
purposes, what is most significant about the PDP models is:
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their almost complete dissociation from the sentential or propositional conception
of what knowledge consists in, and from the conception of human information
processing as rule-governed inference, (italics in original)[3]
Churchland's use here of the term 'almost complete' is confusing - as a great deal
hangs on the extent to which dissociation from sententialism is achieved by the model.
As I will demonstrate, the model has no room in its ontology for sentences or
propositions or their surrogates, so that sentential eliminativism obtains for the models.
[4] But the claim that there are no 'sentences in the head' is, as earlier argued, in itself
too weak to stand as a genuinely eliminative materialism. The significantly stronger
(and genuinely eliminative) claim that sentential descriptions of mental states and
processes ought not to be utilised is not entailed by the modest discovery of sentential
eliminativism at the level of models of cognition. There is a further possibility: that
PDP models, while not themselves employing sentential surrogates, nonetheless
replicate human cognition which does employ sentential surrogates. It is unclear what
further evidence would be required in order to arrive at the conclusion that absence of
sentential entities in the model entails their absence in human mind/brains: perhaps if
the research findings of neurobiologists demonstrated configurations of synaptic
activity which were demonstrably isomorphic with the configurations of
prototype-activation in PDP models, and hence hopelessly ill-suited to performing
'classical' cognitive processes, then the likelihood that sentential eliminativism was
true of both would have to be conceded. Even then, however, one would require a
further argument for intentional eliminativism - hence the intriguing uncertainty
surrounding Churchland's use of the word 'almost' in the quotation.[5]
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The prototype-activation model postulates no significant distinction between
explanatory understanding (which is, for Churchland's present purposes, the
explanandum), and perceptual recognition. His claim is that 'essentially the same kind
of computational achievement underlies both...'[6], This claim seems tendentious. If
we say that to have an explanatory understanding is to be able to produce some
account of how or why some phenomenon is as it is, then this is surely a more
elaborate process than is perceptual recognition. It is explanatorily convenient for
Churchland to postulate this close analogy - as the examples which he cites of actual
successful PDP modelling (which I will shortly discuss) are examples of successful
recognition. I can, however, recognise some (x) - such as a carburettor, or a van de
graaff generator, without being able to do any more than state what it is. The
'computational achievement' involved in explanation is greater than this - even where
my explanation is partial, or cursory, or prone to error in certain key respects. In his
defence, Churchland will be able to claim, from this, that there are degrees of
explanatory understanding. But there again seems to be an asymmetry between
explanation and recognition, in that whether something is recognised as being a token
of some particular type is an all-or-nothing affair. [7] Thus the fact that a model can
putatively recognise does not entail that there is explanatory understanding, or the
capacity for explanatory understanding. [8] The conflation of recognition and
understanding is important, as Churchland goes on to present a PDP account of
perceptual recognition - in the hope of having ipso facto produced a PDP account of
explanatory understanding.
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Churchland introduces his novel new account of cognition by alluding to the perceived
shortcomings of its putative rival, the 'deductive-nomological' model of explanation.
Churchland notes that:
while much attention has been paid to the logical virtues and vices of this model,
relatively little has been paid to its shortcomings when evaluated from a
psychological point of view. [9]
This opening claim of Churchland's reveals a point which is crucial in his writing -
namely, that for Churchland, theories and explanations are inside the mind/brains of
those whose theories and explanations they are - and are not mere abstract entities. As
a key figure in the development of the deductive-nomological model, Carl Hempel, in
his Aspects ofScientific Explanation, did not appear to take himself to be doing
psychology. Hempel's claim is that to give a scientific explanation of a phenomenon
(x) is to show how (x) is subsumed under a law of nature. This can be set out in the
form of a deductive argument - where the premises are the explanans, and the
conclusion is the explanandum. IfHempel were to subscribe to the view that
explanations are brain events, then, I take it, Hempel would endorse some model of
mental processes such as Fodor's, with mental surrogates for each premise entering
into causal relationships which eventuate in the mental surrogate for the sentence
which is the conclusion of the argument. In this case, Hempel's model would, indeed,
be a candidate for psychological criticism. If, on the other hand, Hempel is concerned
exclusively with the logic, rather than the psychology, of explanation, then no
Fodorian commitment is entailed by a thesis which does not locate explanations in the
brains of those who formulate them. [10]
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Churchland's alternative account derives from research which takes neurobiological
research as being primary: neurobiologists present findings regarding the neuronal
organisation of the brain, and artificial networks are subsequently developed which
simulate or model the salient features of this neuronal organisation. What allegedly
renders these artificial networks compelling is that they appear to be more
psychologically realistic than more conventional, 'classical' models. One interesting
example of this is the phenomenon of'graceful degradation': interrupting a
conventional, 'serial' program by taking out one tiny part will typically result in the
destruction of the entire process; by contrast, the 'parallel' processing undertaken by
connectionist networks can have whole sections removed, resulting in continuous
degradation, rather than a sudden 'crash'. To the extent that human cognitive faculties
such as recognition do degrade gracefully following some process such as the onset of
dementia, the connectionist model is thus more effective in accounting for this than is
the classical von Neumann serial-processing model.
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The diagram above is an abstract depiction of the organisation of a PDP network. [11]
There are three types of units: 'input units' are proximal to the external environment
(e.g. the physical entity which is to be recognised, in the simple case of sensory
recognition); 'output units' yield the ultimate result; the 'hidden units' (of which there
may be a great many levels - only one is represented here) mediate between the input
and output levels, it being here that the actual work of cognition takes place. For a
functioning brain, Churchland's claim is that the input level neurons will be sensory
neurons (so that in the case of visual perception, these will be located in the brain's
visual cortex, and - as input units - these neurons will be the first to be activated by
patterns of activity sent along the optic nerve). The lines in the diagram connecting
each input unit to a hidden level unit represent synaptic connections in the brain
(Churchland notes that in practice there may be hundreds of thousands of such
connections from a single neuron, rather than the three here depicted). Via these
synaptic connections, activation at the input level is transmitted to the hidden level(s).
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This transmission may, for each separate connection, be either activation or inhibition -
and to varying degrees, depending on the strength of the signal (the level of activation
of the input unit), the strength of the synaptic connection, and its polarity (activational
or inhibitory). Each hidden unit's activation is the aggregate of these three variables
for each of the connected input units. The result is thus that a pattern of activation at
the input level (an 'activation vector') will cause an activation vector at the hidden
level. For any given activation vector at the input level, it is the configuration of
synaptic weights which will determine the vector at the hidden level. [12] By the same
process, the vector at the hidden level(s) result in an eventual output vector.
This model marks a departure from 'classical' models firstly in having no explicit
propositional representations - that is, if the account of neural processing is correct,
then sentential eliminativism is vindicated for human cognition, and not just for the
models which have been constructed on PDP principles. Rather than being stored in
some sentential surrogate, there is implicit and 'distributed' representation across an
abstract and multidimensional 'vector space'. The pattern of connection, or activation
vector, is the knowledge which the network possesses.[13] The 'parallel' element in
PDP arises from the fact that neurons are actually quite slow in their operation - at
around 100 firings per second. The greater 'psychological realism' which protagonists
claim arises from the fact that many feats of recognition are both extremely complex,
and virtually instantaneous. If facial recognition is achieved in, say, one second, then it
must be achieved in 100 steps or less, as a result of the low firing speed. Given that the
PDP model is a parallel processing model - with potentially enormous vectors of
activity resulting from each synaptic firing - the model can putatively account for at
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least some feats of human cognition which are difficult to account for using 'serial'
(step-by-step) models. [14]
Churchland cites examples of the creation of artificial PDP networks which have
successfully performed recognition tasks. The network's recognitional abilities are
enhanced by the process of weight adjustment of the connections between the nodes at
various levels, so as to manipulate the vectors which arise 'upstream' in consequence
of any downstream vector. One example is the mine detector - which is to be trained
to distinguish between the sonar echoes of mines and of rocks. This is achieved by
providing the system with a variety of mine and rock echoes. Initially, the outputs will
be unreliable (presumably yielding the correct answer - the output 'mine' following a
mine echo input - approximately 50% of the time). The weights are then adjusted
many times, until, for the initial training samples, the correct result is achieved 100%
of the time. What is interesting in this case is that this 'training up' of the network
generates a de facto theory of mine-and-rock echoes (the configuration of weights at
the end of the training up) which cannot be specified in natural language. [15] Hence
the theory is both intrinsic to the network (and not, pace Hempel, an abstract
non-mental entity), and intrinsically non-sentential.
The immediate rejoinder is that this only serves to demonstrate the possibility of an
artificial system for which sentential eliminativism is true - and that this is a
considerably more modest outcome than the demonstration of intentional eliminativism
at the level of artificial-network recognition - let alone at the level of human
explanatory understanding (an outcome which Churchland requires[16]). If it is
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fundamentally misleading (or even misleading to any significant degree) to say of the
system that 'it has recognised a mine', then it isn't at all clear how this is misleading -
so that intentional eliminativism is not sustained by this example. [17] But there are
further problems which stand in the way of taking the mine-detector case to be
conclusive. The vector codings which ultimately result from each input must be taken
to represent 'mine echo' or 'rock echo', and, by analogy, vector codings in
populations of neurons will be what mental representation consists in on the PDP
model. But while the model is impressive as a model of computation, the other -
representational - element in this model of human cognition is less compelling.
Representations are only representations to orfor some cognizer. The output of the
submarine mine detector does not derive meaning from the environment which initially
supplied the input: the output will take the form of some further representation, which
is only a representation of'mine' or 'rock' to the cognizer who is the machine
operator on board the submarine. In much the same way as a pocket calculator doesn't
present an output of numbers - but rather of numerals, which are by human convention
invested with the particular representational significance which they have, similarly, the
vector codings which emerge from a sequence of vector transformations in a
connectionist device are intrinsically bereft of meaning. [18]
Churchland's theory of explanatory understanding has been described as employing
prototype activation: it is during the training process that 'prototypes' emerge. At the
hidden level(s), the training process progressively partitions the space of possible
activation vectors, until, in the case of the mine detector, two approximate regions -
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'hot spots' - emerge: one being the range of (hidden unit) vector codings for a
prototypical mine; the other being the codings for a prototypical rock.
Having hitherto made use of cognitive neurobiology and PDP computational research,
Churchland here accommodates a third area of current scientific endeavour:
psychology. As Stich notes[19], Eleanor Rosch has presented a prototype theory of
perceptual judgement as an alternative to 'assumptions underlying traditional
philosophical analysis'.[20] These assumptions are those which underlie Socratic
conceptual analysis, and the quest for necessary and sufficient conditions for the
instantiation of a given concept. As Stich notes, the attempt to specify necessary and
sufficient conditions for, for example, some (x) being beautiful, assumes that there are
conditions such that if (x) satisfies them, then in consequence (x) must be beautiful,
and conditions such that if (x) fails to satisfy these, then (x) cannot be beautiful. Such
conditions will, of course, be generalizable. Stich notes that:
there is now a fair amount of evidence suggesting that the assumptions underlying
this traditional philosophical project may be simply mistaken. [21]
Rosch's research suggests that the mental structures which underlie our judgements
when we classify items into categories 'do not employ tacitly known necessary and
sufficient conditions for category membership, or anything roughly equivalent'.[22]
What Rosch proposes as an alternative is a categorisation which:
... relies on prototypes, which may be thought of as idealised descriptions of the
most typical or characteristic members of the category. The prototype for bird, for
example, might include such features as flying, having feathers, singing, and a
96
variety of others. In determining whether a particular instance falls within the
category, subjects assess the similarity between the prototype and the instance
being categorised. However, the features specified in the prototype are not
even close to being necessary or sufficient conditions for membership. So, for
example, an animal can lack one or many of the features of the prototypical bird,
and still be classified as a bird. Emus are classified as birds though they can neither
fly nor sing. [23]
Stich, and Rosch - and Churchland - have all noted the similarity between this model
and Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance' theory of concepts. Among its many empirical
advantages for Churchland is the fact that, if the training up process does indeed
partition hidden vector space into prototype regions, then this will account for the
already-noted advantage claimed for PDP models in their 'graceful degradation': the
network may be able to render a correct verdict from degraded or partial input, as long
as this input is sufficiently similar to a prototypical input. On the PDP model as
presented by Churchland, the prototype region will pick out a 'family' (there is no
single set of properties which all and only mine echoes possess - no necessary and
sufficient conditions for some acoustic event being a mine echo - but the training up of
the network results in the identification of a prototypical mine echo, and the system
can then be relied upon, at the end of the training period, to identify non-standard mine
echoes, as long as these possess sufficient of the properties of the mine prototype).
Churchland now moves from artificial networks to living creatures:
the picture I am trying to evoke, of the cognitive lives of simple creatures, ascribes
to them an organised 'library' of internal representations of various prototypical
perceptual situations, situations to which prototypical behaviours are the
computed output of the well-trained network.. [24]
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Churchland will later move, without further justification, from the 'simple creatures' to
which he here alludes, to humans. But what is 'simple' in the model at this stage is the
type of cognition which is being discussed - perceptual recognition - rather than the
network whose cognition it is. There is, in any case, a need for some empirical
justification for the analogy between artificial networks such as mine detectors and
even 'simple' creatures. The reason for the inclusion of the 'simple creature' caveat
soon becomes apparent, following Churchland's account of the operation of the
prototype-activation model:
the prototypical situations include feeding opportunities, grooming demands,
territorial defence, predator avoidance, mating opportunities, offspring demands,
and other similarly basic situations, to each ofwhich a certain broad class of
behaviours is appropriate. And within the various generic prototype
representations at the appropriate level of hidden units, there will be subdivisions
into more specific subprototypes whose activation prompts highly specific versions
of the generic form ofbehaviour. (Is the mouse eating sesame seeds? Or hickory
nuts? Is it avoiding a cat? Or a hawk?) These various prototypes are both united
and distinguished by their relative positions in the hidden-unit vector space. [25]
Churchland's characterisation here of what is taking place within the creature's
mind/brain ('Is it avoiding a cat? Or a hawk?) demonstrates how much additional work
must be done in order to press the case for intentional eliminativism: the use of natural
language and its sentential resources seems not only straightforward, but also
warranted - so that only sentential eliminativism will be guaranteed by the accuracy of
this account. Here we have input to the creature's sensory neurons initiating a vector
which is transmitted to the hidden levels - where, I take it, prototypes and
subprototypes will operate at distinct levels within a hierarchy of hidden levels.
Behavioural prototypes are the outputs in this case - with the possibility of different
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behaviours being triggered by different subprototypes (an animal which doesn't eat
hickory nuts being prompted to no further action by the downstream activation of its
'hickory nut' subprototype; its eating sesame seeds, however, resulting in attack
behaviour in response to the activation of its 'sesame seed' subprototype). The
behavioural output can thus be rendered finely-grained by the partitioning of the
hidden-level prototypes for 'food' into subprototypes for food which the creature in
question eats, and food which it doesn't eat.
Churchland's motivation for the use of the qualifying term 'simple creature' is now
apparent, as he notes that 'this picture will inevitably recall memories of behaviourism,
for the perceptual environment is here portrayed as the fundamental control of motor
behaviour, and the link between the two will appear very stimulus-responsish ... (sic)'.
[26] Given that Churchland seeks to generalise beyond mine detectors and simple
creatures performing recognitional tasks - ultimately to accommodate human moral
action in his PDP model, the need to rebut suspicions of behaviour amounting to mere
tropisms is clear. His response appeals merely to the simplicity of the heuristic model
which has until now been utilised, and the correspondingly massively more complex
architecture and functioning of the brain, which has:
perhaps as many as a hundred layers along some pathways. Further, real brains
divide into many distinct processing hierarchies working side by side on different
problems. A brain is not a single network, but a committee of many co-operating
networks - perhaps over a thousand of them in a typical mammalian brain. And
most important for the present issue, the input to a given bank of hidden units
comes not just from the sensory periphery, but from elsewhere in the brain itself.
The brain is a recurrent network. The all-up input to any layer will almost always
include some "current context" information that derives from earlier processing
elsewhere in the brain. [27]
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All that can safely be concluded from this is that which prototype or subprototype is
activated will be a function of the sensory peripheral activity, together with any input
from elsewhere in the brain - via projections from horizontally-adjacent layers, or
downstream from levels closer to the output level. This possibility is presumably
sanctioned by empirical findings in neurobiology - and is in principle capable of being
designed into future artificial PDP networks. But the conclusion which Churchland
draws from this disclosure of architectural complexity in living brains is far from being
warranted: 'this frees us from the knee-jerk style of operation that worried us a few
moments ago'.[28]
This conclusion is drawn on the grounds that:
[the brain's] ultimate behaviour is a function of factors so many and so subtle,
factors that interact in such highly volatile ways, that the brain's behaviour has
become predictable only in its broadest outlines and only for very short periods
into the future. Moreover, the factors controlling behaviour reside within the brain
itself as much as in the external environment. [29]
There are thus two grounds for rejecting the 'stimulus-responsish' fear: firstly,
complexity of the neural architecture of the human brain; and secondly, the internal
origin of a significant proportion of those factors which eventuate in behaviour.
Regarding the first of these - complexity - there seems to be a flaw in Churchland's
argument, which utilises our ignorance in order to rebut the 'over-simple and deeply
misleading' claim that the PDP model cannot accommodate human freedom. The
nature of the argument here presented seems to be: we do not know all the factors
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which govern behaviour; one of the factors may be free choice; therefore it is
over-simple to claim that we have no free choice'. Clearly, one of the (currently
mysterious) factors controlling behaviour 'within the brain' may account for freedom
in some form - hence dispelling the 'knee-jerk' concern. However, it remains to be
seen how, in principle, patterns of chemical activity across populations of neurons can
achieve this. Pace Churchland's rather sanguine and cursory account here,
predictability isn't the sole basis for claiming that the model is 'stimulus-responsish',
and an argument from what may be no more than neurobiological speculation
regarding internal processes of neural firings prior to instances of behaviour cannot,
without much more work, be presented as our liberation from the fear that freedom
can't be accommodated by the model. [30] This issue is important for my purposes, as
it is still an open question how Churchland can respond to Pylyshyn's 'burning
building' example, as presented by Hannan, and discussed in my last chapter. It will
also be a consideration when we come, later in the thesis, to consider the question of
what strength of eliminativism can be sanctioned by Churchland. [31]
In his The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul - intended by Churchland to
popularise neurophilosophy - he clearly recognises at the outset of the text how
unappealing this aspect of his position might be to his audience. Once again, neural
complexity is cited as ground for reassurance:
... your physical brain is far too complex and mercurial for its behaviour to be
predicted in any but the broadest outlines or for any but the shortest distances into
the future. Faced with the extraordinary dynamical features of a functioning brain,
no device constructible in this universe could ever predict your behaviour, or your
thoughts, with anything more than merely statistical success. [32]
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It isn't clear what kind of impossibility is here being postulated: if it is empirically
impossible for such a device to be constructed, then this is consistent with our having
freedom of the will - so that there is a principled impossibility implied here. If on the
other hand Churchland's point is that the human brain is just too complex for
technology ever to reach the stage where such a device could be produced, then this is
consistent with a principled possibility of predictability of human behaviour over the
medium to long term with precision. [33]
Mere unpredictability thus may not satisfy Churchland's readers: freedom entails
unpredictability - but unpredictability does not of itself entail freedom. All that can be
deduced here is that between the initial stimulus and the ultimate response there is a
highly complex internal sequence (even though, thanks to the enormous cognitive
speed conferred by the parallel nature of the brain's operations, the actual time lag
between stimulus and response is possibly so short as to give the false impression of
there being no intervening influence on behaviour). This falls well short of a defence
of freedom, which one would expect to find when reassured than an account is not
'stimulus-responsish'.[34]
When Churchland comes to account for the neural complexity which guarantees the
absence of predictability, he introduces a new notion: 'limit cycles'. The massively
recurrent nature of human cognition - whereby input can be horizontal and downward,
in contrast to the purely upward input of the relatively much simpler mine detector -
yields a situation where vectors cycle round a partially closed circuit within the brain,
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eventually settling into a stable - and hence endlessly repeated - cycle, called a 'limit
cycle':
limit cycles are vital for orchestrating one's muscles to perform many familiar
behaviours ... this is what keeps your heart muscle pumping ... breathing has a
similar source. So do swimming, crawling, walking, running, flying, chewing, and
almost every other repetitive or periodic behaviour ...[35]
One of the factors which will render my behaviour unpredictable is, surely, my
decision to disrupt a limit cycle - for example, to hold my breath, as I might do while
fleeing Pylyshyn's burning building. It is however difficult to see how the PDP model
can accommodate this decision: it doesn't arrive as recurrent output from further
upstream; nor is it an external input in the same way that physical stimuli from mines
and rocks is an external input to the mine detector. It isn't the case that all input need
be either recursive or sensory: Churchland alludes briefly to 'discursive' and
'linguistic' centres. [36] But such centres will receive and transform what has initially -
at the input level - been physical stimuli. Churchland appears to have no room in his
model for a free decision as an initiator of behaviour. Interestingly, Churchland
concentrates on replacing only one element in the ontology of folk psychology - belief.
It would be interesting to see how there can be a PDP surrogate for the other key
ontological component, desire. My desire not to suffocate in the smoke-filled building,
coupled with my decision to hold my breath as I run, interrupt the limit cycle which
normally ensures that I keep breathing. This is an instance of rational behaviour, of
course - and our conception of ourselves as rational beings is bracketed by
Churchland, pending future developments in neuroscience. But my inclination is to
resist such bracketing, and insist on the reality of such rational free choice.
103
Churchland recognises that unpredictability does not entail freedom of the will - but in
doing so, he raises an interesting new problem, in his evident desire to render his
account appealing:
it would be foolish to mistake such (genuine) unpredictability for what
philosophers and theologians have often hoped for in the way of free will. That
term was typically meant to apply to a human capacity that transcended the natural
order, whereas the dynamical picture here presented keeps us firmly embedded
within the causal order. But it is legitimate to see it as the ground of something
extremely important: our capacity, at least occasionally, for genuinely spontaneous
activity... [3 7]
I take it that 'spontaneous' here means 'originating from internal or self-motivation'.
Having made the point, Churchland promptly drops it without further elaboration. It is
completely unclear what difference there is intended to be between the claim that my
decision to hold my breath is 'free', and the claim that the decision is 'spontaneous'.
Interestingly, the American Webster's Dictionary cites, at the opening of its entry for
'spontaneous', the Latin origin of the term: 'sponte: of one's free will, voluntarily'.
[38]
Other entries in Webster's for 'spontaneous' include: 'without external constraint';
'unpremeditated'; 'self-acting'; 'indigenous'; and 'occurring in the natural course of
things'. It isn't clear which, if any, of these Churchland could avail himself ofwithout
complication. Ifwe ask the question whether artificial PDP systems can act
'spontaneously', I take it that the answer is negative. All that is lacking in the simpler
networks is recurrent processing (as noted earlier, the mine detector's processing -
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both inputs while operating, and 'backpropagation' during training up - is exclusively
upstream, in contrast to the horizontal and downstream capacities of the human PDP
system). [39] In the absence of any further significant distinction between artificial and
human networks, recurrence must presumably be the basis for 'spontaneity'. The
suspicion must be that Churchland is playing to the gallery on this occasion: all that
can plausibly be meant by 'spontaneously' is 'purely internal' - though the
non-philosophical audience for whom this text is primarily intended may assume that
something superior to the free will fruitlessly pursued by 'philosophers and
theologians' is on offer - 'genuinely spontaneous activity'. Even then, purely internal
initiation is difficult to accommodate within the model as presented by Churchland, as
already noted. The origin of a putatively 'spontaneous' action must be an antecedent
physical event; this would appear to rule out freedom of the will - but, given the
exclusively external and recurrent sources of all the processing to which Churchland
alludes, the putatively purely internal physical event which initiates spontaneity is
deeply mysterious.
The attempt to construct a PDP response to the challenge posed by Pylyshyn's
'burning building' serves to illustrate the explanatory gaps which are yet to be filled. In
the first instance, the smell of smoke in the building - the physical event of the
inhalation of smoke - will trigger input neurons upstream of the nostrils, in an olfactory
region of abstract vector space. The vector of neural activity at this input level will
then be transmitted upstream to the hidden levels units, for interpretation - allocation
to some prototype at that level or levels. For the eventual response - fleeing the
building - not to be a mere tropism, the vector at one of these levels must represent
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"danger".[40] The output in this case is activity - running from the building - which
will be the consequence of muscular responses to motor-neuronal outputs. But the
smell of smoke at a barbecue, for example, does not eventuate in escape behaviour - so
that the smell of smoke must have meaning in this context which it doesn't in other
contexts. Churchland has insisted that a given vector of itself represents nothing - it
represents only in the context of the global configuration of synaptic weights which
produces it, in the light of incoming data. But this doesn't resolve the problem of how
a pattern of chemical activity in the brain could have any meaning at all. Not only must
the activation vector + synaptic weights have intrinsic meaning in order for the
connection with a 'danger' prototype to be effected; in order to avoid the conclusion
that the action is merely a tropism, the combinations of such vectors + weights must
mean something to the individual whose brain it is. [41] Churchland may be able to
offer some account of how enormously complex recurrent activity is taking place in
the brain, so that prototypical smoke recognition is associated with a "danger"
prototype elsewhere - this latter vectorial activity being the initiator of the motor
output which manifests itself as running away. But such an explanation would still
have to account for this association having been made in the first place (while it would
not have been initiated at a barbecue). Again a purely causal explanation misses what
must be a semantic property which accounts for the danger-association being initiated.
There is a second feature which the network must possess, in order to obviate the
'stimulus-responsish' concern arising vis-a-vis the burning building: as already noted,
my choice not to be burnt or suffocated - or my choice not first to scour the building in
search of others who need my assistance - must be recognised and accounted for. As
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already urged, a pattern of [stimulus - very complex internal processing at very high
speed - response] is inadequate as a reassurance, where the concern is that my escape
behaviour is a mere tropism. In short, problems both of intentionality and of free will
contrive to present enormous obstacles to the acceptance of any immediately-obvious
PDP account of the escapee's behaviour. Given the prominence which Hannan accords
the 'burning building' case in what is a target article to which Churchland has been
invited to respond, his reticence in presenting his own account must be taken to be
significant.
Setting aside for now any concerns regarding the potential of his PDP model to
accommodate any account of human freedom, we can now summarise Churchland's
alternative to the Deductive-Nomological model (which, as already noted, is taken by
Churchland to be a model of the operation of the mind/brain). Whereas the D-N model
has sentential structures as representations, with computation consisting in inferences
made according to structure-sensitive rules, the PDP model has vector codings for
representations, and computation is vector-to-vector transformation within the
network. A theory is, on the PDP model, a configuration of synaptic weights - so that
a single input vector will eventuate in different outputs, depending upon the theory
which is applied to it. Churchland notes in passing that 'of course, the vectors
themselves represent nothing, save in the context of the global configuration of
synaptic weights that produced them'.[42] So prototypes arise modulo some theory -
the vector in question representing what it does only in the context of the synaptic
weights (i.e. theory) from which it eventuates. This will have the interesting result of
making prototypes theoretical entities (theories being, as already noted, 'in the head').
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Churchland's main claim vis-a-vis PDP networks in the essay 'Explanation: A PDP
Approach' is that explanatory understanding may be accounted for in terms of
prototype activation:
... explanatory understanding consists in the activation of a specific prototype
vector in a well-trained network. It consists in the apprehension of the problematic
case as an instance of a general type, a typefor which the creature has a detailed
and well-informed representation. [43]
Here again we have the appearance of sentential, but not intentional eliminativism:
'detail', and the property of being 'well-informed' seem unavoidably semantic - so that
describing the network (or its possessor) as 'understanding that remaining in the
burning building is dangerous' would appear not to be inappropriate. It is still unclear
how this understanding arises, however: the 'problematic case' in question - that of the
building's being on fire - needs to be apprehended under some prototype which
represents 'danger' and the urgent need for escape, but given the apparent paucity of
the input which may in practice trigger this realisation, accounting for the performance
of the appropriate behaviour is both problematic, and, if the model is to be deemed
plausible, urgent. This is reminiscent of the project identified by one of Churchland's
mentors, Quine:
the relation between the meagre input and the torrential output is a relation that we
are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always prompted
epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence relates to theory, and in what
ways one's theory of nature transcends any available evidence. [44]
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The relation of evidence to theory - the process whereby the smell of smoke triggers
activation of'danger' prototypes - can apparently be accounted for only partially, as
the consequence ofmassively recurrent activity, achieved virtually instantaneously due
to the parallel nature of the processing involved, and the prior training of the network.
What is missing is an explanation of the semantics involved: even though Churchland
may wish to eschew semantic talk, in order to distance himself from classical
sententialist accounts such as that of Fodor, there must nonetheless be some neural
surrogate for semantics, in order that the significance of the smell of burning in this
particular context can lead to the transition from a 'smoke recognition' vector to a
'danger recognition' vector.
There is a further criticism which can be levelled against this account, and it is a
criticism of which Churchland is aware:
"What you have outlined", runs the objection, "may be a successful account of
spontaneous classification, but explanatory understanding surely involves a great
deal more than mere classification. [45]
Clearly there is some work to be done here: the mine detector, following the
completion of its training up, successfully classifies mines, by triggering its 'mine'
prototype in response to incoming sonar echoes from a mine, and generating the
appropriate output. But the mine detector does not have any explanatory
understanding. Churchland's case thus far has been based largely on analogy between
artificial networks such as the mine detector and human brains; the only significant
difference between them (I exclude the material composition as being not significant)
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is the capacity of the human brain for recurrent and horizontal processing. Unless there
are other significant architectural distinctions, this greater complexity of processing
must account for the human's possession, and the artificial network's lack of,
explanatory understanding. [46]
Churchland's response to the objection which he has himself raised alludes to the
contrast between meagre input and (relatively) torrential output:
what we must remember is that the prototype vector embodies an enormous
amount of information ... that vector has structure, whose function is to represent
an overall syndrome of objective features, relations, sequences, and uniformities.
Its activation by a given perceptual or other cognitive circumstance does not
represent a loss of information. On the contrary, it represents a major and
speculative gain in information, since the portrait it embodies typically goes far
beyond the local and perspectivally limited information that may activate it on a
given occasion. That is why the process is so useful: it is quite dramatically
ampliative.[47]
This seems to miss the point of the objection which Churchland has himself raised.
What we have here is more elaborate classification in consequence of the activations,
further upstream, of progressively richer and more detailed prototypes. But it does still
appear on this account to be classification, rather than explanatory understanding
which is being initiated. The greater detail would be an aid to correspondingly greater
understanding - but cannot of itself be taken to be what explanatory understanding
consists in. What may be the source of my confusion here is Churchland's need to
eschew traditional and sententialist accounts of what explanatory understanding
consists in: ifwe are to say that to explain is to be able to answer a 'why' question,
then this would appear prima facie to be uncongenial to an account which at a
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minimum wishes to eliminate 'sentences in the head' - and, as previously argued, must
go beyond this in order to sustain a genuinely eliminativist position which will meet the
ambitions of the Churchlands. But a non-sententialist account of explanatory
understanding cannot consist merely in an account of the progressive enrichment of
classification via prototype: pace Churchland, we cannot accept that: 'on each such
occasion, the creature ends up understanding ... far more about the explanandum
situation than was strictly presented in the explanandum itself without an account of
how the transition from recognition to understanding is effected. [48] In the absence of
further reassurance on this point - and further detail - the 'stimulus-responsish'
objection again rears its head: the mine detector doesn't attempt to escape on
detecting a mine in the vicinity; the woman in the building does try to escape on
detecting smoke. But the difference resides, not in her understanding, and the
machine's failing to understand, the danger - but in the greater sophistication of
prototype in the woman's brain. This will account for the activation of motor-neurons
(and hence her running away) via a purely causal story - but does not resolve the 'S-R'
problem.
Churchland's development of the claim that explanatory understanding is via prototype
activation raises some interesting issues. He argues, for example, that 'explanatory
understanding is the same thing in all... cases: what differs is the character of the
prototype involved'.[49] This will lead to what I will call Churchland's 'continuity
thesis': the claim that there is no fundamental difference between moral or social
explanation and scientific explanation; these consist in the activation of different types
of prototype vector - but this difference is not fundamental. Churchland cites various
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examples of prototypes in order to illustrate the putative prototypical diversity of a
well-trained human brain. The gap between classification and explanatory
understanding is, however glossed over: the first category to be discussed is
'property-cluster prototypes' - which comprise the majority of our human prototypical
vector space. But the 'explanatory role' is left mysterious by Churchland: "'Why is its
neck so long, Daddy?" "It's a swan dear; swans have very long necks'".[50]
This 'explanation' of the length of a swan's neck seems hopelessly impoverished -
though it might well satisfy a small child (both of the examples cited by Churchland are
of such responses to a child's hypothetical questioning). As an account of how parents
respond to such questions this may well suffice - but it appears to be little more than
further classification (the set of all things which are swans is a subset of the set of all
things which have long necks). A proper explanation ofwhy swans have long necks
would surely go beyond mere classification - citing, presumably, the causal effects of
evolutionary development on the species. This seems ineluctably sentential - so that if
the sentential is to be expunged from the model, it is incumbent on Churchland to
demonstrate how this is to be achieved, while still retaining what is recognisably
explanatory understanding.
Churchland's next category of prototypes is 'etiological prototypes'. Again the
account is one of recognition - an etiological prototype 'depicts a typical temporal
sequence of event types' (emphasis mine). [51] Churchland here appears to shift his
position somewhat: in place of the identification of explanatory understanding and
prototype activation, we here have a sequence which 'make[s] possible our
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explanatory understanding of the temporally extended world' (emphasis mine). [52]
While Churchland denies that it is his intention to give an analytical definition of
'cause' - what intricacies constitute a genuine etiological prototype from a
pseudo-etiological prototype is dismissed as a 'secondary [matter] I shall leave for a
future occasion'[53] - the PDP model interestingly appears neatly to account for
Hume's psychological contribution to causation: having made the neural connections
which classify a given temporal event as a causal event, and having repeated this
classification on a number of occasions, the classification may eventually become so
habitual as to resemble a 'limit cycle'. Thus, while the model does not explain
causation, it may be the basis for an explanation of how Hume's account of causation
might operate in practice.
Given his philosophical commitments, Churchland is clearly concerned to illustrate
how the process of competition between theories - and the subsequent reduction and
elimination of theories - can be accounted for using the PDP model. Again the absence
of distinction between explanation and recognition - and thus with mere classification -
poses problems for Churchland's account of scientific progress. This lack of
distinctiveness is made explicit in Churchland's central claim vis-a-vis scientific
progress:
the central phenomenon to be explored here is the brain's vector completion of
partial or degraded inputs, a completion often aided by the brain's recurrent
manipulation of the relevant population of representing neurons. In plain English, it
is the phenomenon of your recognising - perhaps slowly at first, but then suddenly
- some unfamiliar, puzzling, or otherwise problematic situation as being an instance
or example of something well known to you. [54]
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Churchland has previously prepared the ground for this claim, by giving examples of
degraded images - photographs photocopied dozens of times, so that the image is
obscured, for example - and demonstrating how we can nonetheless accurately classify
the object which is only partially represented by the degraded image. The recognition
of a problematic situation as falling under some prototype, hitherto not employed
while considering situations of this type, bears a clear resemblance to Kuhn's
'paradigm shifts'.[55] The scientist is, on this account, utilising the enormous
recurrent potential of the brain 'to explore a range of different activational
possibilities'.[56] These alternative prototypes are already located in abstract vector
space: scientific progress consists in the accommodation of the problematic situation
under a novel prototype. This raises two immediate problems: (i) we need an account
of what it is, in virtue ofwhich the novel prototype is more appropriate than that
utilised hitherto - that is, we need to know in virtue of what we have progress rather
than mere novelty; and (ii) once again, the problem of accounting for the initiation of
this process arises. Churchland's account - the utilisation by the scientist of novel
prototypes, via his access to recurrent pathways - doesn't sound any different from the
sonar operator's use of the mine detector on board the submarine. In his partial
defence, Churchland will have difficulty in eschewing such dualist-sounding
formulations - comparable to his difficulty in eschewing sententialist-sounding
formulations - and we must avoid reading actual philosophical commitment into such
formulations. But there must be a concern that Churchland is conflating the running of
a program and the instantiation ofa program-, the fact that, for example, artificial
PDP networks may be created which mimic the human capacity for
phoneme-detection, does not entail that the mind/ brain is itself a PDP network. While
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the mine- or phoneme-detector must be operated - inputs provided, output interpreted
etc. - by an operator who is not the mine- or phoneme-detector, in the case of the
scientist whose brain is putatively a natural PDP network, the network is - on
Churchland's account - operating itself. This cannot be explained merely by recourse
to the observation that the various parts of the brain interact, so that one part is
accessing the resources or output of another part: a further account, privileging one
part for at least some types of cognitive operation, and explaining the basis for this
privileging - so that this part of the brain is the equivalent of the machine operator - is
necessary. Otherwise the suspicion remains that what the artificial phoneme detector
does is to run a program which mimics the operation of the human mind/ brain; in
consequence, the presumed analogy lacks persuasiveness, and we thus have no
grounds for accepting even sentential eliminativism other than for the machine.
In the absence of a sustained response by Churchland to this latter concern, I propose
to proceed to consider how he might address the former concern: the question of what
makes for progress, where progress consists in the deployment of a prototype in a
novel way. Churchland takes the example of developments in cosmology to illustrate
this in his 1995 text. His account opens rather obscurely, with primitive mankind
viewing the 'degraded perceptual input' of the stars 'scattered carelessly both in space
and in brightness'.[57] It isn't clear to me that this is an example of 'degraded
perceptual input' comparable to the photocopier examples earlier cited - but in any
case, the attribution of names to the constellations such as 'the dipper' is taken to be
an attempt to 'impose a structural order on the contents of the night sky'. [58] If it
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isn't clear what Churchland's point is here, the conclusion which he reaches is really
eccentric:
few of these interpretations are very compelling, visually. And certainly none of
them yielded any useful predictions of stellar behaviour ... the scorpion never
stung anything; the dipper never poured out any water. In this respect, these
interpretations of the visual chaos were not "good theories" about stellar
phenomena. [59]
This example is useful in the first instance for demonstrating how primitive humans
pursue the task of apprehending perceived phenomena under some prototype. Their
relative intellectual impoverishment manifests itself in the fact that they have far fewer
recurrent pathways than do we - so that the range of prototypes immediately available
for the task of'imposing structural order' on the night sky is impoverished by our later
standards. But this observation of Churchland's is combined with an indication of one
of the tasks of theory - 'yielding useful predictions'. This raises two points: (i) once
again, we have the gap between classification and, in this case, prediction rather than
explanation. These cognitive tasks - classification and prediction - cannot be taken to
be identical. Classification will be, at best, an aid to successful prediction; and (ii) this
point is surely reinforced by the absurd suggestion that the failure of 'the dipper' to
pour water demonstrates how poor was the theory. Clearly predictive adequacy is a
bona fide criterion for theoretical virtue - but to suggest that this was the motivation
behind the original naming of the constellations is to push the model beyond
credibility. Churchland has previously argued - in my view unsuccessfully - that all
explanatory understanding is prototype activation. [60] Here we have the quite
separate - and surely implausible - claim that all prototype activation is explanatory
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understanding. Churchland will understandably wish to distinguish between mere
classification and explanation/ prediction[61] - but he cannot do so by eliminating
classification; classification would surely on his account be prototype activation (I
cannot see what else it might be), and that (i.e. classification) is what is occurring in
the case of the primitive denomination of the constellations.
Progress takes place, on Churchland's continuing account, when the Greeks deploy
the prototype 'rotating sphere'. This is a prototype presumably available to the
primitives - but its application with a view to 'imposing structural order on the night
sky' is novel. Churchland here reinforces the uncontroversial claim that predictive
accuracy is a criterion for theoretical success: the motions of the stars and their future
positions is now, via the 'rotating sphere' prototype, predictable with great accuracy.
To make this point is to demonstrate the fatuity of the contrast with the primitive
nomenclature - which not only had not had the intention of making this prediction, but
probably had no predictive purpose at all. Perhaps surprisingly, Descartes is given
credit by Churchland for the next stage in progress - with his activation of the 'vortex'
prototype to account for the dynamics of the solar system. Churchland's description of
the next stage in scientific progress is revealing:
and once again, the interpretation was false. Or, at least, Sir Isaac Newton came up
with a much better one. [62]
It isn't entirely clear how to read this observation: the phrase 'or at least' seems to cast
doubt on the attribution of falsity to the Cartesian interpretation (this is repeated at the
next stage, where Churchland notes, apropos Newton's interpretation, that 'this
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brilliant interpretation eventually proved false as well. Or at any rate, Albert Einstein
came up with a still better one' (emphasis mine).[63] Churchland's commitment to
'the epistemology that makes eliminative materialism possible'[64] has led him to
bracket the notions of truth and falsity, it being unclear what might be the criteria - or
whether any criteria exist - for attributing truth. Here, however, he seems to hedge his
bets by twice appealing to falsity, only to enter an immediate caveat to the effect that
the deployment of one prototype leads to (or, on Churchland's account, is) merely a
better explanatory understanding of the explanandum. Churchland concludes this brief
historical account:
the point of this brief and highly selective excursion into the history of science has
been to portray some of the most sophisticated of our intellectual achievements as
involving the very same activities of vector processing, recurrent manipulation,
prototype activation, andprototype evaluation as can be found in some of the
simplest of our cognitive activities, such as recognising a dog in a low-grade
photograph .(my emphasis)[65]
Aside from the reiteration of the continuity between the cognitive tasks of perceptual
recognition and theory-formulation, the interesting observation here is the possibility
of'prototype evaluation'. Given that a prototype is an abstract region in vector space,
its evaluation in advance of its translation into some suitably semantic form is hard to
envisage - and, of course, the possibility of such translation is still, at this stage, moot.
[66]
Given his doctrinal commitments, Churchland cannot not have a view on the
possibility of theory evaluation, as his sometimes scathing comments on folk
psychology demonstrate. It is therefore intriguing for the sceptic to come across, in
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'Explanation: A PDP Approach', a sub section headed 'Inference to the Best
Explanation' : a subsection which opens with the words:
the idea of prototype activation throws some much-needed light on the popular
idea of "inference to the best explanation". [67]
Churchland poses the problem as posed by C.S. Pierce: 'for any set of observations
there is a literal infinity of possible hypotheses that might be posed in explanation'. [68]
Consistent with his approach to Hempelian explanation, Churchland reconceives the
problem, presenting it not as a logical problem (as Pierce did), but, rather, as a
psychological problem. "Inference to the best explanation" is, we are told, a 'crude
notion' - to be here replaced by 'the more penetrating notion of "activation of the most
penetrating activation vector"'.[69] The term 'more penetrating' is left vague - but
Churchland notes that it is a psychological fact that, within the domain of
psychological possibilities (as opposed to Pierce's logical possibilities) there just isn't
the range of alternative hypotheses postulated by Pierce. [70]
Having recast Pierce's problem in psychological terms, Churchland then purports to
resolve the problem:
we do not search an infinite space of possible explanations. In general, we do not
search at all: in familiar cases a suitable prototype is activated directly. [71]
Pierce's problem seems here to be ignored rather than resolved - and in a manner
which again highlights the difficulty in presenting a plausible non-dualistic account:
where a successful prototype vector fails to be activated directly, 'one repeatedly
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reenters the problematic input', until a suitable activation is achieved. This relationship
- between the controller of the process and the medium in which the process is
conducted - is left by Churchland as if in no need of further clarification.
More seriously for my immediate concerns - which are epistemological rather than
metaphysical - Churchland goes on to note that:
the range of concurrently possible understandings is closed under the relation "is at
least within hailing distance of an existing prototype". [72]
The issue of the relationship between different prototypes is an important one. As I
have earlier suggested, Churchland needs some neural (i.e. causal, non-semantic)
account of how, in the case of the woman in the burning building, there is a connection
effected between the antecedent 'smoke' prototype, and the subsequent 'danger'
prototype, to account for her action in running from the building. Similarly, I take it
that the creative genius ofNewton, in his novel application of the 'deflecting force'
prototype to account for the moon's elliptical orbit, is to be accounted for - in terms of
cognitive neurodynamics - by his entering the problematic input in a prototype vector
distant from that being deployed by his relatively benighted predecessors.[73] But the
problem now arises of accounting for the relationship 'being close to/ distant from', as
applied to vectors. The vectors, qua vectors, exist in abstract space - so that the term
'proximity' must be purely figurative at this level. The respective activations of the
various vectors will - qua brain events - occur in different regions of the brain, but it
isn't clear that this literal construal of'proximity' is what Churchland has in mind. The
processes of horizontal and recurrent activity - or at least the horizontal element - may
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be facilitated where there is a relatively small distance between the parts of the brain
responsible for the prototype activations in question, but Churchland hasn't, to my
knowledge, discussed this possibility, so that we cannot assume that the 'distance' is a
literal distance. [74] A third, and again figurative, possible construal of the notion of
'proximity' in this context might be that it is proximity in the sense of semantic
similarity. Thus, for example, the claims that the earth is a flat disc, and that the earth
is a sphere, are, in some manner which may require disambiguation, 'semantically
close' - the meanings of'flat disc' and 'sphere' are distinct, but nonetheless similar; the
claim that the earth is an idea in the mind of God, on the other hand, is 'distant' from
either. [75]
The confusion engendered here is ironic, given Churchland's clarificatory purpose:
'closeness' between vectors is to account for one of the key elements in his account of
scientific progress - analogy:
a prototype vector whose activation has hitherto been confined to one empirical
domain subsequently comes to be activated with profit in a new domain. More
accurately, the new domain activates a vector that is close to the old prototype ...
talk of analogy has always been hobbled by our inability to say anything very
specific about what constitutes the relevant kind of similarity. We are now in a
position to be entirely specific. Analogy ... consists in the close proximity of the
respective prototype representations ... in the relevant hidden-unit
activation-vector space, (emphasis in original)[76]
If Churchland glosses over the semantic problem with regard to analogy, he addresses
it directly when he comes to recognise that the term 'best' in 'inference to the best
explanation' is an evaluative term. When considering the question of what makes one
prototype vector activation 'better' than another, 'we must answer carefully, since we
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are denied the usual semantic vocabulary of reference, truth, consistency, entailment,
and so forth'.[77] Here Churchland adopts an intentional eliminativist stance: were he
merely to be advocating the elimination of 'sentences in the head', then, of course, the
neural ontology with which these are to be replaced could stand proxy for sentences
outside the head - and thus be candidates for consideration in these semantic terms.
The 'best' explanation - and, indeed explanation itself - could then be that which is
most successful when considered, using conventional semantic criteria, under its
translation from neural terms. This is, therefore, important: if Churchland can effect a
reconception, in neural terms, of epistemic virtue, then the PDP model will
accommodate full-blooded (i.e. intentional) eliminativism. Unfortunately, we are told
that: 'that will be no small task, and I cannot pretend seriously to undertake it here'.
[78]
What Churchland does go on to do is 'to illustrate how some aspects of the problem
can be addressed' (op cit.). Both 'explanation', and the possibility of some explanation
being 'the best' explanation seem beyond accounting for, however, given the
constraints under which he is now working. Thus, for example, it is observed that:
it may be a just criticism to say that A is simply the wrong prototype for the
problematic situation at hand ... because the situation confronted is not a member
of the class of situations that will reliably activated ... [79]
What makes an activation a 'reliable' activation is not clear: on pain of reintroducing
just those semantic notions of epistemic virtue which he has undertaken to avoid,
Churchland cannot suggest that, for example, favourable epistemic status accords to
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some prototype activation on account of its being reliably linked to the truth. Bearing
in mind that explanations are prototype activations, it's not clear what other possible
criterion for 'reliability' might be proffered. Churchland is on easier ground when he
chooses a relatively simple pragmatic example: adverse behavioural consequences. The
hungry coyote who mistakes the tail of a poisonous snake for a retreating desert rat,
and acts accordingly, dies as a result of the error. But here we have no obvious
explanation (the coyote isn't explaining anything, but is rather (mis-) categorising the
visual input: this is a case of faulty recognition of a 'degraded input'. [80] Where there
is no explanation, there can be no consideration ofwhether this is the 'best'
explanation - and we surely cannot take the 'reliability' criterion to be open to
interpretation as 'saves one from being killed'.[81] In short, the 'coyote' example is
completely irrelevant to the issue at hand.
The question of what strength of eliminative materialism is sanctioned by PDP models,
as understood by Churchland, is a difficult question to answer. The mine-detector, and
other artificial parallel machines, clearly do not employ propositional attitudes, nor
surrogates for these - so that sentential eliminativism is true of these machines. This
may or may not entail intentional eliminativism for these machines: the hidden-level
activity, where the organisation of vector space into prototypical regions which will
subsequently output, from any given input, in accordance with the processing of input
vectors via the various prototypes, is, it seems, too far removed from sentential
manipulation to be capable of being described in linguistic terms - so that intentional
eliminativism is true at least at that level of the system's functioning. Whether
intentional eliminativism is true of the entire system isn't clear: while the machine can
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generate an output which is comprehensible to humans utilising language (it could, for
example, output the text 'Warning: Mine' on a screen), it could be said that this fails
to capture the full complexity of what the machine has detected: that, though it
conveys all that we wish to know (and all that the machine is intended to achieve), it
has, in deploying a prototype vector downstream of this output, identified sonar
features of the object which are beyond linguistic description - so that we must not
read from our parochial interests to the linguistically-available simplicity of the
machine, and thus assume that intentional eliminativism is false regarding the machine.
Whether or not intentional eliminativism is true of mine-detection equipment is,
however, of no great interest: what is at issue is whether it is true of human cognition -
and here the issue is much more complex. As presented by Churchland, PDP
processing is consistent with intentional eliminativism for both artificial and human
networks. Ifwe assume for the sake of argument that intentional eliminativism is true
of the artificial networks, then whether it is also true of the human network depends
upon the analogy which Churchland seeks to draw between the two. This in turn
seems to depend upon the claim that the brain could support PDP processing - that
nothing which is known about neurology rules out such a neural architecture; that the
model is more 'psychologically realistic' - in that it will account for the speed and
functional persistence of human cognition in a way that alternative models will not;
and on a claimed analogy between the operation of the artificial networks, and the
cognitive achievement of explanatory understanding. Neither the neurological nor the
'psychologically realistic' claims suffice to demonstrate that the brain is a PDP
network: if true, they are merely consistent with that conclusion. On the third point -
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the central claim that recognition and explanatory understanding are instances of the
same cognitive achievement - this claim seems straightforwardly false, for the reasons
that I have given. Genuine understanding, together with human freedom and an
account of the relationship between the brain and the individual whose brain it is seem
beyond the model, at least as it is currently understood by Churchland. This does not
entail that no future development in PDP science might not close these explanatory
gaps - though in the case of the relationship between the self and the brain, no such
gap appears to be recognised by Churchland. Where difficulties are recognised - for
example, the problem of prototype evaluation, which must infect any account informed
by naturalistic epistemology - Churchland's position is that of Wittgenstein: 'what we
cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence'.[82] There is a crucial ambiguity
here: is our inability to speak about how such processes are effected in the human PDP
network a principled inability (i.e. is this due to the truth of the intentional eliminativist
claim that sentential description of mental states is perhaps so misleading as to be
practically impossible for philosophical or scientific purposes), or is it on the grounds
of absence of sufficient neuroscientific progress - in which case mere sentential
eliminativism may be true? My suggestion is that the need to pass over in silence
derives from the sheer empirical impossibility of the accommodation of features such
as normativity, freedom, and the self, in a model which consists entirely of highly
complex patterns of chemical activity. This impossibility will be reinforced in my next
chapter, where I consider the prospects for a PDP account of morality.
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[1] For present purposes, I propose to restrict myself to connectionism as
understood by Churchland. Connectionism has appeal for many philosophers who are
not eliminative materialists - and, are, indeed hostile to the eliminative materialist
project. This suggests a possible range of positions on the question of what are the
commitments of connectionism: attempting to take account of all of these seems
neither possible nor necessary where the question in hand is what are the implications
for eliminative materialism of the connectionist project, as understood by
eliminativists.
[2] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature ofExplanation: A PDP Approach', in his
A Nenrocomputational Perspective - The Nature ofMind and the Structure of
Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, p. 197.
[3] op. cit., p. 198.
[4] I am using the term 'model' in two distinct ways here: the 'models' to which
reference is made are artificial networks, whose architecture is designed along the lines
postulated by the PDP model of cognition (abstractly viewed as a putative account of
cognition).
[5] Similar textual idiosyncrasies have emerged elsewhere in my reading of
Churchland: it may be that my pursuing these idiosyncrasies is needlessly pedantic, and
unlikely to be genuinely revealing. My proposed solution is that I take Churchland's
meaning literally, but endeavour not to base the conclusion of any argument on what
may be mere lapses on his part.
[6] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p. 198.
[7] This is not, of course, to deny that there may be degrees of complexity of types
to which the same token may be allocated in recognition. The biologist's
categorisation of a particular individual will, for example, employ a significantly more
complex taxonomy than will the layman's. Nonetheless, for any given type, a token
will either be recognised or it will not.
[8] In chapter 5 I will pursue a particular instance which Churchland has raised:
'moral understanding'. The claim that moral action can be accounted for by the
recognition of token instances as being members of some moral type seems to rest on
two dubious premises: that understanding is 'essentially the same type of
computational achievement' as recognition; and that moral choice can be reduced to
some form of understanding.
[9] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p. 199.
[10] Even if my reading of Hempel is erroneous, only the truth of sentential
eliminativism is immediately in prospect for Churchland here. The conclusion that
Hempel had falsely postulated a language of thought would not entail that what is
taking place in the mind/brain cannot be appropriately described in terms of deductive
processes which quantify over propositions.
[11] It remains an open question whether it is also an abstract diagram of the
neuronal organisation of the brain: where Churchland discusses neurobiology (as
opposed to PDP research), he presents prima facie evidence of neural architecture
which is consistent with the PDP model. As earlier noted, clear evidence of
architectural isomorphism in the two disciplines would render Churchland's position
virtually secure. It isn't clear, however, what neurobiological evidence could
demonstrate anything stronger than consistency with the PDP model (i.e. a neural
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architecture which could operate in the way postulated by PDP - but which doesn't
necessarily do so).
[12] This 'configuration of synaptic weights' is a particular theory (hence my
observation in the last footnote that theories are, for Churchland, neuropsychological
entities rather than abstract entities). The various sets of weights which could transmit
a given input vector thus represent different theories - and will ultimately eventuate in
different outputs. For example, the sensory input vector generated by the sight of an
elderly woman with a wart on her nose might yield the conclusion that she is a witch
(the output activity may so categorise her) if the downstream synaptic weights
constitute a witch-theory. The recognition that there are no witches - that this theory
ought to be eliminated - will result in a reconfiguration of weights, so that a more
anodyne categorisation ultimately results. In either case, the input level vector is the
same - this being a function purely of the impinging of the external world on the retina.
This, I take it, would constitute Churchland's account of the theory-ladenness of
perception.
[13] I will cast doubt on the tenability of this account of representation below.
[14] There is, of course, the further problem that facial recognition doesn't seem
like the kind of cognitive process which will utilise anything like sentential entities -
and this is borne out by the divergence between the ease with which we can recognise
a familiar face, and the relative difficulty in providing a verbal description of the face.
If there were quasi-linguistic entities in the brain which were manipulated in cognition,
then their retrieval and translation into natural language might be expected to be
possible. Note how the PDP model also accommodates - as earlier noted - 'graceful
degradation', and recognition from partial or distorted input data. Both these feats
seem beyond the serial model, where removal of any relevant data seems likely to
result in a crash of the system.
[15] It is difficult to see what a 'theory' thus is for Churchland - other than in this
rather obscure sense of being a set of synaptic weights which will eventuate, given
antecedent input from further downstream, in a prototype which is proprietary to that
theory. It seems that both sentential and intentional eliminativism must be true of this
mine-detection theory: not only is it arrived at via the manipulation of elements which
are intrinsically non-sentential; the 'theory' is in principle incapable of translation into
sentences (i.e. it cannot be rendered into a set of sentences which set out to describe
the distinctions between the sonar echoes of rocks and of mines). Having said this, the
output presumably will be capable of this translation (there would hardly, after all, be
any point in having a mine detector which produced an output which couldn't be
construed as meaning either 'that's a mine' or 'that's a rock'). So the hidden-level
activity - where putative theory-formation takes place during the training period - is
both sententially and intentionally eliminativist; the output activity is only sententially
eliminativist (we could not, with any plausibility, suggest that 'that's a mine' fails to
capture the full complexity of the machine's output).
[16] Intentional eliminativism is required for the already-mentioned reason that mere
sentential eliminativism is endorsed by substance dualists; the need for an exhaustive
account of all human cognitive faculties arises from the fact that mentalistic
explanation is to be wholly eliminated by the intentional eliminativist. Churchland's
allusions to such human cognitive feats as moral discrimination make clear his
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appreciation of this fact - but, I will argue, his attempt to conflate simple sensory
recognition and 'moral explanation' cannot be accepted.
[17] The fact that Churchland writes of the system 'recognising' or 'detecting'
can't, of course, be taken to imply his commitment to mere sentential eliminativism: it
is consistent with intentional eliminativism that one foresee a future mode of
communication which is fundamentally different from our current natural language, but
- until this is developed, one must make do with the crude and misleading verbal
resources which are all that we currently have.
[18] I will, in the next chapter, raise a further difficulty in taking the mine-detector
model as being analogous to such cases as human moral judgement: the 'training up'
process in the mine detector is by conscious manipulation of the system's connection
weights by human beings. What would be the comparable case for human moral
agents? The human has, for the training set, the advantage over the mine detector, of
knowing that (x) is a mine, and (y) is a rock - hence his ability to recognise the need for
adjustment of weights. The detector's training is thus supervised from the privileged
vantage point of a human mind which knows the difference which the detector has yet
to be trained to recognise. If all human minds were similarly in need of some training
up, comparable to that required by the mine detector, then it is hard to see how we
could have secure basis for even this relatively simple task of recognition and
differentiation. This problem bears some resemblance to the homunculus problem.
[19] In his essay 'What is a Theory of Mental Representation?', in Stephen Stich
and Ted A. Warfield (eds.): Mental Representation - A Reader, Blackwell, Oxford,
1994.
[20] op. cit., p.352.
[21] op. cit.
[22] op. cit., p.249.
[23] op. cit. It should be noted that Stich presents this as 'early' work by Rosch -
and that 'more recent research has made it clear that for many concepts ... [the
prototype account] will [not] explain the data comfortably'. This need not be fatal to
Churchland's use of the prototype model, however, despite his heavy reliance on
vindication by current empirical research findings in the sciences, for as Stich goes on
to note (p.249): 'for some concepts it has been proposed that subjects' judgements
rely on something very much like a tacitly known scientific theory'. As will become
clear, this possibility is congenial to Churchland's account. Churchland has elsewhere
argued (in 'The Continuity of Philosophy and the Sciences' - 'Mind and Language'
vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1986) that the task for the philosopher is to be a proto-scientist,
speculating about the future discoveries of science. (Consistent with this, Churchland
is at pains to reject the notion that philosophy is conceptual analysis.)
[24] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach' p.207.
[25] op. cit.
[26] op. cit.
[27] op. cit., p.208.
[28] op. cit.
[29] op. cit.
[30] Given that the 'vector space' in which prototypes arise is both
multidimensional and abstract, the claims that real brains have many more than one
hidden level, and that real brains divide into distinct processing hierarchies may be hard
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to substantiate. May it not be the case that these conclusions are consistent with our
currently very limited neurobiological knowledge, rather than being a secure
conclusion from it? Surely such phenomena as abstract multidimensional spaces may
be no more than presumptive inferences from what is empirically accessible - so that
there are degrees of assurance that they exist (some phenomena in this category, such
as black holes, being relatively highly-assured; others, such as wormholes connecting a
number of distinct universes, being highly speculative possibilities, which are no more
than consistent with what is currently known).
[31] In his essay 'Explanatory Pluralism and the Co-evolution of Theories in
Science', in Robert McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and their Critics, Blackwell,
Oxford, 1996, McCauley claims that in a 1990 jointly-authored paper, the
Churchlands 'discuss and largely defuse five well-worn objections ... to the reduction
of psychology to neurobiology'. One of these objections is given as 'freedom', (op. cit.
p. 17). Rather disappointingly, in the paper in question ('Intertheoretic Reduction: a
Neuroscientist's Field Guide', in Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The
Mind-Body Problem - A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), the
Churchlands' sole reference to the issue is to claim that: 'whether and in what sense
there is any human freedom, beyond the relative autonomy that attaches to any
complex dynamical system that is partially isolated from the world, is an entirely
empirical question. Accordingly, rather than struggle to show that a completed
neuroscience will be consistent with this, or that, or the other preconceived notion of
human freedom, we recommend that we let scientific investigation teach us in what
ways and to what degrees human creatures are "free"'. I can't agree with McCauley
that this brief treatment amounts in any sense to a 'defusing' of the problem of
explaining how human freedom can be accommodated in a pattern of electrochemical
activity across a population of neurons. Given the claim that the philosopher is a
'proto-scientist', it seems rather a dereliction of duty to counsel that we await the
future teaching of scientific investigation - especially given Churchland's bold claim
that the 'stimulus-responsish' 'fear' is 'oversimple and deeply misleading'
('Explanation: A PDP Approach' p.207). I return to the issue of human freedom in the
context of moral action in the next chapter.
[32] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1995, p.3.
[33] Churchland calculates later in the same chapter (op. cit., p5) that with 'the total
number of synaptic weights that the brain might assume is very roughly ten raised to
the 100 trillionth power. Compare this with the measure of only 1087 cubic metres
standardly estimated for the volume of the entire astronomical universe'. The brain
thus 'encompasses a space of conceptual and cognitive possibilities that is larger ...
than the entire astronomical universe' (op. cit., p.4). This rather mind-boggling
statistic merely clouds the issue: does this yield the conclusion that the brain's
enormity renders prediction technically impossible, or is there a source or sources of
behaviour which are beyond the predictive reach of any device consistent with the laws
of nature?
[34] We need also to scrutinise Churchland's assurances that the currently-private
will remain so. Again the question will be whether this is due to a principled first
person/ third person asymmetry, or because of insurmountable technological
impediments arising from the sheer complexity of the mind/ brain, and the likely
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prospects for neuroscience. I suspect that it cannot be the former - and that, by
extension, the impossibility of a behaviour-predicting device is also mere technical
impossibility. I return to this issue in chapter 6.
[35] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Sold, p. 101.
[36] op. cit., p. 110.
[37] op. cit., p. 114.
[38] Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Merriam Webster, Chicago,
1986.
[39] It isn't clear what evidence there is for this: earlier writing seems to suggest
that the evidence for human cognition being via PDP is in part via analogy from
artificial systems: now this is being embellished in order to attempt to accommodate
specifically higher-order (e.g. human) capacities.
[40] In fact, as I will argue, more than this is required: the activation of the
"danger" prototype must be understood by the woman.
[41] Churchland doesn't address the question of the relationship between the brain
and its owner - presumably for fear of appearing to present a dualistic account. But a
situation whereby the various areas of the brain have meaning only for each other
(there being nothing over and above the brain) surely also fails to dispel the
'stimulus-responsish' concern (even if such internal 'meanings were possible). Who is
in charge? I return to this question in later chapters.
[42] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p.210.
[43] op. cit.
[44] W.V.O. Quine, 'Epistemology Naturalized' in Hilary Kornblith (ed ):
NaturalizingEpistemology, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, p.25.
[45] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p.210.
Note, incidentally, how the term 'spontaneous' reappears here. On this occasion, it
appears to mean 'using its own internal resources' - so that the connection between
Quine's 'meagre input' and 'torrential output' are achieved by the network unaided.
This seems to reinforce my earlier objection that Churchland's only tenable PDP
objection to the 'stimulus-response' criticism is that there is complex internal neural
activity intermediate between the stimulus and the response - not that the response is
in any sense at least in part the outcome of a contributory free choice.
[46] Churchland devotes a chapter of The Engine of the Soul, the Seat ofReason to
the question 'Could an Electronic Machine be Conscious?' - so I may be doing
artificial networks some disservice in denying them the possibility of explanatory
understanding. I return to the question of machine consciousness in a later chapter; for
now I propose to proceed on the assumption that extant artificial PDP systems such as
the mine detector have no capacity for explanatory understanding, and that this is to be
taken to be attributable to the simplicity of their architecture.
[47] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p.212.
[48] op. cit.
[49] op. cit..
[50] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p.213.
[51] op. cit.
[52] op. cit. Churchland doesn't develop this point: it may be a merely infelicitous
use of words on his part.
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[53] op. cit.
[54] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, p. 114.
[55] I will consider the Kuhnian influence on Churchland's account of the theories
in the next chapter, when I come to consider Churchland's moral theory.
[56] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, p.278.
[57] op. cit., p. 115.
[58] op. cit.
[59] op. cit.
[60] I assume for present purposes that the only distinction between 'explanation'
and 'prediction' is temporal - explanation coming after the event, and prediction
before. I also take it that Churchland would raise no objection to this assumption.
[61] Though my view, as already presented, is that he fails: his putative instances of
explanation are - assuming for the moment the accuracy of the PDP account of
cognition - actually instances of mere recognition/ classification.
[62] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, p. 118.
[63] op. cit., p. 119.
[64] paraphrased from Paul M. Churchland, 'Evaluating our Self-Conception' in
Mind and Language, vol.. 8, no.2.
[65] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, p. 121.
[66] I return in my final chapter to questions of truth and falsity, and the extent to
which these notions might be operable within an eliminative materialist model; the
question of evaluation is considered in the next chapter, where I consider the
implications of Churchland's moral realism.
[67] Paul M. Churchland, 'On the Nature of Explanation: A PDP Approach', p.218.
[68] op. cit., p.219.
[69] op. cit., p.218.
[70] Consistent with his account, Churchland will eschew consideration of
'hypotheses', which are linguistic entities. In place of'hypotheses', he will consider
'activation vectors', which perform a neural role corresponding to the logical role
which hypotheses play in non-psychological accounts. Unfortunately, no such handy
neural surrogate term is available for 'explanation' - so that the translation of the
problem into neural terms is only partial. Churchland notes that 'in the end, the process
is not one of "inference" at all, nor is its outcome generally a sentence' (op. cit.).
Herein lies the problem: notwithstanding its 'crudity' from the perspective of cognitive
neurodynamics, an account in which inference to that hypothesis which is maximally
consistent with the facts of observation, and which thereby presents us with an
'explanation', is transparent, in that there is no mystery about what makes this
explanation an explanation. When Churchland comes to exemplify the process from a
cognitive neurodynamics perspective, the example which he gives - of a coyote being
bitten by a snake - appears not to incorporate any explanation at all (see below).
[71] op. cit. p. 219.
[72] op. cit.
[73] In a later essay - Learning and Conceptual Change', Churchland notes that 'the
(hyper)distance between the old and new prototype vectors is a measure of how great
the conceptual change effected' (Paul M. Churchland, 'Learning and Conceptual
Change, in his A Neurocomputational Perspective - The Nature ofMind and the
Structure ofScience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, p.241).
131
[74] I take it that what specific population of neurons subserves a given activation is
arbitrary, in much the same way that what region of a computer's hard disk contains
the software which runs the computer's clock is arbitrary. This is not to ignore the fact
that specific regions of the brain are allocated to specific broad types of cognitive
activity (olfactory; visual; etc.). Presumably it is not held to be the case that my
'deflecting force' vector is activated in a location in my brain exactly equivalent to the
location of the vector in Newton's and Churchland's?
[75] My impression is that Churchland's 'proximity' is proximity in something like
this sense. What he seems to need, however, is this being a function of proximity in the
literal - regions of the brain which are near each other - sense, as this will provide a
causal account. He refers to 'response properties' of neurons as providing the
'constituting dimensions of... very high-dimensional similarity'. Here the properties of
the second of my three levels (the brain level) is accorded some obscure basis for
similarity at the first level (the abstract space level) - though this is hopelessly obscure.
This is both a defence ('it will typically transcend effective verbal description'), and a
pressing requirement of cognitive neurodynamics: if this can be disambiguated, then it
is consistent with his anti-sententialist leanings, whereas the 'semantic' (i.e. third)
account leaves him once again mired in the problem of sustaining a plausible version of
eliminativism - i.e. one which doesn't merely eliminate 'sentences in the head'. (All
quotations in this footnote taken from 'Explanation: A PDP Approach' p.220.)
[76] op. cit., p.219.
[77] op. cit., p.220.
[78] op. cit.
[79] op. cit.
[80] Clearly we must be careful to distinguish here between the cognitive
achievement of the coyote, and what we are capable of vis-a-vis the coyote: it isn't
explaining anything in pouncing on the snake - but we can explain why it so
ill-advisedly acted in this way. Similarly, if, per impossibile, we could communicate
with the dead coyote, then it could explain its actions retrospectively - but again this
doesn't entail any explanation in its brain at the point of determining to act. Once again
we have the conflation of perceptual recognition and explanatory understanding:
inference to the best explanation is not inference to the best feat of perceptual
recognition: contra Churchland, these are not 'instances of the same form of cognitive
achievement' (op. cit., p.228).
[81] Though, as I will argue in the next chapter, Churchland seems to present a not
dissimilar interpretation of what makes for moral behaviour, where he cites
considerations of survival and social success.
[82] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D.F. Pears and B.F.
McGuinness (eds.), Routledge, London, 1961, 6.57.
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CHAPTER 5 CHURCHLAND'S MORAL REALISM
Churchland's The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul [1] demonstrates the full
Kuhnian scope of his ambition. The project has shifted from being a (possibly) radical
contribution to philosophy of mind, to being a putative revolution in human thought
generally. This synoptic ambition underlies the text, whose aim is:
to make available ... the character and potential significance of the developing
theory and the recent experimental results ... [the reader] will be better able to
participate in the inevitable debates about appropriate public policy concerning
medical care, psychiatry, the law, moral responsibility, our correctional system,
education, private morality, and the nature of freedom ... it is ... crucial that
relevant information be made widely available. [2]
Churchland's synoptic ambition for PDP-based eliminative materialism provides the
motivation for his recent work on moral philosophy. The claims that the brain is
nothing but a PDP system, and the physicalist claim that the mind is the brain, jointly
entail that all of our mental lives can be accounted for in terms of activation vectors. I
will refer to this as the 'radical synoptic claim': the claim that all human mental activity
is the processing of a PDP brain. Churchland must thus argue that moral judgement is
an example ofmental activity which can be accommodated within the PDP model. He
must show how a moral position is consistent with eliminativist PDP.
One of the ways of taxonomising the standard moral positions is to distinguish moral
realism, moral irrealism, and moral nihilism. Of these three, irrealism seems most
clearly impossible to reconcile with PDP. In summarising the irrealist position to which
emotivists, prescriptivists and projectivists will all subscribe, Smith notes that the
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irrealist will deny that there are moral facts, insisting rather that 'our moral judgements
simply express our desires about how people behave'.[3] For the irrealist, 'desire' is
central to morality. It is unclear what Churchland's position on desire is: his attack on
folk psychology is exclusively in terms of the other half of what is sometimes referred
to as 'belief-desire psychology'. No configuration of the variables of the PDP model
(synaptic weights; activation vectors; the partitioning of neuronal activation space)
seem likely to be obvious candidates for some neuronal surrogate for desire. [4] In my
last chapter I drew attention to Churchland's rejection of the will (at least as
traditionally conceived); the related traditional element of desire would appear to be
among what Smith terms 'queer moral properties', which include will, and which are
intrinsic to moral irrealism.[5]
If Smith's taxonomy of moral positions is exhaustive (as it appears to be), then
Churchland is thus left with two options: either he can endorse moral nihilism, or he
can attempt to accommodate moral realism in his PDP model. It is unclear why
Churchland doesn't avail himself of the moral nihilist option, which is consistent with a
particularly radical form of eliminative materialism. Given that our traditional
self-conception is put in question by Churchland's thesis, it could be argued that part
of that self-conception is of persons as moral agents - but that, as moral agency seems
ineluctably tied to the discredited ontology of folk psychology, the alternative
conception which the neurocomputational perspective entails is so radical as to discard
even moral agency. It may be the case that Churchland finds this intuitively
unappealing (though intuition is itself a rather conventional basis for philosophical
conviction). As with the 'free will' issue, it appears to be Churchland's evident wish to
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maximise the appeal of the putative paradigm shift in our self-conception which leads
him to attempt to avoid the moral nihilist option. [6] The claim that morality is a sham -
and the consequent implication that, for example, the holocaust cannot be
appropriately described as having been a moral wrong - will be unpersuasive to the
intended lay audience for his The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul.
Much thus depends on Churchland's ability to sustain a PDP version of moral realism.
If he fails, then his position must embrace the massively counter-intuitive moral
nihilism. The only other alternative would be to accept that no PDP account of
morality is possible - but that this does not impugn the status of morality. But for
Churchland to adopt this option is for him to concede defeat: he needs PDP to entail
eliminativism. If the 'queer properties' of moral irrealism are bona fide properties
which can be neither accommodated by PDP (i.e. reduced) nor eliminated, then
eliminative materialism is not entailed by what empirical success PDP may have in
other domains. In the absence of any alternative to PDP which will successfully reduce
the 'queer properties', explanation in terms of properties and states which are
essentially non-physical is neither reducible nor eliminable - so that the central claim of
eliminative materialism is false. [7] The question is thus whether there can be a PDP
account of morality - that is, a PDP version of moral realism - and what consequences
the account will have for the further question ofwhat strength of commitment to
eliminative materialism Churchland can endorse.
Churchland's rejection of traditional epistemology precludes his endorsement of a
conventional form of moral realism, whereby one discovers putative moral truths via
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the exercise of reason, which uncovers moral laws[8]. Such an aprioristic route to
moral truth must be replaced by one which is empiricist - and consistent with the PDP
model, given the synoptic claim regarding this model. Thus moral knowledge, like
scientific knowledge, must be embodied. Churchland's moral concepts will be
prototypes. This recasting of moral realism is consistent with what I will term 'the
continuity thesis'. Churchland's claim will be that the only difference between moral
knowledge and scientific knowledge is that moral prototypes are activated in the
deployment of the former, but not in the latter.
Churchland's first published work on moral philosophy is in his
A Neurocomputational Perspective, which ends with a short chapter entitled 'Moral
Facts and Moral Knowledge': 'moral truths, I shall argue, are roughly as robust and
objective as other instances of truth ...'.[9] In order to evaluate the case for
Churchland's putative PDP-based morality - the case for 'moral knowledge' being
coded in patterns of vectorial activity in the brain - it will be helpful to consider first,
what Churchland takes 'knowledge' to consist in, and secondly, what he takes
'morality' to consist in.
Clearly, the epistemology that makes eliminative materialism possible must deviate
from traditional accounts of knowledge as 'justified true belief. The claim that these
three conditions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for knowledge
assumes a traditional notion of concepts as having precisely specifiable necessary and
sufficient conditions: as noted earlier, the empirical work of psychologists such as
Rosch, which forms part of the context for the development of the notion of PDP
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prototypes, postulates concepts which are not amenable to such precise definition.
Like the sonar echoes of mines, concepts will have loose, family-resemblance relations
between their individual instantiations. But there are further motivations for
Churchland to reject the 'justified true belief construal: most conspicuous is the fact
that knowledge must on the PDP account be embodied, and non-sentential. For a
cognitive component - in this case, a neural component - to satisfy the condition of
beingjustified and true would appear ineluctably for it to be a component which enters
into just the kind of semantic relations which Churchland must eschew. The 'justified
true belief condition seems to be consistent with, at most, sentential eliminativism -
there are no sentences in the head, but the chemical activity which there is eventuates
in states which are translatable into sentences which can then be evaluated for
justifiability and truth. Churchland cannot without difficulty accept the notion of
'truth' in his account of knowledge:
although the history of human intellectual endeavour does support the view that
over the centuries our theories have become dramatically better in many
dimensions, it is quite problematic whether they are successfully "closer" to
"truth". Indeed, the notion of truth itself has recently come in for critical scrutiny
... it is no longer clear that there is any unique and unitary relation that virtuous
belief systems must bear to the nonlinguistic world. [10]
What we have here is at least the bracketing of 'truth', on the grounds that there may
be a number of possible criteria for epistemic virtue. [11]
Conventional accounts of knowledge - those consistent with the 'justified true belief
condition - will account for an individual's having knowledge in terms of that
individual's knowing that... (where what will conventionally replace the ellipsis is a
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proposition - so that the conventional account seems ineluctably linked to
prepositional attitudes). By contrast, Churchland emphasises 'knowing-how', in
alluding to:
... the practical or pragmatic nature of both scientific and broadly normative
knowledge ... both embody different forms of know-how. how to navigate the
natural world in the former case, and how to navigate the social world in the
latter. [12]
So knowledge is a brain state, the possession of which facilitates a certain performance
on the part of the individual whose brain state it is, and the evaluation of which must
be in non-traditional (i.e. non-semantic) terms. To have 'knowledge' in a particular
domain is to have a brain which is configured with just those synaptic weights which
will trigger prototypes relevant to the performance in question.
This takes us some way towards understanding 'the epistemology that makes
eliminative materialism possible'. Churchland acknowledges an intellectual debt to
Kuhn - and his reading ofKuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions is presented
by Churchland in defence of his epistemological position. Thus, for example, in his The
Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, Churchland states that Kuhn's text 'upset my
own Logical Empiricist assumptions':
it had that effect for two reasons. The first was his claim ... that past scientific
revolutions were not the unambiguous expression of sheerly logical and
experimental factors ... [but] were the expression of... social, psychological,
metaphysical, technological, aesthetic, and personal [factors] ... the second reason
... was his claim ... that the unit of scientific understanding is not the sentence, or
set of sentences, but the so-called "paradigm", or family of paradigms. [13]
139
The latter of these Kuhnian contributions may be quickly dispensed with for my
present purposes. Churchland sees the Kuhnian 'paradigm' as being a prototype: in
both cases, what we have is a scientific revolution eventuating in the novel deployment
of this paradigm/ prototype - this constituting an explanatory achievement. In
consequence, we have a new development in 'know-how'. Clearly, if the unit of
scientific understanding is not the sentence, then we have sentential eliminativism for
theories (at least). The former ofKuhn's claims is more important for the purposes of
the present chapter (where what is at issue is the possibility of embodied, moral, facts).
Churchland's argument for the continuity thesis (the thesis that there is no fundamental
distinction between science and morals) will be based largely on putative analogies
between scientific progress and moral progress - so that the criteria for evaluation
(social, psychological, etc.) which are here outlined will be shown to be operative in
the case of moral development of the community. Thus, for example, Kuhn:
urged a "performance" conception of theory evaluation ... a theory is a vehicle
whose virtue lies in its many uses ... the evaluation of a theory by the scientific
community is almost always a matter of complex social and intellectual
negotiation. [14]
Given this negotiability, deriving from the claim that 'it is no longer clear that there is
any unique and unitary relation that virtuous belief systems must bear to the
nonlinguistic world', it is unclear why Churchland alludes to 'moral facts'. 'Facts' are
surely nonnegotiable: once established, they may be open to various novel
interpretations - but the facts per se will remain unchanged. More seriously, a fact
would appear to be an entity which is open to sentential description: it can be 'picked
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out' by means of a sentence of the form: 'it is a fact that a planet's curvedpath in
three-dimensional space is in reality a straightpath within the non-Euclidean
geometry of thefour-dimensional spacetime continuum that surrounds the "attracting
body".[ 15] If the items of'knowledge' are to be immune to semantic interpretation,
and if they are to be elements in a syndrome which is open to continuing challenge via
continuing intellectual progress, then these items are surely inappropriately dubbed
'facts'.
Having briefly considered the first of the two questions raised earlier (what does
Churchland take 'knowledge' to be?), I now propose to go on to the second question:
what does Churchland take 'morality' to consist in?
For the continuity thesis to be sustained, the only distinction between 'scientific
knowledge' and 'moral knowledge' which can be accepted is the distinction that the
former is via prototypes which are not moral prototypes. Thus, given that a Kuhnian,
performance-evaluable construal of scientific knowledge is advocated, so 'moral
knowledge' must also be 'know-how': as noted earlier, moral knowledge can be
defined as: 'how to navigate the social world'.[16] As Churchland notes, this account
of morality contrasts sharply with:
... the more traditional accounts that picture the moral person as one who has
agreed to follow a certain set of rides (e.g., "Always keep your promises", etc.), or
alternatively, as one who has a certain set of overriding desires (e.g., to maximise
the general happiness, etc.). Both of these more traditional accounts are badly out
of focus. [17]
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The final point here may be taken to indicate the linguistic challenge posed by
Churchland's account: were he to claim that the traditional accounts werefalse, then
this would appear to entail the presumed truth of his own account - hence the need to
resort to metaphor ('badly out of focus'), in order to obviate assessment in terms of an
epistemology other than that which makes eliminative materialism possible.
In reinforcing the first part of this claim - the claim that morality does not consist in the
internalisation, and subsequent following of, rules, Churchland moves from sentential
to intentional eliminativism:
... it is just not possible to capture, in a set of explicit imperative sentences or rules,
more than a small part of the practical wisdom possessed by a mature moral
individual... statable rules are not the basis of one's moral character. They are
merely its pale and partial reflection at the comparatively impotent level of
language. [18]
Churchland is concerned, not merely to deny that the moral agent is possessed of a set
of internal 'sentences in the head' such as 'Always keep your promises', but that, in
addition, to claim that what is in the head - the syndrome of synaptic weights and
prototype vectors which constitutes the individual's moral 'expertise' - can be
reflected in only a 'pale and partial' manner by the 'impotent' resources of language.
This entails intentional eliminativism: strictly speaking, sentential descriptions of
internal cognitive states ought not to be utilised.
The second part of the claim in Churchland's quotation - that the notion of the moral
person as one who acts on desires is 'badly out of focus' - leads to the claim that:
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a person might have an all-consuming desire to maximise human happiness. But if
that person has no comprehension of what sorts of things genuinely serve lasting
human happiness; no capacity for recognising other people's emotions, aspirations
and current purposes ... no skills whatever at pursuing that all-consuming desire;
then that person is not a moral saint. He is a pathetic fool ...[19]
The opening observation here, that the person in question 'might have ... desire' of the
requisite sort, is ambiguous: it could mean either that it is possible for someone to be
in this condition; or, alternatively, it may not mean this at all - and be intended merely
as granting the precondition which would have to obtain in order for the opposing
point of view to work, prior to demonstrating that it does not, in fact, work as an
account of morality. Given my earlier observations regarding the absence of any
conspicuous neural surrogate for desire in Churchland's PDP model, I take it that the
latter is the appropriate interpretation - and that Churchland is not conceding the
possibility of someone's being in the folk psychological-sounding condition of
'overriding desire'. But setting aside this quibble, what follows in the quotation is
revealing of Churchland's conception of'morality'. Consistent with his performative
conception of knowledge - and hence of moral knowledge, Churchland's position is
that the intention of the agent is of no relevance in the evaluation of his actions; what
is relevant is the agent's knowledge of how to promote happiness within the
community. The corollary of this is that the shrewd and calculating individual, who
manipulates public opinion in his own interest by pandering to the public's perceived
interests, along the lines of the sophists and orators in Plato's dialogues, will, if
successful in their assessment of the public mood, be candidates for 'moral sainthood'.
[20] To be morally good is to be an effective performer, consistent with moral
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knowledge being knowing how to act morally. The corollary of this is that the inept
performer is 'a fool'.
Having denied that desire to act morally is sufficient for morality, Churchland goes on
to deny its necessity:
a man may have, as his most basic and overriding desire in life, the desire to see his
own children mature and prosper. To him, let us suppose, everything else is
distantly secondary. And yet, such a person may still be numbered among the most
consummately moral people of his community, as long as he pursues his personal
goal... in a fashion that is scrupulously fair to the aspirations of others ...[21]
This seems a rather weak position, given the clear importance for Churchland's
account of his presenting criteria for the evaluation of moral performance which will
fulfil the same function as the Kuhnian criteria for scientific knowledge. 'Scrupulous
fairness to the aspirations of others' cannot, in any case, be taken as a universalisable
criterion: the criteria for successful performance must be indexed to the specific
context within which the individual is operating. Churchland's moral realism thus
differs from most traditional accounts in a further respect: its relativism. There can be
no moral knowledge which is not indexed to the prevailing local conditions of the
individual's community. Churchland responds to the question "why be moral?":
as well ask, "Why should I acquire the skills of swimming?" when one is a fish. In
both cases, the short answer is, "Consider, dear creature, the environment in which
you have no choice but to live." To be sure, this answer leaves open the question
of exactly what motor skills will make one the best possible swimmer, and likewise
the question of exactly what social skills will make one the maximally successful
social agent. [22]
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Once again, Churchland's position leaves no room for what one intends by one's
actions: maximal social success is the sole performance criterion. But the '[social]
environment in which you have no choice but to live' may well establish criteria for
maximal social success which are, contra Churchland's rather blase formulation,
conspicuously hostile to the objective of being 'scrupulously fair to the aspirations of
others' . Pastor Niemoller, a Berlin churchman in the 1930s, founded a group which
helped combat rising discrimination against Christians of Jewish background under the
Nazis. This led to Niemoller's arrest by the Gestapo, and eventual incarceration in the
Dachau concentration camp. How will Churchland evaluate this behaviour? Niemoller
famously (and rhetorically) observed that:
when Hitler attacked the Jews I was not a Jew, therefore I was not concerned. And
when Hitler attacked the Catholics, I was not a Catholic, and therefore, I was not
concerned. And when Hitler attacked the unions and the industrialists, I was not a
member of the unions and I was not concerned. Then, Hitler attacked me and the
Protestant church - and there was nobody left to be concerned.[23]
Clearly, when the majority - perhaps the entirety - of the community is opposed to
one's publicly-adopted position, then one's actions are conspicuously not conducive to
one's being 'maximally socially successful'. Churchland thus has two options: either he
can brand Niemoller 'a pathetic fool' for his adoption of a position so radically at odds
with 'the emotions, aspirations, current purposes ...' of the community - the social
environment - in which he lived; alternatively, he must widen the scope of this
community, both geographically and temporally, beyond 1930s Germany - so that
Niemoller's actions are consonant with the human community in the modern age, or
some similar formulation of'community'.[24] This now poses a problem, however:
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unless we can delineate 'the moral environment' in such a way as to redeem Niemoller
- but without encompassing the conflict of purposes and aspirations etc. which a
plurality of cultures and time periods will likely generate - then it will become
impossible both to accommodate the undoubtedly moral actions ofNiemoller, and
have a coherent set of community-based criteria by which to index an individual's
morality or immorality. [25] The only other alternative would be to adopt rules for
morality which are timeless and not culturally-specific - and Churchland has already
discounted such a basis for morality.
Thus far, I have presented only Churchland's desire for explanatory unity as a
motivation for this reconception of morality as knowledge embodied in the brain, and
the consequent 'social skill' conception of morality. There are, however, a number of
analogies which Churchland sees between the scientific and the moral domains. As
analogy plays a significant role in his PDP epistemology - it is the basis for scientific
progress, as problematic cases are incorporated under novel prototypes, hitherto
employed for the analogous case - he can be expected to find such analogies
persuasive. [26]
Churchland identifies three respects in which moral knowledge is analogous to
scientific knowledge: the state of the layman's knowledge in each case; the
achievement of progress in the two domains; and the criteria for evaluating knowledge
in the two domains.
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The first of these analogies - that concerned with the state of the layman's knowledge -
arises in the course of Churchland's response to an anticipated objection to the
continuity claim: that scientific theory possesses a history of progress, and an inherent
objectivity, which stands in sharp contrast to the 'flimsy, arbitrary and subjective'
moral and social domain.[27] Churchland's response to this is to claim that a false
analogy is being posed: the appropriate analogue for the layman's confused, narrow
and arbitrary moral and social convictions, is, not the 'carefully distilled wisdom of
institutionalised science', but the equally confused, narrow and arbitrary scientific
knowledge of the layman. Churchland concludes:
if anything, the average person displays a slightly higher level of moral cognition
than of scientific cognition. If we wish to disqualify moral cognition as a form of
knowledge, we must look to some other contrasts to bring it down. [28]
It's difficult to see how Churchland believes that anything is demonstrated by this
observation - let alone that it supports the continuity thesis. Even if it were admissible
to internalise theories and knowledge so that they have no abstract existence - in fact,
no existence at all - outside human brains, it would still be inadmissible to deduce
anything about the objective nature of these entities from the layman's limited grasp of
them. The argument then begs the question by assuming that people's 'ignorance,
prejudice, self-interest, class interest, unbridled emotion and religious enthusiasm' are
evidence of a low level of moral knowledge. [29] His response misses the point, in any
case. What makes possible the advancement of science towards the 'carefully distilled
wisdom' of the professional scientist is precisely the fact that there is what Churchland
elsewhere terms 'an objective configuration of objects and properties' to which true
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scientific claims will correspond.[30] The claim that knowledge consists in knowing
how to do something - and that morality and science are, despite claims to the
contrary, not fundamentally different, on the grounds that we don't do either
particularly well, cannot seriously be held to support the case for the continuity thesis.
As already noted, a key element in Churchland's PDP model of explanation is the
account which he offers of scientific progress. Churchland sees a comparable process
of continuous adjustment of social policy as further evidence of the close analogy
between the moral and scientific domains. The recurrent nature of individual human
cognition is recalled in the process of the accumulation of legislation via 'long
experience and many adjustments'.[31] Just as there is no infallibility in science - even
Newton's prototypes were superseded by the better explanation advanced by Einstein,
whose theory is itself now a candidate for similar displacement - so there is an ongoing
need for adjustment in social policy. The basis for evaluation is - in keeping with
Churchland's Kuhnian epistemology - wholly pragmatic: whether a given policy aids
our collective operation in the social environment. Again, however, Churchland's
analogy here seems not to sustain the continuity thesis in the way that he intends. In
the case of continuous adjustments of social policy, what we have is a set of laws and
institutional arrangements, rather than a body of moral knowledge. The prevailing
policy will have moral implications, of course - but continuous adjustment of social
policy is not the same thing as continuous adjustment of moral convictions or moral
knowledge. The analogy becomes even more strained when Churchland introduces the
judiciary - whose role in interpretation of the abstract wisdom of the legislature is
likened by him to that of engineers, whose task is to apply abstract wisdom to actual
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cases. The analogue of the scientific paradigm - the prototype - is in this case the
judicial precedent. Lawyers and judges thus attempt to apprehend a great diversity of
actual cases 'as instances of some antecedent prototype'. [32] The merit of this
arrangement, as Churchland points out, is that it ensures consistency in the application
of the law.
At this point, a disanalogy between this process, and the research efforts of scientists
and engineers, arguably becomes apparent. Consistency is an objective in law because
only by being consistent can the law befair - consistent treatment of all who are
subject to the law is one of the central principles of the rule of law, which is a feature
of a fair society. So there is an intrinsically normative dimension to the task facing
legislators and judges in a liberal democratic society: consistent treatment is fair -
therefore it is good. In the domain of science, 'consistency' is regarded as virtuous -
but here there is no objective of being 'fair'. Consistent handling of control variables,
and consistent treatment of raw research data ensures the reliability of the ultimate
findings, and is thus a constraint on good scientific procedure (where 'good' means
'effective').[33] I conclude that, to the extent that this analogy succeeds, it does so on
account of the specifically non-moral (and hence non-normative) aspects of the
process of legislation and legal interpretation.
The gap between morals and the law is conceded by Churchland, when he observes
that:
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the realm of socially-enforced law encodes only the most serious of our collective
convictions about appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. Beneath that realm
there is a similar body of shared understanding, a similar framework of
social-recognitional and social-behavioural skills that we expect our fellow citizens
to command. [34]
Given the social dislocation of contemporary Western society - nowhere more
apparent than in the United States - this seems an extraordinary claim. Neither the
apparent suggestion that there is general consensus regarding the 'most serious of our
... convictions', nor the claim that there is further consensus at a lower level, stand up
to any scrutiny. This is important, given the central claim of the continuity thesis. As
my 'Pastor Neimoller' example was intended to demonstrate, Churchland's 'maximally
successful social agent' is one who can act in consonance with the objectives and
priorities of the wider community - so that there must be a fact of the matter about
what this communal set of objectives and priorities is. The analogy here is with the
transition from one paradigm to another in Kuhnian theory: here the transition 'is a
social fact accomplished by a community of scientists'. [35] There is thus a pressing
need for the claim which Churchland goes on to make apropos the law and judicial
precedent: 'this is the domain of common public morality'.[36] In the absence of any
such common morality, there is little prospect of the individual's being able to learn
how to operate as a maximally successful social agent, where this is indexed to criteria
putatively established at this communal level. The absence of the accomplishment of
such a communal set of prototypes will also weaken the analogy with science, as the
latter is conceived by Kuhn and Churchland. [37]
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In my previous chapter I raised Churchland's own formulation of an objection to his
PDP model of explanation, to the effect that the model will accommodate only
recognition and subsequent classification, rather than explanation. [3 8] In the case of
moral explanation, a further problem is consequent upon Churchland's continuity
thesis. In virtue of what is a process of classification and explanation a process of
moral classification and explanation? This problem is evident in an example which
Churchland cites in defence of his model - that of abortion:
one side of the debate considers the status of the early foetus and invokes the
moral prototype of a Person, albeit a very tiny and incomplete person ... the other
side of the debate addresses the same situation and invokes the prototype of a tiny
and possibly unwelcome Growth, as yet no more a person than is a cyst or a
cluster of one's own skin cells. [39]
As it stands, this is a clear example of recognition. As with the judge's activation of a
'judicial precedent' prototype, there is no explanation here (reinforcing my claim that
not all prototype activations are explanations, even if all explanations are prototype
activations). In the case of the activation of a scientific prototype, there is, I suggest, a
gap for which Churchland fails to account, between the activation of the prototype,
and the subsequent explanation which is given as an output. In the moral case, the gap
will be between classification - the activation of one or other of the prototypes
'Person' or 'Unwanted Growth' - and action. Churchland's account of the woman
leaving the burning building will be in terms of output vectors being in this case motor
vectors - so that muscular activity is stimulated as output, and she runs away. In the
'foetus' case, the output could be either a judgement: 'abortion is permissible/ not
permissible in this case', or it could be an action - the action of seeking an abortion, or
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continuing with the pregnancy. [40] The problem is in saying what makes the present
case a moral case at all. The issue of the status of the foetus is surely a metaphysical,
rather than a moral issue: if the foetus is categorised as a 'person' - then, given certain
possible construals of what is a person, moral status may derive from this metaphysical
status. [41] Ifwe consider the case of a gynaecologist's prototype activation on
meeting a woman who requests an abortion, and assume that the gynaecologist's
'Unwanted Growth' prototype is activated, then motor activity will be stimulated in
what I take it will be a comparable manner to that in the case of the woman's running
from the building (mutatis mutandis). In that case, Churchland's vaunted analogy
between moral cognition and scientific cognition has been so successful, that it is no
longer clear from this account what makes a judgement a moral judgement. If a
candidate in a medical science examination is shown a sample of tissue in ajar of
preserving fluid, and asked to identify the contents of the jar, and if the candidate
determines that the object in the jar is a growth of some kind - say, a cyst - then the
PDP account will allude to the activation of a 'Growth' prototype in the candidate's
brain, leading to a motor output, as the candidate lifts his arm to the answer paper, and
writes 'growth' in the space provided for this sample. Churchland would appear to
have no account of what makes the gynaecologist's judgement a moral judgement,
and the medical student's judgement a scientific judgement. If this interpretation is
accurate, then Churchland has effectively eliminated morality by so successfully
conflating the moral domain with that of science (given the presumed accuracy of the
PDP account) that the boundary between the two disappears on his account. [42]
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What is missing from Churchland's account is the fact that the metaphysical question
of the status of the foetus has moral force in virtue of the fact that its answer entails
the further, and moral, judgement that 'if I have an unwanted foetus, then I ought/
ought not to terminate the pregnancy'.[43] The difference between morals and science
is precisely this deployment of the moral 'ought': the claim that morals and science
differ only in terms of the nature of the prototype activated will only stand if this
difference is somehow accommodated: in the absence of normativity, there can
apparently be no difference, so that morality is effectively eliminated. Nor can we say
that the moral nature of the gynaecologist's prototype can be read off from the moral
nature of her subsequent action. While this might seem prima facie consistent with the
performative conception of moral knowledge postulated by Churchland, such a
manoeuvre merely serves to shift the problem, as we must now ask what, on his
account, makes an action a moral action? We cannot claim that the determining factor
is the judgement of third parties, whose prototype firings on apprehending her action
are moral prototype firings, as this merely returns us to the question of what is a moral
prototype. 'Social' success - conformity with the actions of the rest of the community
- seems similarly too ambiguous to serve as an effective criterion for the demarcation
of the moral action from the non-moral, and the consequent identification of the
antecedent prototype as a moral prototype. Ants, for example, behave in a manner
which is consistent with a maximally-successful ant community, with elaborate
divisions of labour and hierarchies, and a sophisticated network of interdependence. I
take it that no one will claim that the effective soldier ant's behaviour is therefore
morally good - so that 'maximal social success' cannot, without further clarification,
serve to delineate the moral from the non-moral.
153
Roger Scruton raises a question which he takes to be 'the crux for the moral realist':
what is to be said to someone who agrees with the moral argument, but feels no
inclination to act on it? [44]
The attempt to construct a possible PDP response to this question raises interesting
consequences for Churchland's moral realism, given his concern to resist the objection
that his model cannot accommodate human freedom. Scruton's formulation appears
conventionally sentential: 'agreement with an argument' is a semantic condition, and
assumes knowledge-that, rather than know-how. In place of such agreement, the PDP
theorist will, I take it, characterise the situation as one of comparable prototypes (or
the same prototype) being activated in both brains, or all of the brains in question. The
question of whether the same prototype might instigate different outputs in different
brains is an interesting one. Churchland's account gives no reason to expect that the
same prototype will always eventuate in the same type of output response - and this
would appear to be confirmable a posteriori, by the empirical fact that, for example, a
pervert's response to a given prototype activation in his brain may be exactly the
opposite of the response of 'normal' individuals. [45] Scruton's question appears to be
based on the rationally-characterisable situation where one may correctly deduce, from
the combination of some moral rule and antecedent circumstances, how one ought to
act. Aristotle's notion of'incontinence' - where I know how I ought to act, having
worked out the appropriate practical syllogism, but elect not to do so, would appear to
capture the kind of case which Scruton has in mind. But the 'queer moral properties'
of the moral irrealist again come into play here. 'Inclination' is a condition which
154
doesn't appear capable of being transferred to the PDP model: I can, on the Scruton
and Aristotelian traditional models, will myself to act or not to act in accordance with
some judgement regarding how I ought to act or ought not to act. But once again,
Churchland's account appears 'stimulus-responsish': once all of the appropriate
prototypes have been activated at the hidden levels in my brain, my behavioural output
is rendered inevitable by the synaptic connections and synaptic connection strengths
already established in the brain in the abstract region of these prototypes. Interestingly,
Churchland appears to have a response to Scruton: Aristotelian incontinence cannot
arise, so that the objection to moral realism is misplaced. The downstream vector
activations are associated with the appropriate motor activity. This is, however, a
Pyrrhic victory, as Churchland has in consequence no obvious room in his model for
'inclinations to act'.[46] It is thus completely unclear how Churchland could respond
to the question which Scruton sets for the realist.
The earlier-noted question: 'what is a person?' is of interest in the light of this evident
gap in Churchland's account. The tradition, which he has so conspicuously bracketed
on various occasions, will postulate the possession of reason as a necessary condition.
[47] Churchland's account of morality must therefore be an account which can
accommodate morality in the absence of rationality. [48] This raises the questions:
could a PDP machine be constructed which made moral choices; and if not, why not?
Suppose we were to select some society where there was consensus at all levels
(government, church, individual) that the foetus is a person - and emphatically not a
mere growth. A machine very like the mine detector could then be trained up to
recognise foetuses and growths - as a result of an input of x-ray images from the
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womb. The internal connection weights in the network are initially set at random
values, and the training set of recorded images - half of them foetuses, and half cysts -
are fed into the machine's input layer. Using the backpropagation technique of
synaptic weight adjustment, we cycle repeatedly through the training set until the
machine outputs the message 'don't operate' in response to each of the foetuses in the
training set, and 'operate' in response to each of the cysts. The training set is
enormous, and includes many non-standard cysts (and foetuses); its ultimate
performance is comparable to the mine-detector in terms of successful identification of
inputs.
What we now have is a machine which is maximally efficient, in that its outputs
conform precisely to the objectives, priorities, and preferences of the community. In
terms of Churchland's performance criteria for moral knowledge, the machine is
'consummately successful'. It is unclear to me how Churchland can reject the claim
that the machine is making moral judgements - or acting morally. [49] The only
distinctions between the machine's operation and human operation are (a) their
respective physical compositions - which is clearly irrelevant; and (b) the complexity of
their respective internal operations: the 'foetus-detector' makes use of neither
recurrent nor horizontal processing: like the mine-detector, it is an exclusively
'feed-forward' network. This latter distinction cannot be held to be what makes an
output a moral judgement. [50] Just as computational complexity intermediate
between the input and the eventual output cannot of itself account for human freedom,
nor can it account for the presence of a moral judgement: where two networks
produce identical outputs from identical inputs, and in identical contexts, (and where
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neither network's functioning is being augmented by an additional, non-PDP,
component) the claim that the output of one has the property of being a moral
judgement, while the output of the other does not, is not credible. I conclude that
Churchland must concede the possibility of artificial networks making moral choices.
[51]
When Churchland comes to consider the issue of moral wrongdoing, further
interesting light is shed on his position. The 'moral miscreant' is an individual who is
'unskilled in social practices'. [52] The account which he offers of this moral
miscreancy appeals in the first instance to lack of appropriate training - so that the
prototypes for moral behaviour which is compatible with social success are poorly
developed. The miscreant in this case presumably resembles a mine-detector which is
still undergoing the training-up which will eventually lead to its successful
performance, but whose performance is currently deficient. But the question then
arises of what one ought to do about this regrettable situation. In a chapter in The
Engine ofReason entitled 'The Brain in Trouble', Churchland considers how therapy
might operate, in accordance with the PDP model. In particular, he contrasts 'talk' and
'chemical and surgical intervention'.[53]
Churchland's account of the perceived failures of Freudian analysis are presented in
terms of his general model of competition between theories. Freud is credited with a
feat of scientific creativity, in that he 'attempted to redeploy the central family of
commonsense cognitive prototypes - beliefs, desires, fears, and practical reasoning - in
a new domain: the Unconscious'.[54] Freudianism is thus a paradigmatic example of
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the novel deployment of already-familiar prototypes. Given that these are the
prototypes of folk psychology, Churchland is, not surprisingly, critical of the theory,
and can cite poor performance - the standard Kuhnian criterion - in defence of his
position. Churchland's analysis of the source of this theoretical failure appeals to
sentential eliminativism: cognitive processes lack the sentence-like and inference-like
structure of the commonsense prototypes for belief, desire, fear, and practical
reasoning. As already urged, activation vectors operate via vectorial transformation -
so that the pathological behaviour which is the target of therapy has not arisen as a
result of sequences of inferential stress defined over propositions. Churchland
concludes that:
... we have done far better by looking for structural failures or abnormalities in the
brain, for functional failures in its physiology, for chemical abnormalities in its
metabolism, for genetic failures in its original blueprint, and for developmental
hitches in its maturation.[55]
This claim must have enormous consequences for the prospects of Churchland being
able to offer a plausible account of either human freedom (a response to the
'stimulus-responsish' criticism), or the human capacity for moral choice. Churchland's
conclusion is that: '[we cannot] fix a genuinely broken brain just by talking to it'.[56]
Given the claim just made - that functional, chemical, and structural anomalies in the
brain are the likely sources of pathological behaviour, and the vectorial and
transformative nature of the brain's functioning (whether defective or not), then this
latter claim must be true, where a 'broken brain' is one which generates sub-optimal
social practices as its output. Given that Churchland has raised the dichotomy between
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'talk' and 'chemical and surgical intervention' in this section of the text, it must surely
be the case that chemical or surgical - reconstructive - intervention will be the most
causally effective procedure, where rectification of the problem - the adaptation of
behaviour to conform with appropriate social practices - is the objective.
Churchland hesitates to endorse this conclusion, however. He observes that 'drugs or
surgery might enable the process, but only social interaction can actually provide [the
solution]'.[57] This, however, must be held to be inconsistent: 7/it is the case that all
moral reasoning consists solely ofvector-to-vector transformation in the brain, where
the causal processes subserving this vectorial activity are reducible to chemical causal
sequences which have the end result that they do in virtue of the global configuration
of connections which obtain within the brain, then surely a therapy which consisted
solely of either adjustment of the brain's chemical balance, or adjustment of the
synaptic weights, would be effective in adjusting the behavioural output.[58] 'Talk'
might make a contribution to the process, but it wouldn't be strictly necessary. [59] It
may be objected, of course, that human processing is much more complex - being
massively recurrent and horizontal as well as 'feed forward' in its operation. Once
again, though, human cognitive complexity would be called upon to rescue eliminative
materialism, having already been postulated by me as a possible eliminativist response
to the 'stimulus-responsish' objection, and the moral machine objection. [60]
The clear implication of this is, of course, the return of the 'stimulus-responsish'
problem in an apparently intractable form: by introducing a chemical into the public
water supply, I could presumably effect a change in brain state which could in turn
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influence the behaviour of those who ingest the chemical. If the behavioural change
took the form of a shift from sub-optimal - to - optimal social practice, then this would
have to be construed on the Churchland account as an enhancement in the moral status
of the individuals concerned. This is a preposterous assumption - but, as with the
assumption that a machine could be constructed which could make moral choices, it
isn't clear how Churchland can reject it while retaining a position consistent with his
PDP model.
My claim is that - within the terms of reference of the PDP model - chemical
intervention would have to be deemed more effective than 'talk'. Churchland suggests
that 'there will always be a place for systematic conversation ... in the therapeutic
process'. But this linguistic process will have to be received as input by the system - in
its auditory input region, as a set of acoustic phenomena - then processed via vectorial
transformation to the relevant prototypes. This is a deeply mysterious process, as it is
still unclear how the brain can effect the conversion of vibrations in the air, via
chemical transformations in the brain, to activate subsequent upstream vectorial
activity which has the appropriate meaning (i.e. which represents the same thing(s) as
the representations in the brain of the therapist - is the same prototype). There is both
enormous scope for cognitive dissonance - a slightly different prototype being
activated in the therapist's and the patient's respective brains (this being especially
likely given the nature of the patient's perceived problem in the first place) - and the
likely need for a very large amount of this painstaking hit-and-miss activation, in order
to nudge the brain into developing the pathways which will ensure socially successful
behavioural outputs. [61]
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My suspicion is that Churchland is here failing to follow his own argument to its
inevitable conclusion - that what the future may hold is a world of moral readjustment
by pharmaceutical intervention - because the claim is likely to be too radical to have
appeal to his audience (the layman for whom his The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the
Soul is principally intended).[62]
Churchland's room for manoeuvre here is limited. It is difficult to see how adjustment
of the brain's chemistry couldfail to have the desired effect on the behavioural outputs
of the human PDP system, in the absence of any other 'therapy'. On the other hand,
standards for moral behaviour must be indexed to a particular community, on
Churchland's account. [63] The achievement of moral conformity via purely
pharmaceutical means now seems implausible - as the drug would require to be
adjusted to the specific moral standards of the community in question - so that the
emphasis on 'talk' rescues the account from absurdity. Churchland thus has a dilemma:
if he is to remain consistent with his claim that brain chemistry is the basis for moral
choice, then he needs to concede that drug therapy would be sufficient. But for drug
therapy to be sufficient, the set of behaviours would require to be more standardised
than his moral-relativism model assumes. The possibility of one pill for adjustment to
Muslim fundamentalist morality; another for Ulster loyalism; and so on, seems too
ridiculous to be given any consideration. But Churchland must retain the moral
relativism model, in order to be able to identify Kuhnian performance criteria. There
patently are no universal standards of actual moral practice - so, in the absence of
rationally-discoverable moral rules, from which actual moral practice may, or may not,
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deviate (and he has rejected this possibility on Kuhnian epistemological grounds), then
there must be the relativity of 'moral facts'. Given the absurdity of the
different-pills-for-different-local-moral-standards notion, he is constrained to fall back
on the therapeutic virtues of 'talk' - notwithstanding his withering assessment of
Freud, for whom therapy consisted exclusively in talk. [64]
Once this is conceded, the prospects for any form of eliminative materialism stronger
than mere sentential eliminativism seem poor. Moral education - or moral re-education
- via 'talk' will take the form of sentential inputs, with patterns of inference, and, in all
likelihood, the normative terminology of the rejected epistemology. The
reconfiguration of'talk' so as to eschew these features seems impossible (so that the
miscreant will be appealed to on grounds such as "if you wish to be maximally
successful socially, then you should behave in accordance with standards of behaviour
expected by the community; surely you want to be socially successful because ..."). If
this is the input, then what results from this in terms of hidden- and output-level
transformations, would appear to be capable of sentential description with a fair degree
of descriptive accuracy, contra the intentional eliminativist claim, even if it is true that
the processing involved is intrinsically non-sentential.
At the beginning of this chapter, I set out what I have termed the 'radical synoptic
claim' - that all human cognitive activity, including the formulation of moral
judgement, may be accounted for in purely PDP terms. If this claim is true, then future
scientific research will enhance the neurocomputational perspective until all aspects of
morals, social policy, and aesthetics, as well as science, will be accounted for purely in
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terms of the operation of human PDP networks. The claim that all cognitive activity is
PDP activity entails the weaker claim that human sensory recognition is by PDP
processing. The claim that the PDP account of human brain functioning is totally false
will thus include the claim that sensory recognition is not subserved by vectorial
activation in the brain. I do not wish to make this claim, as it seems prima facie
plausible to claim that procedures such as facial recognition are achieved, at least in
part, by a process which is replicated by the artificial mine detector.[65] But the claim
that human sensory recognition is subserved by a PDP process in the brain is
consistent with substance dualism (the self acting as the counterpart of the sonar
operator who uses the mine detector) - so that my willingness to accept the possible
accuracy of this claim does not entail acceptance of an outcome remotely near the
radical synoptic claim advanced in Churchland's The Engine ofReason, the Seat of the
Soal. IfPDP is to entail eliminative materialism, then the radical synoptic claim must
be true.
It remains to be proven that moral choice coidd be exercised by an exclusively PDP
network. Churchland has left implicit throughout the apparent assumption that the only
distinction between scientific and moral 'explanation' is the nature of the prototypes
whose activation is that explanation. But the key question of what makes a prototype a
moral prototype is left unaddressed, the apparent assumption being that one can read
off the moral nature of the prototype in question from the categorisation of the action
to which it gives rise. This could work in one of two ways: either we could deduce the
activation of a moral prototype from the individual's attempt to operate in a 'socially
successful' manner; alternatively, we could accept that the action is, by common
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consent, action within a moral domain (as in the case of abortion). The first of these
options fails to provide a pragmatic answer to the question of what makes a prototype
a moral prototype, in virtue of the fact that 'social success' is too ambiguous a
category, incorporating as it does both human behaviours which are morally neutral,
and animal behaviours. The latter option is circular: what is accepted by common
consent to be moral action will be determined by the prototypes which are commonly
deployed in apprehending such action; we would still require an account of what
makes these prototypes 'moral'.
What is thus at issue is Churchland's ability to sustain his claim that his position is
moral realism. The key element which I suggest is missing is a normative element: if
Churchland can accept that the difference between a moral prototype and a non-moral
prototype is that the former, but not the latter, explain how we ought to behave, then
he can answer the question of what makes a prototype a moral prototype. If, however,
he cannot accommodate this distinction between the moral and the non-moral - and if
the ineliminability of the moral 'ought' is accepted - then morality itself ought to be
eliminated, so that, despite his professed endorsement of moral realism, Churchland's
position is, in fact, moral nihilist.
Moral nihilism is consistent with intentional eliminativism, so that in endorsing moral
nihilism, Churchland would keep open the option of a genuinely eliminative
materialism. The claim that moral judgement is an example of mental activity which it
is impossible to accommodate within the PDP model, so that the synoptic claim for
PDP is false, would be addressed by the counterclaim that there is no domain of moral
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judgement, so that the success already achieved in duplicating other forms of human
cognition in artificial PDP systems secures the possibility of an exclusively PDP
account of all human cognition, this account availing itself of none of the explanatory
categories of folk psychology. But his desire to render his general position acceptable
to the widest possible audience presents a dilemma, for the converse is also true: if
Churchland endorses normativity as an essential feature of moral judgement, then only
sentential eliminativism seems to be in prospect. If we describe some individual's
moral stance as being a commitment to the Tightness or wrongness of a particular
practice, such as abortion, then we have normativity - but it is difficult to see how this
sentential presentation could be fundamentally wrong - or even wrong in any
significant respect. In this case, Churchland will have gained a satisfactory account of
what makes a judgement a moral judgement - but at the cost of relinquishing all but
the modest sentential form of eliminativism.
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to render this account consistent with his PDP model, has required that he strip out
just those elements which enable us to state what morality is. Moral judgements are
moral judgements in part due to the fact that they provide us with reasons for acting in
a particular way. The bracketing of rationality precludes this characterisation by
Churchland.
[44] Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy - A Survey, Sinclair-Stevenson, London,
1994, p.561.
[45] It isn't entirely clear whether this example works. In the same way in which
there must be more vectorial activity in the woman's brain when she is in the burning
building than activation of the 'Smoke' prototype (how else would we account for her
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not fleeing the barbecue?), similarly, the pervert's prototype must either be
accompanied byfurther prototypes with which they are associated in his brain - and
which in turn give rise to the gratification which he experiences, or the prototype must
be qualitatively different in the first place. The former seems more consistent with
Churchland's account (i.e. further prototypes being activated in conjunction with the
one in question). I consider later in this chapter Churchland's observations regarding
the scope for treatment of deviant individuals, given the apparent opportunities
afforded by the neurological research of which he avails himself.
[46] One is tempted to add that once again morality seems to be under threat of
elimination on Churchland's account: moral actions must surely arise from one's free
choice to act morally. What made Niemoller's actions morally courageous was
precisely the fact that he willed himself to act against his own self-interest: had his
actions been the consequence merely of chemical activity in his brain, then their moral
force would have been lost. But this would be to bring to bear against Churchland's
position an anti-consequentialist objection, rather than an anti- PDP moral realism
objection.
[47] See, e.g., the opening section of his The Engine ofReason; also his
revealingly-titled 'Evaluating Our Self-Conception', in Mind & Language, vol.8, no.2,
Summer 1993. In fairness to Churchland's position of scepticism regarding the
possibility of'classical' definitions which stipulate necessary and sufficient conditions
for their instantiation, it is not unproblematically clear that absence of reason
disqualifies one from entitlement to consideration as a 'person'. Young babies and
patients in a persistently vegetative state lack reason - but one is disinclined to claim
that they are 'not persons'
[48] Andy Clark suggests that 'reflection on the form of inner encoding might...
cause us to alter or expand some elements of our conception of rationality ...
Churchland ... suggestively argues that once we understand the non-sentential
(prototype-involving) form of inner economy we will come to place knowing-how
(rather than knowing-that) at the centre of our vision of reasoning and rationality.'
('The Varieties of Eliminativism' in Mind & Language vol.8, no.2, Summer 1993,
p.229). I find this set of claims rather vague. The connection between 'knowing-that'
and rationality is clear (and is exemplified in Aristotle's practical syllogism). But it isn't
clear how any of the elements of our conception of rationality might survive the
elimination of this type of knowledge, and its replacement with knowing-how. Clark
goes on to suggest that 'perhaps ... we may come to place less weight on
reconstructing decisions (or moral judgements) as the conclusions of sequences of
inferential stress defined over propositions and to instead treat reasoning and
decision-making more like e.g. driving a car' (op. cit., p.230). This last quotation
seems to rest on an equivocation surrounding the term 'reasoning'. If reasoning means
'working out what to do' - then it is arguable that Churchland's mine detector does
this, as it processes the input vectors which arise from sonar echoes (the machine
determines whether to output 'Mine' or 'Rock' on its screen). This is 'knowing how'
in Churchland's rather strained sense of'knowing how to react' (though I cannot see
how this differs from 'knowing that the object is a mine'). Clark's example of 'driving
a car' reinforces my point that there is a clear and fundamental distinction between
'reasoning' in this loose sense, and rational choice. What is it to be rational when
driving a car? It is surely to have a set of antecedent objectives (get to where one is
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intending to go; don't hit any pedestrians; don't violate any traffic laws; etc.) - and to
behave in a way which is consistent with the satisfaction of these antecedent
objectives. The sentential eliminativist claim - that I don't process 'sequences of
inferential stress defined over propositions' in my head while driving - may well be
true. But if intentional eliminativism is true - so that my driving behaviour cannot be
reconstructed or interpreted as 'if you want to avoid killing anyone, don't drive on the
pavement' - so that my keeping on the road is the consequence of my not wanting to
kill anyone, together with my knowledge that if I drive on the pavement I am liable to
kill someone - then rationality is surely lost.
[49] I will ignore for present purposes the usual problem of describing an
intrinsically non-sentential system's operation without recourse to
potentially-misleading natural language resources - also the fact that moral action is
left mysterious in the case of human PDP systems.
[50] The gynaecologist and the medical student of my earlier example will have
brains of comparable architectural complexity: given the similarity of their training,
their prototypes can also be assumed to be at least very similar. Yet one was making a
moral judgement, the other an ontological judgement in response to the input.
[51] In my next chapter I will consider the related question of whether a machine
can be conscious. I will there argue that the absence of the possibility of subjective
experience of a machine - the principled absence of a first-person perspective - entails
the impossibility of a machine's behaviour being appropriately characterised as 'moral'
behaviour. I take it that, just as Niemoller must be free for his actions to have value,
for the same reason, he must be conscious for the actions to be morally evaluable.
[52] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, p. 149. Such a characterisation -
studiously avoiding the employment of normative terms such as 'bad' or 'wrong' -
serves to highlight once again the difficulty in dichotomising between the moral and
the non-moral in Churchland's account. The expression 'unskilled in social practices'
is redolent of the terminology employed by the finishing school. Someone who doesn't
know how to eat shellfish in polite company isn't immoral - but is arguably 'unskilled
in social practices'. On a less flippant note, sufferers from autism may have, as one of
their conspicuous symptoms, a lack of skill in social practices. Churchland needs to be
able to exempt such unfortunate people from the category of the 'moral miscreant' -
but it isn't clear how this can be achieved, without recourse to the 'queer properties'
of the moral irrealist ('it isn't theirfault, they don't choose to behave in this way').
[53] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, p. 181 et. seq.
[54] op. cit., p. 182.
[55] op. cit., p.183.
[56] op. cit.
[57] op. cit.
[58] By 'adjustment of synaptic weights' I mean the process carried out on the mine
detector during training up. It doesn't have to be spoken to (indeed, speaking to it
would hardly be of any benefit). So my assumption here is that - at least in principle -
comparable backpropagation would be possible for human 'training up'.
[59] This issue is of enormous significance for the question of how strong a thesis
Churchland's eliminative materialism is to be. If talk has a role, then this seems
inevitably to weaken the thesis: given that talk may also constitute the output (e.g. on
the therapist's couch), then the presence of talk as both an input and and output must
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limit the extent to which we can say that internal states intermediate between these are
inaccurately individuated in terms of their propositional content - so that only mere
sentential eliminativism is in prospect. If on the other hand, talk can in future be
dispensed with in the case of therapy, then its general dispensability is in prospect -
and this is an assumption central to a particularly extreme form of eliminative
materialism. I consider the possibility of the general elimination of 'talk' in my
concluding chapter.
[60] In any case, the 'impossibility' which might be appealed to by the eliminativist
in this case could surely be no more than mere technical impossibility - impossibility
within the context of what is currently-available technology.
[61] I assume that this construction of new pathways is possible, however - and that
the brain of the patient is here replicating approximately the same process as the
creative or scientific process, where the individual thinks 'laterally', and deploys novel
pathways in utilising prototype vectors which will later become second-nature.
[62] As I will discuss in my concluding chapter, there is a radical version of
eliminative materialism - which Churchland has considered briefly in his earlier writing
- which would involve the elimination of all talk, whether as a vehicle for psychological
therapy, or for any other purpose.
[63] The Churchlands offer a suitably naturalistic explanation of this: 'as with the
ecology of a tropical rainforest... the human ecology is exquisitely complex and can
take many different forms, depending on the local economic circumstances, social
organisations, technological developments, geographic location, and idiosyncratic
history. In the case of natural ecology, it is obvious that the behavioural "skills" that
will make an individual fern a flourishing and well-integrated ecological citizen are
utterly dependent on the details of that enveloping natural ecology. In this sense, the
fern's "biological virtues" are always "ecosystem relative'". ('Flanagan on Moral
Knowledge' in Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and their Critics,
Blackwell, Oxford, 1996, p.303).
[64] Herein lies the problem: Freud is both lampooned by Churchland (' ... the
bearded and monocled Freudian analyst probing his reclining patient for memories of
toilet training gone awry and parentally directed lust') (The Engine ofReason, p. 181),
and criticised, on the more serious grounds of his employing a defective (because
folk-psychological) prototype as his explanation of the internal workings of the mind.
But only the latter, it seems, is being rejected by Churchland: the 'talk' part of the
therapy remains. The therapy presumably would consist less in asking the patient
questions - whether about toilet training or parental lust, or anything else - and more in
telling the patient how he ought to behave. This rather unappealing scenario (one
could presumably accommodate the Gestapo's remonstrations with Niemoller in this
model - they were advising him on how to be maximally successful as a social agent in
Nazi society) departs only slightly from Freudian therapy - which must be a
disappointment for those of a radical eliminativist disposition.
[65] My objection that the mine detector does not interpret its own output, so that
an interpreter and controller of the process is still required, still stands - so that I do
not accept that the mine detector research demonstrates that we are in some sense
sophisticated mine detectors. The significance of what the mine detector outputs is
significance to or for some operator; by extension, the achievement of a PDP
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recognition in network in the human brain would be output which has significance -
not to the network itself, but - to the selfwhose brain it is.
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CHAPTER 6 CAN CHURCHLAND ACCOUNT FOR
CONSCIOUSNESS?
Churchland is concerned to tackle an argument which is advanced, in different ways,
by Nagel and Jackson, who:
argue for the existence of a special, intrinsically perspectival kind offact, the fact
of "what it is like" to have a mental experience of such-and-such a kind, which
intractably and in principle cannot be captured or explained by physical science. [1]
Nagel proposes that this fact - of there being something that it is like to be a particular
organism - is linked to that organism's being conscious:
... the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that
there is something that it is like to be that organism. [2]
If it is a necessary condition for being conscious that a being instantiates this condition,
then the absence of the condition is sufficient for the absence of consciousness. If the
condition in question is in principle intractable to physical science, as suggested above,
then consciousness is ipso facto intractable to science. This entails in turn the falsity of
the claim that all mentalistic explanation, together with its ontology, is either reducible
to physicalistic explanation, or is eliminable - so that Nagel's claims, if true, are fatal to
any but the most modest forms of eliminative materialism.
In this chapter, I will first consider Churchland's argument against Nagel and Jackson,
before going on to consider his account of how consciousness may be accommodated
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by his PDP model - even to the extent that a conscious machine is an empirical
possibility.
Churchland expresses the problem which he must address as being that of a claimed
fundamental bifurcation between the objective and the subjective:
Consciousness, it has been argued, is essentially a subjective phenomenon,
accessible only to the creature that has it, while anything that is truly physical -
one's brain activity, for example - is ... objective in nature, that is, to be accessible
to many people from many points of view. [3]
Both Churchlands have rightly objected to what amounts to an argamentum ad
ignorantiam, to the effect that as we cannot atpresent provide an account of
consciousness using only the explanatory resources of physical science, no such
account can be given. Thus Patricia Churchland observes that:
beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have proposed setting
conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as "the most
difficult problem". When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals
itself to be ... use of our current ignorance. [4]
The 'ignorance' in question is ignorance with respect to the question of how an
objective account of'what it is like to be' could be provided. A similar argument -
based on a putative inference from what cannot be imagined - is attacked at some
length by Paul Churchland in his The Engine ofReason. Characteristically, he rebuts
this type of argument by appeal to a number of instances from the history of science.
Thus, for example, Ptolemy apparently rejected the possibility of our ever being able to
provide genuinely scientific explanation of the nature and motions of the stars and
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planets, on account of their distance, and the consequent impossibility of imagining
this impediment being overcome. The solution to Ptolemy's problem is presented in
PDP terms:
[what Ptolemy lacked was] ... 'the conceptual framework that Newton would later
construct... Newton's framework ... would have partitioned parts ofPtolemy's
neuronal activation space in a new and radically different way.[5]
This is, of course, an anticipation of what Churchland himselfwill later go on to
attempt in his positive account of consciousness: the radical re-partitioning of our
neuronal activation space, in order to render the currently unimaginable (to some)
physical science account of consciousness imaginable. In the meantime, both
Churchlands do appear to be attacking straw men - for the argument for the principled
intractability of our subjective mental lives to physical science is based on much more
effective arguments than either current ignorance or unimaginability. There is, in any
case, a countervailing logical trap, which Churchland recognises:
to be fair, however, neither can substantive theoretical questions be decided just by
citing some carefully chosen examples from the history of science, examples that
may, or may not, be genuine parallels to the case at issue ... [6]
In preparation for his response to the Nagel objection, Churchland makes use of a
section from Leibniz's Monadology:
suppose that there were a machine so constructed as to produce thought, feeling,
and perception, we could imagine it increased in size while retaining the same
proportions, so that one could enter as one might a mill. On going inside we
should only see the parts impinging upon one another; we should not see anything
which would explain a perception. [7]
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Churchland's response to this is to deny that it supports the conclusion which Leibniz
intends (namely, the dualistic conclusion that 'thought, feeling and perception' belong
to a different order of reality from the physical parts of the mechanism which
'produces' them): 'it remains possible, even granting Leibniz's story, that the taste
sensation of a peach is identical with a four-element activation vector in the gustatory
pathways'.[8] Leibniz's thought experiment is, he suggests, another example of
argumentam ad ignorantiam: in the absence of possession of the necessary
explanatory resources - that is, the appropriately partitioned neural activation space -
we would fail to 'see anything which would explain a perception'. This again
anticipates Churchland's later approach to the topic of consciousness: if he can
contribute to the requisite partitioning, then his claim is that just such explanation will
be possible with regard to study of the human brain: an exhaustive account of the taste
of a peach will be possible from our suitably-trained examination of the relevant
gustatory activation vector. Nagel's argument will be less easily dismissed, however,
as it makes explicit one of the features of the taste of a peach which such an exhaustive
account would require to include: what it is like to taste a peach. Churchland's claim
that it is not impossible for suitably-trained examination of the gustatory vector to
yield what Leibniz terms 'explanation' of a perception must include the claim that this
property - of there being 'something that it is like' to have the experience which is the
vector activation - will also be subject to exhaustive and exclusively physical
explanation. Nagel's claim is that this is known to the individual whose experience it is
in a subjective manner which renders it beyond any possible physical - and thus
objective and publicly-accessible - account.
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Churchland accepts one of the elements in Nagel's argument - namely, that there is a
way ofknowing which is intrinsic and unique to the knower. This is explained as:
a unique set of intimate causal connections to the sensory activity of one's own
brain and nervous system ... what this means is that each creature has a way of
knowing about its own sensory states that no other creature has ... other people
cannot know [your sensory states] ... via the individual informational pathways by
which you know them, because only you possess exactly those pathways. [9]
Churchland thus recognises an epistemic asymmetry. The claim that there is this
asymmetry does not of itself entail that there is something which can be known only
via these 'auto-connected pathways' in the brain. Such an outcome would result in
first-person privilege with regard to the item of knowledge in question. The presence
of particulars which are uniquely proprietary to this mode of knowing might be
thought further to entail their intrinsically non-physical nature, on the grounds that
were they to be physical, then they would be ipso facto accessible to third-person
inspection (though perhaps only given suitable neuroscientific training). While the
existence of this way of knowing - via auto-connected pathways - does not entail the
existence of non-physical individuals, it is nonetheless consistent with their existence,
as Churchland recognises:
Does the undoubted existence of this unique way of your knowing about your own
internal states mean that there is something non-physical about those states,
something that must transcend representation within physical science? Perhaps.
[10]
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Ifwe take 'physical science' to be the totality of physical explanation, which is in turn
the totality of physical prototypes, then the question at issue is whether, given an
ideally-completed set of all possible physical prototypes, the phenomenon in question
would be appropriately apprehended under one of these prototypes.
While an asymmetry in the fundamental nature of things known entails an asymmetry
of modes of knowing (the presence of mental particulars which are subject to
first-person privilege will entail a non-physical - and hence non-scientific - mode of
knowing them); the entailment does not work in the opposite direction: an asymmetry
of modes of knowing does not entail an asymmetry in the fundamental nature of things
known. Were there to be such an entailment, then Churchland's recognition of the
asymmetry of modes of knowing would compel his endorsement of dualism.
Churchland is concerned to stress this point, via a number of cases where there is
putatively just such a divergence: epistemic asymmetry, but no fundamental
metaphysical asymmetry:
by way of an axonal network called your proprioceptive system, you have
informational access to the physical configuration of your own body and limbs.
That information comes from the millions of sensors in your muscles, sensors that
convey tension information to the brain. Nobody else can know the configuration
ofyour body in this particular way. Only you. Because only your brain enjoys the
relevant causal connections to your body. Others must use other means to know
your bodily configuration: they must see it, or feel it with their hands ... the object
ofknowledge is the same from both perspectives, the subjective and the objective,
(my emphasis)[ll]
Two problems arise from Churchland's use of this account of the proprioceptive
system. Firstly, the 'multitude' of similar examples which he goes on to indicate (such
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as 'the fullness of your bladder, and ofyour bowels') (op cit.) do not collectively
amount to an argument for the claim that epistemic asymmetry never accompanies an
asymmetry in the fundamental nature of things known: 'some' does not entail 'all' - so
that the observation (if true) that there is epistemic asymmetry in the absence of
asymmetry in the fundamental nature of things known in this multitude of cases is too
weak to serve the purpose for which it is apparently intended - that is, to demonstrate
that such an accompaniment of epistemic and metaphysical asymmetry never occurs.
Secondly, and more seriously, Churchland begs the question here: we need not accept
the observation that the fullness of one's bladder is subject to epistemic, but not
objective asymmetry ('the object of knowledge is the same from both perspectives') -
and hence need not accept Churchland's further conclusion that: 'there is nothing
supraphysical, nothing beyond the bounds of physical science here'.[12]
Apropos the earlier example of the configuration of one's limbs, Churchland claims
that the object of knowledge in both cases (i.e. the subjective/ proprioceptive and
objective/ third-person) ' ... is something paradigmatically physical... the configuration
ofyour body and limbs'. [13] Clearly the configuration of one's body and limbs per se
is indeed physical. But it remains to be proved that this is 'the object of knowledge' -
that is, that the object of knowledge is nothing but - this physical configuration. In the
same way that there is something that it is like to be a bat using echolocation, so there
is something that it is like to have just my current configuration of limbs. The dualist
will not accept that this may be included in the category of the 'paradigmatically
physical' - so that the claim is question-begging.
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All that Churchland can legitimately claim up to this point is that, as already noted, a
divergence of ways of knowing does not entail a difference in what is known - but this
modest claim does not refute any claim which Nagel and Jackson make. His
conclusion that: 'the existence of a proprietary, first-person epistemological access to
some phenomenon does not mean that the accessed phenomenon is non-physical in
nature' can therefore be accepted without any damage being done to the Nagel
position.
One option open to Churchland - but, somewhat surprisingly, not considered by him
explicitly in his The Engine ofReason - is to sustain the claim that there are epistemic
asymmetries but no corresponding metaphysical asymmetries on the grounds that
knowledge is knowledge how rather than knowledge that. Robinson describes this
claim (i.e. the claim that all knowledge is knowledge how) as a 'behaviouristic
intuition'.[14] The argument might then proceed by claiming that what is at issue - the
putatively non-physical entities - would be targets for knowledge that, but that in the
absence of knowledge that, all knowledge is within the category of'modes of
knowledge'; there is no separate category of knowledge which would satisfy the
dualist's intuition that there is something which the scientist lacks vis-a-vis his
knowledge of the configuration of my limbs - knowledge that it is like (x) for me
(where what would stand in place of (x) here is ineffable on account of the essentially
non-public nature of the experience). It is difficult to know how to evaluate this
possible line of argument. The emphasis on knowledge-how in Churchland's writing is
motivated not merely by his Kuhnian influence, but also by his desire to resist
sententialism. If knowledge is knowledge-that, then there would appear to be no
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prospect of any stronger formulation than sentential eliminativism being sustainable:
patterns of activation activity in the brain, which are intrinsically non-sentential but
which generate a condition appropriately described by a propositional attitude, cannot
be an attractive proposition for Churchland. Robinson's allusion to behaviourism is
also useful in this context: the avoidance of the subjective which characterises
behaviourism will lead to the attempt to eschew such mentalistic-sounding
formulations as the individual being in a state characterisable as being 'knowledge
that'. The argument that the ineluctably subjective can thus be eliminated will in
consequence be question-begging, as an anti-subjectivist epistemology is being
brought to the aid of an anti-subjectivist metaphysics, at just that point in the argument
where the anti-subjectivism is moot. In any case, Churchland tends to stress
knowing-how, while not explicitly denying the existence ofknowing that - so that his
position is unclear on the point. There is, however, as might be expected, a possible
route from 'the epistemology that makes eliminative materialism possible' to a putative
response to Nagel. Unlike the accumulation of putative cases of epistemic asymmetry
in the absence of asymmetry of things known, discussed above, the argument from all
knowledge being knowledge how is valid. [15]
Churchland now progresses his argument, making the claim that what is known via the
two modes of knowing (the subjective and the objective) is identical - so that
physicalism is redeemed, all entities and properties being open to investigation by
science, and thus, ipso facto, being physical entities and properties. 'Our collective
scientific enterprise', he states, while it won't detect the intrinsic character of the bat's
(echolocationary) sensory states in the proprietary way in which the bat does (hence
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the two modes), nonetheless 'will indeed both detect them (via microelectrodes) and
represent them (in the language of science)'.[16] Once again, however, Churchland is
begging the question: if science can achieve this outcome, then his position will be
vindicated - there will be epistemic asymmetry in the absence of fundamental objective
asymmetry. But whether science will, in fact, be able to perform this task is still an
open question. IfNagel is right, then it is empirically impossible that science will ever
achieve this outcome. So Churchland's conclusion at this point: 'the states
represented, the bat's sensory states themselves, are presumably the same in each case
... [a]s before, the difference lies not in the character of the thing known; it lies in the
distinct manner of the knowing'; is not supported by the argument from scientific
speculation which he has advanced.[17]
Given that the title ofNagel's essay is 'What is it like to be a bat?', Churchland's claim
here is very bold: in principle, science could tell us the answer to Nagel's question.
There is no element of the bat's subjective awareness which is not capable of being
represented objectively to us via science - so that science could, in principle, tell us
what it is like to be a bat. [18]
Having considered Nagel's argument, Churchland now goes on to tackle Jackson's
thought experiment, in which a neuroscientist called Mary's eyes:
... have high-tech chronic implants that flatten any spectral diversity in the
incoming light. The only energy variations that get through to her retina are
uniform across the entire spectrum ... she has therefore never seen the colour red
as the rest of us have. She does not know what it is like to have a sensation of red.
[19]
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In consequence of having been in this position from birth, Mary cannot know, via her
auto-connected epistemic pathways, what it is like to see red. Churchland will argue
that this does not entail that she cannot know what it is like to see red (hence the
significance of Mary's profession). His objection to Jackson's claim that she cannot
know what it is like to see red will be based on the claim that once again epistemic
asymmetry is being taken to accompany an asymmetry of things known.
Churchland sets out the situation in the now-familiar PDP terms:
Mary's deprived condition has indeed kept her from ever knowing, via her
auto-connected epistemic pathways, a sensation of red. No amount of
neuroscientific book-learning on her part will ever constitute a
representation-of-redness in those pathways if and when [she ever gains
colour vision] ... and she is presented with a ripe tomato, then she will indeed
come to know the sensation of red in a way that she has never known it before, in
a way that finally exploits her autoconnected epistemic pathways', (emphasis in
original) [20]
Given the accuracy of the PDP account of cognition, this set of claims is
uncontroversial. The emphasis on the phrase 'in those pathways' prepares the reader
for what follows: as a neuroscientist, Mary has an alternative mode of knowing. Given
that this mode of knowing can access all that is knowable via the mode of knowing
which Mary lacks, she does in fact know what it is like to see red:
Once more ... the genuine occurrence in Mary of that special, prescientific way of
knowing does not entail that something non-physical is what gets known ... it is a
kind of state with which she is scientifically quite familiar, a 70-20-3 0-Hertz coding
triplet across the neurons of area V4, perhaps. That sensation is indeed new to her
auto-connected sensory experience, but she's seen it a thousand times before in the
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auto-connected pathways of others. And it is the same thing in her as it is in all of
the others: something physical. [21]
This reiterates a point which he has made earlier, apropos Leibniz: '...it remains
possible that, should you and I happen to know what vectors constitute what
sensations, and should we happen to know where and how to look for those activation
vectors, then we might recognise those sensations ... as they go by. A well-informed
observer could catch what an untrained observer could not'. [22] IfMary knows
everything that there is to know about the physical process of colour coding, and if the
experience of seeing colour is just this process which is exclusively physical (i.e.
there's nothing over and above this), then the claim would appear to be supportable:
Mary will recognise what the untrained observer would not - to the extent of even
grasping what the untrained, and equally colour-blind, observer would not: an
experience of what it is like to see red. This is ensured for Churchland by the fact that
what Mary lacks is a mode of knowing, not access to an object of knowledge.
Robinson observes, regarding this strategy:
the idea behind the 'mode' theory is, presumably, that if the phenomenal is merely
another mode of access to respectable physical facts, then it does not itself
constitute an extra fact: it is not an addition to ontology, but an extra mode of
access to part of the previously accepted ontology. [23]
So, if we apply this to the 'Mary' case: employment of autoconnected epistemic
pathways is merely another mode of access to the physical ontology to which she has
access via another mode of knowing (i.e. her access to the autoconnected epistemic
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pathways of other people). An 'ontology' here consists in a set of facts - so a 'mode of
knowing' is not a fact. Robinson suggests that this must be rejected:
Call the set of physical facts P and the set of scientific modes of access which
[Mary] has to these facts S, and the ... mode she lacks H. Ifwe regard S and H as
external to P, then the addition of a new mode of access will not alter P\[24]
Thus Churchland's claim must be that (given that a mode of knowing is not a fact)
there's no addition to our ontology as a result of the acquisition of a new mode of
knowing, in addition to the one already possessed. However, as Robinson goes on to
point out, the physicalist thesis is that every fact is a physical fact - that is, all facts are
already contained in P, where P is the set of all physical facts. But 'modes of access to
physical facts are themselves simply physical processes and are included in physical
facts'[25] (I take it that what Robinson means here is that it is a physical fact that that
modes S and H are modes of access to P - so that this fact is ipso facto in P, which is,
as just noted, the set of all facts, if physicalism is true. In other words, the opening
claim that a mode of access to physical facts is not itself a physical fact 'is sophistical'.
Robinson concludes:
therefore, if [Mary] knows all the relevant members ofP (i.e. knows all the facts
that P comprises), then '[she] should know all the facts about H, including what
the mode of access is phenomenally like. [26]
It's difficult to see how Churchland could respond satisfactorily to this objection. It
would appear prima facie that he has two options. Given that his claim will be that
there is nothing additional to know via H which Mary does not antecedently know via
S, he could claim either that Mary can know what H is like vicariously, via her
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knowledge ofwhat S is like; alternatively, if S is not phenomenally like anything, then
neither is H.
The first of these would require that we conflate (1) what it is like to see red, and (2)
what it is like to see someone else's seeing red (where the latter is elliptical for 'what it
is like to see the 70-20-30-Hertz coding triplet being activated in someone's neural
area V4'). The claim that these experiences are identical could only be tested a
posteriori, given sufficient development in the science of colour perception (and,
perhaps, also given a suitable subject - a colour-blind neuroscientist who acquires the
H mode - a capacity for colour perception via autoconnected epistemic pathways).
Churchland is ignoring just this 'what is it like?' question, though (he doesn't, for
example, express Mary's S-mode perception in terms ofwhat this is like for Mary) -
and in doing so, and concentrating rather on the 'what is known' question, he begs the
question by assuming that what is know via H is nothing over and above what is
known via S. [27]
The second of the options putatively open to Churchland - denying that either S or H
is phenomenally like anything - would require that there are no phenomenal properties
in our modes of knowledge. To use this response to Robinson's closing point that
'
[she] should know all the facts about H, including what the mode of access is
phenomenally like' (op. cit.) would be to beg the question against Robinson. In any
case, I can introspect - employ my auto-connected pathways - and thus confirm that
there is something that it is like to see the colour red. So the second option must be
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rejected. [28] I conclude that Churchland has failed to make his case for the absence of
objects of knowledge which are in principle beyond the reach of physical science.
Churchland briefly considers the argument of a third opponent of his claim that the
subjective will prove reducible to the objective: John Searle. In his The Rediscovery of
Mind, Searle makes the important point that: 'any introspection I have of my own
conscious state is itself that conscious state'. [29] On Churchland's construal, Searle
thus identifies a fundamental difference between the two modes:
... one has direct and unmediated knowledge of the character of one's own
sensations. In the case of physical things [Searle claims that] ... there is a legitimate
distinction between appearance and reality. [30]
The latter part of this claim is one with which Churchland will agree wholeheartedly:
his examples from the history of science are replete with instances of just this
distinction operating in science, and the misleading appearance acting as an
impediment to the re-partitioning of neuronal activation space which would yield a
better theory. But the opening claim here - that one's knowledge of one's own
sensations (via one's operation of the auto-connected pathways) yields knowledge
which is 'direct and unmediated' cannot be accepted by Churchland. Churchland's
model depends upon the two modes of knowing being distinct, but not fundamentally
different. Specifically, the project of re-partitioning our neuronal activation space is the
project of formulating a better theory of one's subjective states - so that the
theory-ladenness of perception must extend to our subjective perception. On Searle's
account, by contrast:
188
... in the case of the mental... the appearance is the reality and vice-versa. One
cannot be wrong about the contents of one's own mind.[31]
If this claim is accepted, then Churchland's PDP model is jeopardised (this in addition
to the problems which it will create for his account of the reduction of the subjective
to the objective). On the model, a 'theory' is a set of synaptic weights. Given that all
activity within the network will be mediated by these weights, in addition to the
pathways and prototypes also already established in the brain, the 'theory-ladenness of
perception' consists in just this ubiquity of synaptic-weight determination of what is
ultimately presented as output by the system. For me to access those objects of
knowledge currently accessible only to Robinson's//-mode, and to do so in a way
which did not involve this mediating influence of synaptic weight configurations
(which is what the absence of the theory-ladenness of//-mode perception will require)
is for me to perform a cognitive function which is beyond being accommodated by the
model - and this failure to account for such 'direct and unmediated access' seems to be
beyond accounting for in principle. If this is correct, then Churchland's need to reject
Searle's claim is urgent. [32]
Churchland's response to Searle relies on the Freudian claim that: '... we are not
infallible in our judgements about all mental states. One can misapprehend one's own
desires and fears'. [3 3] Even if this conceded, this does not, however, serve
Churchland's immediate purpose. 'Some' does not entail 'all': even if there is some
empirical support for the claim that one's own apprehension of one's desires and fears
is fallible - this in turn leading to the possibility of an enriched apprehension following
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neural repartitioning (i.e. theoretical advancement), in just the way that Freud
proposed, this does not entail that all of one's judgements regarding one's mental
states are similarly infected by fallibility. So Churchland could be correct in his claim
that 'the very concepts we bring to the business of apprehending our internal states are
a source of chronic error', but without this pervading all such internal apprehension -
so that Searle's claim is only partly erroneous, and Churchland's only partly correct.
What Churchland is ignoring by this stage in his exposition is the Nagel and Jackson
question of the qualitative states which accompany one's sensations. One could surely
concede the possibility of Churchland being correct with regard to every other
introspectively-accessible object of knowledge, without having to concede on this
particular object. Thus, I may be in error about my desires - but my awareness of what
my occurrent desire feels like is surely infallible. By extension, my general awareness
of what it is like to be me is a clear case of what Searle describes - namely, knowledge
which is direct and unmediated.[34] Churchland has not yet dealt successfully with the
subjective knowledge of what it is like to be that subject. [3 5]
If the conclusion - that 'what it is like to be me' is (perhaps uniquely) an object of
knowledge of which my knowledge is direct and unmediated - is true, then this leaves
a gap in the PDP account, as painstakingly constructed by Churchland. The truth of
the claim will also entail that his claim that all knowledge is mediated is false. There is
no further alternative of ignoring (while not denying) the fact that there is a fact of the
matter concerning what it is like to have the sensation of being me. In his positive
account of consciousness, however, Churchland effectively adopts this latter course,
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by providing a putative set of features of consciousness which ignore the fact that
there being something that it is like to be me is both a necessary and a sufficient
condition for my being conscious.
In a passing aside, Churchland raises a technical quibble with the substance of
Jackson's story:
I will here ignore the developmental brain damage that would surely attend the
chronic colour deprivation ascribed to Mary. Adulthood would be too late to set
her free. By then her neuronal resources for colour vision would be severely
atrophied. But thiswould spoil a good story. [36]
The situation here is more serious than this, however: if Churchland is correct in this
assessment, then there is a problem for his position which is the counterpart of the
argumentum ad ignorantiam weakness which he perceives to pervade his opponents'
position. IfMary could not see red via her neuronal resources for colour vision
following the removal of the implants, then she could not, in consequence, confirm
that the two modes of knowing were accessing the same object of knowledge. But this
then raises the question of who could do so. In the case of the non-impaired viewer,
we would be unable to guarantee that what might be termed 'noise' - recurrent and/ or
horizontal input from elsewhere in the brain, and deriving from activity associated with
the other mode for accessing this object (Robinson's H mode) wasn't contributing the
access to the object which is putatively being gleaned solely from the scientific, S
mode. In the same way that the various parts of the brain cooperate with each other to
minimise the cognitive loss arising from brain cell death or lesions in the brain, this
process might, in the case in question, be both automatic, and unnoticed by the
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cogniser herself. [37] In the case of the bat, we'd have nothing at all to compare the
S-mode data with (for the obvious reason that we aren't bats). Confirmation of a
precise 1:1 mapping of all that is accessed via H and all that is accessed via S may thus
be impossible to achieve. Were my speculation about the parts of the brain
confounding our endeavours by assisting each other to be false, and were
Churchland's claim that Mary's colour neuronal resources would not be up to the task
also to be false, then Mary could confirm the 1:1 mapping - and it might then be
thought a safe presumptive inference to the more exciting claim that science could
inform humans, via a suitably-trained up S mode, what it's like to be a bat. So - contra
Churchland's proposal to ignore his own quibble rather than spoil a good story - my
claim is that his story is the one which is spoiled.
If this is correct, then Churchland can never get beyond mere scientistic faith: when
scientists eventually inform us that they know what it's like to be a bat, and that our
assurance that this is true resides in an exact mapping of the bat's
//-mode-discoverable objects of knowledge, and the scientists' S-mode-discoverable
objects of knowledge, then we ought to accept the claim. In this case, the debate
seems permanently intractable: one side will argue, on the basis of intuition, that the
scientific claim is unreliable; the other side, that this is a mere argumentum ad
ignorantiam.
This is where Churchland's claim that machine consciousness is an empirical possibility
is useful. The question which we must ask is: is there anything that it would be like to
be that machine? If this question is omitted - if Churchland merely alludes to the
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claimed isomorphism between the machine's internal architecture, and that of human
auto-connected pathways - then the burden of proofwill remain with Churchland, who
has not denied that one of my objects of knowledge is what it is like to be me. Nor has
he denied that consciousness exists - and that what it is like to be me is knowledge (at
present) exclusively accessible to the auto-connected pathways in my brain. All that he
has denied is that these pathways provide the only empirically possible means of
accessing this knowledge. The challenge for Churchland is, however, enormous: if he
can support the claim that we can have a reliable means for confirming that there is
something that it is like to be the machine, then the //-mode/ S-mode 1:1 mapping is
vindicated for the machine. In the light of the machine's states being exclusively
physical states (the condition for their comprehensive discovery via the S-mode), then
the phenomenal property of there being something-that-it-is-like-to-be will have been
demonstrated to be a physical property (at least for the machine). At that point, the
claim that this property is a non-physical property in humans would be apparently
impossible to sustain: dualism would be finally confuted. If this best-possible scenario
for Churchland is not available, then the claim that all explanation is explanation of
events which are open to explanation exclusively in terms of physical science and its
explanatory categories is still contestable. The truth of this claim is, of course, a
constraint on the truth of eliminative materialism per se: an autonomous mental
category of explanation, underlying such processes as the formation of moral
judgement, will destroy the whole project, with the exception of the claim that there
are no sentences in the head. Having set out the task facing Churchland as he attempts
to support the claim that machine consciousness is empirically possible, I now propose
to evaluate his argument.
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Churchland identifies 'the salient features of consciousness' as being:
i. possession of short-term memory;
ii. independence of sensory input (i.e. the brain continues to function in
the absence of any new input from sources external to it);
iii. steerable attention (one can direct one's attention to a specific topic);
iv. capacity for alternative interpretations
v. the disappearance of consciousness in deep sleep
vi. its reappearance (albeit in muted or disjointed form) in dreaming; and
vii. the harbouring of the contents of the several basic sensory modalities
within a single, unified experience. [38]
While any system which instantiates these features may be taken, in virtue of their
instantiation, to be conscious, Churchland is careful to make clear that this set is not to
be taken to be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for consciousness: it is,
rather a 'rough triangulation'.[39]
Given this initial trepidation on Churchland's part, it is not entirely clear how to
evaluate the claim here being made. What is conspicuous by its absence is what I have
claimed to be the key issue: Churchland does not present the property of there being
something that it is like to be the network in question as a condition for consciousness.
I have suggested that this is necessary for consciousness (no truly conscious
experience would be possible without an accompanying awareness of what this
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experience is like - what it is like to be having this experience); I also take it to be
sufficient for consciousness (if any individual has the experience of there being
something that it is like to be that individual, then, for the duration of that experience,
that individual must be conscious).[40]
This claim entails that the features in Churchland's list of factors are neither necessary
nor sufficient for consciousness. I take it that one could suffer from some psychiatric
condition where one's mind/brain did not instantiate any one of the features on
Churchland's list, without thereby being unconscious (or incapable of instantiating
consciousness) - so that none of the features is necessary. [41] Their sufficiency is more
problematic: Churchland will go on to claim that all seven might be instantiated in a
machine. But the 'steerability' of attention (feature (iii) in the list above) seems to be a
condition which requires just the fundamental ontological subject/ object distinction
which Churchland is concerned to deny. I have earlier objected to the presumed
analogy between the mine detector and the human mind, on the grounds that the mine
detector must be operated by an individual who is entirely separate from the machine
itself (i.e. a sonar operator), but that no corresponding faculty for one part of the brain
to access the other parts, and thus to act as a counterpart to the sonar operator is
possible, or accounted for, in Churchland's account of the brain as a PDP network.
[42] The only tenable solution is some form of ontological dualism - in which case
there is the fundamental subject/ object distinction - and the subject can then
instantiate the property of subjective self-awareness, and hence - on my account
consciousness (this subjective self-awareness being the necessary and sufficient
condition for consciousness). In the absence of this ontological distinction, Churchland
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must give grounds for holding that this 'steerability' may be instantiated by a purely
physical network.
The basis for the claim that this property - along with the others - may be so
instantiated, is:
... a recent convergence in theoretical modelling and empirical brain research ...
[which] suggests a way in which this might be done. A suitably configured
recurrent network will display cognitive behaviours that are systematic functional
analogues of all seven of these ... dimensions of conscious. [43]
Empirical brain research has apparently identified a massively recurrent network of
axonal projections radiating from the brain's intralaminar nucleus. Churchland's
account of how the features may be accounted for purely via the operation of this
arrangement in the brain is disappointingly perfunctory. Steerability - our capacity to
direct thought to a given topic, given the vast range of possibilities which the brain will
accommodate - is accounted for in terms of the neural network's capacity:
... to enhance the chances of a specific recognition ... [by increasing] the
probability that the appropriate prototype vector will be activated by the sensory
inputs. Recurrent pathways can and do affect such activational probabilities by
slightly pre-activating the relevant neuronal layer in the specific direction of some
prototype vector ... (for example ... choking sound for the anxious mother).[44]
This would undoubtedly be a very useful feature - but the account given seems
implausible, given that the initial decision is apparently attributable to the network
itself, which elects to effect the requisite adjustment in probability. Churchland's
account of this is obscure: '... attention is steerable by the network's own cognitive
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activity', with no explanation of how this is initiated in the first place. In short, we
have an example here of rational behaviour being left utterly mysterious: the model
cannot account for the mother's deciding to pay particular attention to the sounds the
baby is making, because she fears that the baby may choke. Such an account will
reintroduce the queer entities and queer properties to which the traditional account
will appeal. I conclude that were Churchland able to account for the steerability of
attention, then he would have room in his account for the key property of subjective
self-awareness: there is something that it is like to be a nervous mother - so that while
the property ofbeing nervous is occurrent, the mother is conscious. In the absence of
these entities and properties, I cannot accept Churchland's claim that: 'a salient
functional analoguefalls out of the neurocomputational model ... for steerable
attention', (my emphasis) [45]
This claim is, in any case, heavily qualified later , when Churchland concedes that: 'I
do not know, and you should not believe, that the preceding account is the correct
account of consciousness. There is a remote chance, perhaps that it is'. [46] While
Churchland is consistent in making this claim - that we can only speculate as to what is
the correct account of consciousness - he is nonetheless confident that there is no
category of the exclusively-subjective. This is clear from his claim that:
... [there is nothing] ... exclusively subjective about one's own mental states.
Although they are typically known by way of one's auto-connected pathways, they
can be known by way of other pathways as well. In fact, they are already so
known, even by the standards of current common sense: other people infer my
current mental state from my words, from my facial expression, and from my
unfolding physical behaviour. The core point here is that there is simply no conflict
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between being objective and being subjective. One and the same state can be both.
[47]
Taking the opening claim here first - the denial of any exclusively subjective
knowledge - it can be deduced from this that, even though we do not yet know what
would constitute an accurate and comprehensive account of consciousness, such an
account can in principle be furnished from a purely objective (physical, scientific)
standpoint. This is a useful conclusion, as it allows Churchland to press his eliminative
case despite the fact that he has to concede some difficulty in explaining what
consciousness is. Whatever it is, it is to be accommodated by the explanatory
categories of physical science. The immediate problem is that Churchland has no
evidence to support this claim - which is based on nothing more than scientistic
optimism. Even if he had succeeded in demonstrating that, for the various examples
which he cited earlier, every object of knowledge accessible to the H-mode pathway
was also accessible to the 5-mode pathway, this would not entail that anything which
is //-mode accessible is also S-mode accessible. But the induction which he here
proposes has no basis at all: none of the cases cited (the configuration of one's limbs;
the fullness of one's bladder and bowels; one's hair standing on end) are cases where
the entire subjective experience is reducible to what is objectively accessible. In each
case, the (ignored) condition of there being something that it is like to have the
physical condition in question is beyond such objective knowledge. This is especially
clear in the further claim made in the quotation above - that behaviouristic criteria of
language and facial expression provide such objective access. To the very limited
extent that this is true, the objective knowledge gained is unreliable and piecemeal - so
that this cannot be held to support the claim that there is no fundamental dichotomy
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between the subjectively-known and the objectively-known. Finally, Churchland's
concluding sentence in this quotation: 'one and the same state can be both' is even
weaker as a defence of the no-fundamental-dichotomy claim: this is consistent with the
claim that there is no subjective knowledge which cannot be objective knowledge - but
it does not entail this conclusion.
This weakness in Churchland's argument is significant - as the central claim of his next
chapter ('Could an electronic machine be conscious?')[48] is that the answer is likely
to be affirmative. But this optimism is based, not on a cogent account of what
consciousness is, but rather on this unsubstantiated claim that, given that
consciousness is a subjective condition, and given that there is no fundamental
dichotomy between the subjective and the objective, so science can in principle both
account for, and replicate, the requisite condition.
Churchland's preamble to the tentatively affirmative answer which he gives to the
question incorporates a considerable amount of detail of artificial models which
replicate the functioning of the human retina. [49] This leads Churchland to the
optimistic speculation that such developments might be possible for the brain and
nervous system as a whole. This then leads to the question: '... would such an artificial
silicon brain, lodged in a robot body, be truly conscious?'. [50]
In considering the grounds for scepticism which have been raised by his opponents,
Churchland reintroduces, as one of the grounds for scepticism: 'sensory qualia'.
Having omitted these from his earlier account of consciousness, Churchland now notes
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that: 'the problem is to find a plausible home for them within a purely physical
framework'. [51]
Churchland here cites, with approval, the argument ofNed Block, who criticises
functionalism in part on the basis of its failure to account for qualia.[52] Block's
objection is that an abstract model which satisfies functionalist criteria for mentality,
might meet all of the algorithmic requirements for responding to input stimuli, but that:
... sensory qualia would still be absent from this system. Functionalism, therefore,
must be missing something important about the nature of conscious intelligence.
[53]
Churchland endorses this claim ofBlock's: what is missing from the functionalist
account is 'what takes place inside a cognitive creature'.[54] Once again, it seems, the
sheer complexity of the brain's architecture holds the key to explaining a
hitherto-perplexing feature of human mental existence:
most of the major features of human and animal cognition arise not because of any
program we are running. They arise because of the peculiar physical organisation
of the nervous system, because of the way in which information is physically
coded, and because of the physically distributed means by which that information
gets transformed. [55]
Churchland is candid in his assessment that conscious robots are not in immediate
prospect - but he nonetheless proposes that the answer to the question 'could an
electronic machine be conscious?' is 'it rather looks that way'.[56] What has been
overlooked is that Nagel and Jackson's claims regarding qualia have not been shown
by Churchland to be false. Only by ignoring, at a key stage, the question of how we
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know what it is like to be the cognizer that we are, and by making an unwarranted
appeal to the likely success of science in accessing objectively all that is currently
exclusively subjective, does he appear to refute the claim that qualia are essentially and
irreducibly subjective. The reintroduction of qualia much later in the argument,
coupled with the same scientistic optimism, cannot therefore be taken to sustain the
claim that there will 'probably' be conscious machines.
Unless Churchland can present an argument for the objective accessibility of qualia,
the entire eliminative materialism project is weakened - not just the immediate claim
for the empirical possibility of artificial consciousness. Autonomous explanation,
beyond the reach of science, will defeat the project of the elimination of the
explanatory categories of folk psychology, or their reduction. That Churchland could
salvage from this outcome the claim that there are no sentences in the head - this claim
being consistent with the explanatory adequacy of folk psychology - merely serves to
show how inadequate sentential eliminativism is as a form of eliminativism. My next
chapter will finally address this question of what can be eliminated.
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render any attempt to eliminate [knowledge that] as a bona fide epistemic category
hopeless). So, much rests on Churchland's ability successfully to rebut Searle's claim,
beyond the immediate need to demonstrate the reducibility of the subjective to the
objective.
[33] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, p.205.
[34] Notwithstanding Churchland's distaste for a priori arguments which seek to
delimit the possible future discoveries of science, it surely cannot be denied that my
knowledge of what it is like to be me is incorrigible-, any claim to the effect that 'he
thinks that he knows what it is like to be him - but he's operating under a
misapprehension, as will ultimately be demonstrated by new developments in
neuroscience' is absurd.
[35] Though he does later - and illegitimately - claim that 'we have already defeated
the ... arguments ofNagel and Jackson', (op cit., p.250).
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[36] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, p. 201.
[37] I have no evidence for this, but it seems to be in the spirit of Churchland's
model.
[38] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, p.213.
[39] op. cit. This cautious tone is later dropped, as I will go on to demonstrate.
[40] Churchland's earlier account, with its (speculatively-based) conclusion that
science will detect and represent everything - every object of knowledge - available to
the bat's unique //-mode, is consistent with knowledge of [what it is like to be a bat]
being knowledge of some physical property. Churchland's ignoring the property of
[what it is like to be a bat] seems to be based on the assumption that rebuttal of
Nagel's claim that the property is accessible only to the bat (which Churchland has not
in any case achieved) entails the elimination of the property itself. But this cannot be
accepted. Churchland has in any case accepted (for example, in the Mary case), that
the property of there being 'something that it is like' is a bona fide property.
Churchland's claim against Nagel and Jackson is that epistemic asymmetry does not
entail metaphysical asymmetry. But nor does the truth of the claim that everything
accessible to the //-mode is accessible in principle to the A'-mode entail that any
property which Nagel has claimed to be accessible only to the //-mode does not exist.
All that is entailed by the truth of this speculative claim is that either the property is
knowable via the S-mode, or it does not exist. But this speculative claim does not
justify the property's being ignored in what follows. Churchland must either make and
defend the massively counter-intuitive claim that there is no such property, or,
alternatively, make and defend the claim that the property is accessible to the A'-mode,
and thus physical.
[41] The research work of the psychologist Oliver Sacks, where patients suffered
cognitive deficiencies apparently much more serious than those in Churchland's list -
but were nonetheless conscious - would seem to bear out this intuition.
[42] Intriguingly, Churchland, in alluding to the 'self-connected way of knowing'
that arises via the auto-connected pathways, giving rise to 'this peculiarly self-focused
way of knowing about one's internal state', points out that 'it is part of any creature's
internal system of body regulation ...' (The Engine o/Reason, p. 198). This point isn't
further developed. The form ofwords here used is clearly dualistic - the creature
regulating its body. But a non-dualistic account must leave something out: the
auto-connected pathways are pathways via which something is in control of the body.
Churchland surely evades the point with his question-begging claim that : 'such
"auto-connected" ways of knowing have, as the objects of knowledge, exactly the
same robustly physical things and circumstances as are occasionally known, through
"heteroconnected" ways of knowing, by other individuals' (op. cit.). The 'way of
knowing' at issue putatively results in an exclusively physical state, as he has argued.
But as well as its consequences, the way of knowing will also have, among its objects
of knowledge, the entities and properties which initiated the causal sequence which
gives rise to this physical output. These mysterious entities and properties are swept
up in the general claim that all objects of knowledge pertinent to this way of knowing
are 'robustly physical'.
[43] op. cit., p.214.
[44] op. cit., p.218.
[45] op. cit.
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[46] op. cit., p.223.
[47] op. cit., p.225.
[48] op. cit., pp. 227-252.
[49] op. cit., p.236. This work has been undertaken by Carver Mead, one of the
original developers of integrated circuits.
[50] op. cit., p.243.
[51] op. cit., p.250. Churchland here makes the (false) claim that 'we have already
defeated the negative arguments of Nagel and Jackson, so there is no need to
readdress them'. The claim is thus that (a) qualia - as discussed by Nagel and Jackson -
are really existing properties, but (b) they are not - contra Nagel and Jackson -
exclusively subjective. This in turn entails that there is no principled reason why
Mead's robot could not instantiate the property of having something that it is like to
be that robot: what is accessible in the brain to scientific explanation is being taken by
Churchland to be replicatable by science (this is, I take it, the point of the lengthy
excursus on Mead's artificial retina) - so that the falsity ofNagel and Jackson's
inaccessibility claim, together with the truth of the replicatability claim will entail the
possibility of a robot with qualia. If there being something that it is like to be an object
is, as I have earlier urged, sufficient for that object's being conscious, then the robot is
in turn conscious.
[52] In his 'Troubles with Functionalism', in C.W. Savage (ed.), Perception and
Cognition - Issues in the Foundations ofPsychology, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, 1978. This reinforces my earlier claim that Churchland's objection is not
to the existence of qualia per se, but merely to the claim that they are objectively
inaccessible.
[53] Paul M. Churchland, The Engine ofReason, p.251.
[54] op. cit.
[55] op. cit.
[56] op. cit., p.252.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN BE ELIMINATED?
The 'radical synoptic claim' is the claim that the entirety of human mental existence
can be accounted for in terms of the operation of activation vectors in human brains.
This is entailed by the claims that the mind is the brain (the central physicalist claim)
and that the brain's functioning is entirely in terms of PDP processing.[l] My last two
chapters have argued for the falsity of the radical synoptic claim: Churchland's account
of PDP cannot account for either moral agency or for consciousness. As the radical
synoptic claim entails eliminative materialism, the falsity of the radical synoptic claim
leaves the case for eliminative materialism at best not proven.
Eliminative materialists could respond to this by arguing that my rejection of a PDP
account of moral agency or consciousness is based on an unwarranted aprioristic
epistemology: they will deny that we can state a priori that PDP research will not
eventuate in the solution of the apparent problems of moral agency and consciousness.
As Rudder Baker points out, the scientific pragmatist holds that, for example:
... a science may set out to explain the impetus that keeps things in motion and end
up abandoning the notion of impetus altogether. [2]
'The epistemology that makes eliminative materialism possible' thus accommodates
Churchland's view of philosophy as proto-scientific speculation; his enthusiasm for
PDP, in the light of its undeniable achievements to date in the case of artificial
networks, together with his scientistic optimism, lead him to invest considerable
optimism in the radical synoptic claim - this possibly to be vindicated by such future
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developments as a conscious PDP machine.[3] Churchland will thus reject anything
other than future empirical evidence as refuting the radical synoptic claim - so that its
attendant entailment of eliminative materialism is also currently still intact.
In this chapter I will argue that there is no stable and coherent position for Churchland
to occupy in the eliminativist debate - and that this is the source of his evident
vacillation between a modest, conservative form of eliminativism, and a revolutionary
form which promises a fundamental reappraisal of our species' self-conception. At the
mildest end of a spectrum of eliminativist positions, PDP research findings support a
position which may actually be endorsed by at least some Cartesian dualists.
Churchland will himself wish to eliminate both this position, and the slightly more
radical position which sees folk psychology as a systematically misleading theory
which is a candidate for elimination - though this is perhaps not worth the effort, as
folk psychology is no more inaccurate than is Newtonian mechanics (and may even be
much less so). Once we come to positions which Churchland can endorse as being
genuine full-strength eliminativism, the positions are so destructive of central tenets of
our self-conception - and of philosophy - as to be incoherent.
Any eliminative materialist position must proceed from the sentential eliminativist
claim that there are no 'sentences in the head'. The sentential eliminativist claim is
derived from analogy with the mine detector. The architecture of its internal processes
is incompatible with the syntax of natural language: for it to be compatible with natural
language syntax, its processing would consist of sequences of inferences defined over
propositions. As the instantiation of this syntax in a mechanical device would require
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its manipulation of sentences, there are no surrogates for sentences inside the mine
detector. Sentential eliminativism is thus established for the mine detector. Given that
the PDP account is, as earlier argued, more psychologically realistic, the claim is then
made that there are no sentences inside the heads of human cognizers either. In the
same way in which the causally-efficacious states of the mine detector are not
sentential entities, neither are the causally-efficacious states of the human brain.
Mere sentential eliminativism goes no further than to claim that there are no sentences
in the head. This claim may well be true. But Churchland cannot endorse mere
sentential eliminativism, as it will entail that, while there are no sentences in the head,
it is nonetheless appropriate to utilise the intentional idiom to characterise what is
going on in the head - so that intentional eliminativism is false. Churchland's
commitment to theory-theory (the claim that folk psychology is a theory) will lead him
to claim that it is the ontology of folk psychological theory which is being eliminated
by sentential eliminativism - so that explanation in terms of the explanatory categories
of folk psychology is misleading (as it entails realism about the ontology which
underlies this type of explanation). The claim that folk psychology's explanatory
categories ought not to be utilised - or ought only to be tolerated pending the
development of some superior mode of explanation - is intentional eliminativism.
Mere sentential eliminativism thus fails to qualify as a form of eliminative materialism,
because it has to accompany the falsity of the theory-theory - which, as I argue in my
opening chapter, is necessary for eliminative materialism itself, as the latter commences
from the claim that folk psychology is a candidate for elimination, and a necessary
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condition for the truth of this claim is that folk psychology is a theory. So if mere
sentential eliminativism is true, then the central thesis of eliminative materialism is
false. There is, perhaps, an option of dropping the claim that folk psychology is a
theory - but this would empty eliminative materialism of virtually all significance. If
eliminative materialism amounts to no more than mere sentential eliminativism, it
ought to be eliminated: the claim that there are no sentences in the head is endorsed by
proponents of widely varying positions in philosophy of mind - including, inter alia,
Cartesian dualists - so that the position is not materialist, and is only eliminative in a
trivial sense.
Churchland must thus endorse intentional eliminativism, if the eliminative materialist
thesis is to be sustained. Sentential eliminativism and theory-theory jointly entail
intentional eliminativism. [4] As these two positions are individually necessary and
jointly sufficient for intentional eliminativism, so intentional eliminativism entails the
two positions. Unlike mere sentential eliminativism, intentional eliminativism is a bona
fide form of eliminative materialism, as it thus entails the claims that the sentential
descriptions of folk psychology constitute a theory, and that the theory is deficient, on
account of the non-existence of its ontology.
As it stands, intentional eliminativism is a purely negative thesis. There are various
strengths of intentional eliminativism: at the most modest extreme (what I will term
'merely pedantic intentional eliminativism'), the claim will be that strictly speaking,
folk psychological categories ought not to be employed - or at least ought not to be
employed by science, as they are less accurate than we would wish. [5] At the other
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extreme (what I will term 'radical intentional eliminativism'), the claim is that folk
psychological categories are fundamentally misleading, and must be expunged as soon
as future scientific development permits. The intentional eliminativist position is
presented in Churchland's seminal essay 'Eliminative Materialism and the
Propositional Attitudes', which predates his work on PDP.:
... any declarative sentence to which a speaker would give confident assent is
merely a one-dimensionalprojection - through the compound lens ofWernicke's
and Broca's areas onto the idiosyncratic surface of the speaker's language - a one
dimensional projection ofafour- or five-dimensional solid that is an element in
his true kinematical state ... being projections of that inner reality, such sentences
do carry significant information ... and are thus fit to function as elements in a
communication system.(emphasis mine)[6]
If we consider the issue in PDP terms, then the question at issue is that of the
'distance' in abstract vector space between folk psychological explanation, and a
putatively superior explanation which might ultimately be available. Ifmerely pedantic
intentional eliminativism is hypothesised, then the distance is negligible. In this case,
the distinction between sentential and intentional eliminativism is also negligible: both
agree that there are no sentences in the head (intentional eliminativism entails
sentential eliminativism); the latter will, unlike the former, incorporate the claim that
folk psychology is a theory, but the prototypes proprietorial to the more favoured PDP
theory will be 'close to' those of folk psychology. [7]
Merely pedantic intentional eliminativism is thus the mildest form of eliminativism, as it
is the most modest position consistent with the eliminative materialist claims that folk
psychology is a theory, and that it is a candidate for elimination on account of its being
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a misleading theory, and hence potentially open to replacement by a superior theory.
Churchland sets out what could be construed as being a merely pedantic position in
'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes, where he considers the
possibility of a complete replacement of folk psychology:
... it is not inconceivable that some segment of the population ... should become
intimately familiar with the vocabulary required to characterise our kinematical
states, learn the laws governing their interactions and behavioural projections,
acquire a facility in their first-person ascription, and displace the use of [folk
psychology] altogether ...[8]
On this scenario, natural language, together with its syntactic forms and semantic
categories, remains intact. In fact, this form of eliminativism is - consistent with its
potentially merely pedantic status - remarkably conservative, as it will accommodate
rationality, normativity, and the first-person perspective, all of which are alluded to in
passing at this point in the essay. [9] All that is eliminated is the proprietary
terminology and 'laws' of folk psychology. But, given that rationality is retained, the
position must be conservative in further respects. To be rational - as this is conceived
in folk psychological terms - is to formulate judgements and act in such a way as to
maximise the consistency of one's actions and judgements with one's beliefs and
desires. If we are to retain a conception of rationality, then it is difficult to see how we
may deviate very far from this account. If we may continue to use natural language,
but to allude to vectorial transformations as the basis for rational action, then these
vectorial processes must be closely analogous to the deductive processes attributed by
the folk psychologist to Pylyshyn's woman in the burning building. The merely
pedantic formulation of intentional eliminativism would hold that entities similar to
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beliefs and desires are operative in the rational decision of Pylyshyn's woman to flee
the burning building (though actual description of her internal processes in these terms
is misleading, strictly speaking). The similarity would reside in the fact that the actual
states in the woman's brain encode content. Churchland could thus avoid the
'stimulus-responsish' problem: the woman's action is not a mere tropism, as she is
responding to this content which is encoded in her brain. The encoding doesn't take
the form of a mental sentence of the form parodically alluded to by Stich: '...a tiny
television monitor or CRT [in the head] ... with thousands of English sentences
displayed on the screen'.[10] But what is in the head may be, for instrumentalistic
purposes, accurately described as being 'a belief that she is in imminent danger' - so
that the fact that there is no sentence in her head of the form 'I am in imminent danger'
does not serve to undermine the use of such natural language descriptions of internal
cognitive states. The fact that we can retain our self-conception as rational beings (and
hence as moral agents) is a clear strength of merely pedantic intentional eliminativism.
The fact that it is merely 'not inconceivable' that some segment of the population
should master the seemingly enormous (and surely pointless) task of learning how to
describe the neural processes and states which subserve the woman's action in
deciding to flee, seems to underline the modesty of the eliminativism here on offer.
Ifwhat is really in the head is so close to the ontology of folk psychology (assuming
that folk psychology has an ontology) as to accommodate rationality, then folk
psychology cannot be seriously erroneous in its attribution of propositional attitudes in
accounting for that rationality: the distance between folk psychology and the location
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of what will become its superior replacement cannot be great, and the revolution is
extremely limited. Merely pedantic intentional eliminativism is a form of eliminative
materialism which Churchland would himself wish to eliminate. Given that theoretical
replacement involves the discarding of some of the displaced theory (those elements
which are not reduced by the successor), the question then is how much of folk
psychology will survive. On the merely pedantic eliminativist account, a great deal
would survive. For if it were to be endorsed, then folk psychology would, on this
account, have a status comparable to that ofNewtonian physics. While Einsteinian
physics is a better theory, and Newton's is false in certain key respects (e.g. the
relationship between space and time); Newton's theory is still taught in physics
departments, and Newton is still revered as one of the precursors of an intellectual
revolution which spawned, among other things, the modern social sciences. Indeed, it
is consistent with Churchland's model that Einstein's theory awaits a similar fate. But
a comparable status for folk psychology cannot be an outcome which Churchland will
find congenial: his characterisation of folk psychology tends to be more in terms of
medieval theories ofwitches and phlogiston - theories which were fundamentally
inaccurate. Radical intentional eliminativism is, in fact, the motivation behind
Churchland's entire eliminative materialist project:
the real motive behind eliminative materialism is the worry that the "propositional"
kinematics and "logical" dynamics of folk psychology constitute a radicallyfalse
account of the cognitive activity of humans ... the worry is that our folk conception
of how cognitive creatures represent the world (by propositional attitudes) and
perform computations over these representations (by drawing sundry forms of
inference from one to another) is a thoroughgoing ^^representation of what really
takes place inside us. (emphases in original) [11]
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While Churchland might wish to see merely pedantic intentional eliminativism
eliminated as a candidate position in theory of mind, non-eliminativists will likely
regard the position as fatuous: probably no-one will claim that the
propositional-attitude ascriptions of folk psychology are a literal and exhaustive
account of what is going on in the head of Pylyshyn's woman. Jerry Fodor, whose
'language of thought' thesis is perhaps the most conspicuous target of (full-blooded)
intentional eliminativism, presents what seems to be a rather tentative account of the
description of internal cognitive reality which propositional attitude ascriptions
present:
Claim 1 (the nature of propositional attitudes):
For any organism O, and any attitude^ toward the proposition P, there
is a ('computational'/'functional') relation R and a mental representation
MP such that
MP means that P, and
O has A iff O bears R to MP. [12]
Fodor commits himself to this position using appropriately cautious language: '[this
theory is] ... ontologically committed to the attitudes and ... in my view [it] is quite
probably approximately true(my emphasis)[13]
Fodor thus does not take propositional-attitude ascriptions to be literal and exhaustive
as an account of what is going on in the head, and so may regard the merely pedantic
form of intentional eliminativism with equanimity. The merely pedantic version of
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intentional eliminativism may thus be safely ignored: it is far too conservative of folk
psychology for Churchland to wish to endorse it, and it eliminates nothing which
protagonists of folk psychology will likely wish to preserve. In short, as a possible
theory of mind, it ought to be eliminated. [14]
While friends of folk psychology such as Fodor may regard merely pedantic versions
of eliminative materialism with equanimity, Churchland's claim above that the
motivation for the version of eliminative materialism which he will endorse is 'the
worry that the "propositional" kinematics and "logical" dynamics of folk psychology
constitute a radicallyfalse account of the cognitive activity of humans', will not be so
regarded. Any version of eliminative materialism which retains rationality must thereby
retain content: if the 'spontaneous' behaviour to which Churchland alludes is not based
on PDP states in the brain which are representational states, then eliminative
materialism entails a radical reassessment of our self-conception. This is the scenario
which Fodor has in mind when he comments that:
if commonsense intentional psychology were really to collapse, that would be,
beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our
species. [15]
There appears to be no stable position between merely pedantic intentional
eliminativism and this catastrophic scenario. If rationality is to be retained, then at
most eliminativists can claim that the falsity of folk psychology resides in its false claim
that there are sentences in the head, and that what goes on in the head during
cognition is computation over these sentences. The positive thesis of eliminative
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materialism - if it is to retain rationality - must be that while there are no such
sentential entities, and cognitive processing is thus not via sententially-based
computation, the actual kinematics and dynamics of the brain preserve the truth of the
claim that the woman flees the building because she smells smoke, perceives herself to
be in imminent danger, and, in order to save herself, flees the building. But here the
'logical dynamics' of folk psychology are being preserved in the putatively more
accurate account - so that eliminative materialism collapses into mere sentential
eliminativism, combined with scientistic pedantry. If, on the other hand, the
eliminativist's positive thesis is to avoid the 'merely pedantic' objection, then it must
deliver on Churchland's promise of a radically different kinematics and dynamics. But
if the dynamics of the new model are non-logical, then rationality (and thus freedom
and morality) are ipso facto eliminated along with the propositional kinematics and
logical dynamics intrinsic to folk psychology. Given that his central task is
proto-scientific speculation, Churchland's position is inevitably subject to considerable
uncertainty, but the absence of any stable position between the (eliminable) merely
pedantic, and the (catastrophic) radical intentional eliminativism seems to answer what
Churchland presents as an 'open question':
'we have here a novel paradigm ... whose kinematics and dynamics are radically
different from that displayed in folk psychology. Whether it will prove capable of
in some way reducing the familiar taxonomy of propositional attitudes is still an
open question, but I am inclined to skepticism ... what this means is [that] ... we
have a faltering old theory under siege by a new and more promising theory with
an orthogonal categorial structure. That is why some of us anticipate the eventual
elimination of our folk psychological ontology. [ 16]
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It isn't clear what are the implications of the elimination of the ontology of folk
psychology - but the 'catastrophic' fear seems initially borne out, when Churchland
goes on to discuss 'truth' and 'reference' as possible candidate components of folk
psychology's ontology. The extent to which a non-pedantic form of eliminativism is
'catastrophic' is a moot point. As we have already seen, Churchland, in his recent The
Engine ofReason, the Seat of the Soul, is concerned to sustain a position which is
simultaneously radical and conservative: a revolution in our self-conception is in
prospect, and yet we will retain our freedom, capacity for moral choice, and
consciousness. In response to the fact that many of its critics within the philosophical
profession have regarded eliminative materialism as risible, precisely due to the
perception that it proposes the catastrophic elimination of, inter alia, truth, belief, and
consciousness, the Churchlands are similarly conservative in her essay 'Do We
Propose to Eliminate Consciousness?':
for the record, what eliminativist claims come to is essentially this: As science
advances, certain "natural" categories that figured in an earlier theory turn out to
have no role and no place in the replacing theory ... to put not too fine a point on
it, the world is as it is; theories come and go, and the world remains the
same. So theory modification does not entail that the nature of the world itself is
modified ipso facto. It is our understanding of the nature of the world that gets
modified. [17]
As it stands, it would be difficult to find fault with this commonsensical distinction
between the elimination of some particular theory of consciousness, and the
elimination of consciousness per .ve [18] The key question is whether such a
radical-yet-conservative option is sustainable. Similarly, Paul Churchland will seek to
eliminate, not truth and reference per se, but rather the prototypes for truth and
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reference which are proprietorial to folk psychology, and thus part of the ontology of
this radically false theory. Thus Churchland confirms that:
I am entirely willing to let go these notions, and to try to replace them with more
penetrating evaluative/ semantical notions. [19]
The question must be whether it is coherent to argue for a 'successor concept' to truth
which will both satisfy the radical aim of eliminating all of the detritus of the failed folk
psychology, and yet simultaneously satisfy the conservative aim of retaining any of the
characteristics of a concept which would be recognisably a concept of truth. [20] We
cannot (currently) say in virtue of what this successor conception of truth is a
conception of truth. Why, then, ought we to accept the possibility of such a
development? When confronted by Putnam's objection that this is a mere 'gleam in
Churchland's eye'[21], Churchland appears to miss Putnam's point:
'this is a serious mistake. A new kinematics and dynamics has been under vigorous
exploration for roughly seven or eight years ...[22]
The availablity of an alternative account of the brain's kinematics and dynamics is
consistent with merely pedantic intentional eliminativism: the conventional account of
truth being retained, but truth being a relationship entered into by elements other than
sentences, and preserved by a syntax other than computations over sentences. In
missing the point of Putnam's objection, and shifting the focus of attention to progress
in recent PDP research, Churchland appears to give the impression that discovery of a
replacement concept is imminent.
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There are no clear grounds for believing that there is a stable position between mere
pedantry, and the catastrophic outcome raised by Fodor. When called upon to provide
assurance that our conventional concepts of basic features of our mental lives such as
consciousness and rationality are false, but that satisfactory replacement concepts
which will preserve the underlying phenomena are a principled possibility, both
Churchlands resort to mere affirmation that this is indeed the case - coupled with
irrelevant allusion to the claimed progress to date achieved by PDP research. Even if
we are to subscribe to the epistemology which sustains eliminative materialism, so that
we reject the claim that it is analytic that rationality must involve content, and that, as
content must be at least describable via natural language, so (at most) merely pedantic
eliminative materialism is possible if there is to be the retention of rationality, it is still
mere scientistic optimism which sustains the claim that there is a stable position
between pedantry and catastrophe.
Once this is conceded, the scope for a sustainable form of eliminative materialism
seems extremely tenuous. I have earlier argued that both mere sentential, and merely
pedantic intentional, eliminativism ought both to be eliminated. The Churchlands
themselves accept the case for elimination of catastrophic eliminativism, which would
eliminate truth, rationality, morality, consciousness - and via these eliminations,
philosophy (and the Churchlands themselves).
Once every other possible eliminativist position is itself eliminated on account of its
being either non-eliminative (sentential eliminativism), too modest to be taken
seriously (merely pedantic intentional eliminativism), or too extreme to be taken
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seriously (catastrophic eliminativism), the remaining position - the precarious point
somewhere midway between the pedantic and the catastrophic - is exposed for the
implausible position that it is. In order to avoid being eliminated with the pedantic
version, it must be radical (and so must eliminate significant parts of folk psychology's
ontology); in order to avoid being eliminated with the catastrophic version, it must
sustain recognisable concepts of truth, rationality, freedom, morality and
consciousness. But the claim that some concept of, for example, rationality, could be
too different from our procrustean, conventional notion of rationality to be captured,
even inaccurately, by natural language and its employment of folk psychological
categories - yet still be a replacement for rationality - is presented as an article of faith
rather than as a demonstrable 'truth'. Once again, 'the epistemology that makes
eliminative materialism possible' is pressed into service in defence of an implausible
eliminativist claim: on this occasion, it does so by rejecting the analytic/ synthetic
distinction on which the counter-intuition will rest. This scientistic faith is the
inevitable recourse for Churchland, given his epistemological position, his elimination
of the alternative eliminativist positions, and his insistence on the theory-theory. As
Putnam - himself a defender of an epistemological position at least very similar to
Churchland's - suggests:
If I know that you know that the bus to work stops at the corner of Bartlett
Avenue, and that you know that that is the nearest stop to your house, and that
you dislike walking very far in the cold, I will naturally expect that if you decide to
take the bus to work on a cold morning, you will wait for it at the corner of
Bartlett Avenue. [23]
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This is so clearly true - and so mundane in its simplicity - that it is surely beyond
serious doubt. But - as Putnam goes on to insist:
... the failure to find a series ofscientifically describable events in the brain ...
which correspond point by point to the steps in [this] ... practical syllogism ... does
not involv[e] a commitment to a categorical structure which is incompatible with
... that of brain science. [24]
It is the commitment to the claim that folk psychology is a theory which compels
Churchland to insist, implausibly, upon the possibility of an alternative,
non-propositional account of this sequence of rational behaviour which satisfies the
seemingly impossible conditions of being both radical and conservative in the ways
already set out in this chapter. Were he to renounce the theory-theory claim, then he
could retain the claim that there are no sentences in the head, based upon PDP
research to date, combined with the claim that the human brain is analogous to the
mine detector, and sustain the conservative position that rationality and the other
central features of our mental lives are beyond scientific disproof - by claiming that
Putnam's account of the individual who waits for the bus is, as presented by Putnam, a
psychological truism - but one which is subserved by a complex PDP process in the
brain, rather than by computations over sentences inside the head. The (roughly
accurate, and predictively adequate) natural language account presented by Putnam
implies no commitment to actual sentences in the head, or their manipulation in
thought.
What prevents this solution, and compels the untenable position which Churchland
actually occupies is that such a position is not eliminativist: unless folk psychology is a
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theory, it is not a candidate for elimination, and so eliminative materialism fails. As his
commitment to theory-theory, and his need to steer a course between eliminativisms
which are either eliminable on account of their weakness, or eliminable on account of
their implausible radicalism, leads Churchland to this untenable position, I conclude
that eliminative materialism ought itself to be eliminated.
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[1] The radical synoptic claim could thus be argued to be false on one of two
grounds: either that physicalism is false, and that a (possibly PDP) brain operates in
conjunction with a non-physical mind; or that the brain is not an exclusively PDP
system. This latter claim could acknowledge the plausibility of the claim that
perception is via vectorial transformations from the sensory input level, but deny, for
example, that, qua cognitive procedure, explanation is, as Churchland claims, an
exclusively PDP procedure.
[2] Lynne Rudder Baker, 'Eliminativism and an Argument from Science' in Mind
and Language, Vol. 8 No. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 182.
[3] It is difficult to see what would count as evidence that a machine was
conscious - but this is not of itself sufficient to refute the claim that a conscious
machine is empirically possible.
[4] The claim that folk psychology is a theory entails the claim that folk
psychology has a proprietory ontology: sentences in the head are the theoretical
entities of folk psychology qua theory (this is a reconstruction of Churchland's
position). It is thus the case that if the central claim of sentential eliminativism is true,
and there are no sentences in the head, then the propositional attitude attributions of
folk psychological practice allude to theoretical entities which do not exist (as did
medieval witch theories). At the very least there is thus scope for being misleading in
employing such attributions, so that at the very least there is a case for what I refer to
in this chapter as 'merely pedantic intentional eliminativism'.
[5] In the absence of a PDP-based alternative mode of description for states
currently characterised as, for example, 'believing that Churchland has a good case',
then we have no alternative but to state that such folk psychological formulations are
'less accurate than we would wish'.
[6] Paul M. Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes',
in his A Neurocomputational Perspective - The Nature ofMind and the Structure of
Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989, p. 18. (This essay originally published in
the Journal ofPhilosophy 78 (1981); reprinted as chapter 1 of his 1989 collection.
Page references in this chapter are to the latter.).
[7] It must be conceded, however, that this seems implausible, given that the folk
psychological formulation is a 'one dimensional projection' of what is in fact a 'four-
or five-dimensional solid'. Churchland's inability to embrace merely pedantic
eliminativism is further underlined by the fact that in the Neurocomputational
Perspective version of the essay, he usefully adds 1989 comments throughout the by
then eight-year old original text. At this point in the exposition Churchland adds that
'this guess (i.e. the guess that the relationship would be of a one-dimensional
projection of a four- or five-dimensional solid)... has proved to be very timid. The
relevant cognitive statespaces typically have hundreds, thousands, or even millions of
distinct dimensions, and their partitioning into hypersolids is correspondingly
complex'. ('Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', p. 17).
Churchland's commitment to the radical synoptic claim for PDP further commits him
to a correspondingly radical intentional eliminativism.
[8] Paul M. Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes',
p. 18.
[9] Churchland suggests that we must 'transcend the poverty of [folk
psychology's] conception of rationality by transcending its propositional kinematics
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entirely' (op. cit., p. 16); and that folk psychology's declarative sentences ... 'are unfit
to represent the deeper reality in all its kinematically, dynamically, and even
normatively relevant aspects' (my emphasis) (p. 18).
[10] Stephen P. Stich, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science - The Case
Against Belief, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1983, p.36.
[11] Paul M. Churchland, 'Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes: How
the Brain Represents Reality', Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, Vol. LII,
No. 2, June 1992, p.420.
[12] Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics - The Problem ofMeaning in the Philosophy
ofMind, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987, p. 17
[13] Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics, p. 16.
[14] It may seem surprising that Fodor can, on my account, be sanguine about
merely pedantic intentional eliminativism, given that this position is - unlike mere
sentential eliminativism - consistent with the central claim of eliminative materialism (a
claim which Fodor, as a theory dualist, must reject). In his essay 'Varieties of
Eliminativism' (in Mind and Language, Vol.8, No.2), Andy Clark suggests that
Fodor's language of thought is what is eliminated by mere sentential eliminativism.
Fodor's position is that the causal processing in the brain of the physical states which
are the mental representations, will preserve the syntactical relationships of natural
language. As the mental representations preserve the semantics of natural language,
there is thus a de facto 'language of thought'. This is a much more elaborate claim
than Stich's tiny television screens. But Fodor can retain his language of thought, and
hence reject a version of mere sentential eliminativism which proposes the elimination
of natural-language-syntax-in-the-head, while nonetheless accepting the extremely
weak merely pedantic intentional eliminativist claim that propositional attitude
ascriptions don't convey the full story of what is going on while this syntactic
procedure is actually operative.
[15] Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics, p.xii.
[16] Paul M. Churchland, 'Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes',
p.421.
[17] Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland, 'Do We Propose to
Eliminate Consciousness?', in Robert N. McCauley (ed.) The Churchlands and their
Critics, Blackwell, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1996, p.297.
[18] Rather disappointingly, the Churchlands do not avail themselves of the
opportunity here to provide an alternative account of consciousness. The suspicion
remains that, as the endorsement of radical eliminativism must entail the elimination of
the irreducibly subjective, so the claim that consciousness is not to be eliminated must
either entail the falsity of radical eliminativism, or some as-yet undiscovered account of
consciousness which is fundamentally distinct from our conventional account, but
which nonetheless preserves consciousness.
[19] Paul M. Churchland, 'Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes',
p.422. This appears to be a clear case of what Andy Clark has referred to as
Churchland's 'dealing in futures' (Andy Clark, 'Dealing in Futures: Folk Psychology
and the Role of Representations in Cognitive Science', in Robert N. McCauley (ed.),
The Churchlands and their Critics (Blackwell, Cambridge Mass., 1996). My objection
is that Churchland need not make the attempt to find 'more penetrating' semantical
notions. To be semantical is to be characterisable in terms of content, so that any such
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successor notion would be incompatible with intentional eliminativism - and hence
incompatible with eliminative materialism. As with qualia, freedom, and normativity,
the claim that what I have referred to as a 'radical -yet-conservative' option is
sustainable in principle is false - and this falsity is, pace Churchland's post-Quinean
epistemological stance, demonstrable a priori.
[20] The same claim stands for rationality, consciousness, and all other aspects of
our mental lives currently infected by their conception via the categories of folk
psychology.
[21] Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.,
1988, p. 110.
[22] Paul M. Churchland, 'Activation Vectors versus Propositional Attitudes',
p.420.
[23] Hilary Putnam, 'Truth, Activation Vectors and Possession Conditions for
Concepts', in Philosophy andPhenomenological Research, Vol. LII, No. 2, June
1992 , p.439.
[24] op. cit., p.440.
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